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Blockchain voting is how we get a world where no one trusts the results of elections because very few people have the knowledge and experience to understand and
by heavyset_go 5y ago
Blockchain voting is how we get a world where no one trusts the results of elections because very few people have the knowledge and experience to understand and audit such a system.
Should an election be called into question, suddenly the public must rely on only a handful of oracles that can interpret the votes and assure everyone that everything is fine because of "crypto" and "blockchains".
With paper voting, anyone who can count can participate in a recount or audit. In comparison, there are multitudes more experts who can audit an election via paper votes.
> Over the long term, insisting on paper permanently would be a huge handicap to our ability to make voting better. One vote per N years is a 250-year-old form of democracy, and we can have much better democracy if voting were much more convenient and simpler, so that we could do it much more often.
I'm not willing to sacrifice trust and the easy ability to verify elections, or hand control of democracy over to technologists, just so we can vote via apps on our phones.
- tshaddox 5y agoOf all the complaints about blockchain voting this seems to me like one of the least valid ones. People don't have the slightest clue how traditional vote counting and recount procedures work until sometimes goes wrong and it makes the news, and at that point it's literally impossible for the average citizen to do any form of auditing whatsoever.
- heavyset_go 5y ago> People don't have the slightest clue how traditional vote counting and recount procedures work until sometimes goes wrong and it makes the news And yet we can pull almost anyone off the street from both sides of the political aisle to participate in a non-partisan recount or audit and have it work out, which is what happens. We can't do that with blockchains.
- tshaddox 5y agoSure, but it's still a tiny portion of people who can be chosen to count the votes, and each one can only verify that they themselves have counted accurately.
- heavyset_go 5y agoI think there's value in the fact that voting is transparent enough that anyone can verify elections. There's also value in "John Doe from church and my cousin helped with the recount" versus "Three top 'experts' say it's fine, but I heard two of them work for Facebook!" or "We just have to trust what Palantir's consultants say."
- nuerow 5y ago> Sure, but it's still a tiny portion of people who can be chosen to count the votes The counting process is open to any interested party, and more importantly the ballots are made available to any group interested in auditing them. > and each one can only verify that they themselves have counted accurately. What part do you believe might be missing?
- tshaddox 5y agoWhat do you mean? I’m pretty sure a random citizen cannot just ask for millions of ballots and count all of them. When you help counting, you’re only counting a tiny portion of the ballots.
- jltsiren 5y agoThat may be true in the US today, but other countries have voting systems that are easier to understand and more transparent. Let's take a reasonable threat model. The society is heavily fractured. Not in an inconsequential way as in the US today, but more like Europe between the world wars. Communism and fascism were mainstream, and there was a credible threat of a civil war. (Not to mention a fair number of actual civil wars.) Consider an average voter who does not trust the election authorities or the companies providing hardware and software for the elections. Maybe they are a communist who assumes that every major tech company is on the other side and actively trying to tamper with the elections. If the elections are actually run in a (mostly) fair manner, will that person trust the results? That happened many times in the early 20th century Europe. People who had no reason to trust the elections still believed in the legitimacy of the results, which probably prevented civil wars.
- acdha 5y ago> People don't have the slightest clue how traditional vote counting and recount procedures work until sometimes goes wrong and it makes the news Is that really the case? It seems far more common that the problem isn’t that people don’t understand how it works but is rather that they don’t like the result and pick that as an excuse. When evaluating a proposed new system, we have to think about it outside of contexts where everyone is acting in good faith — the current system survived hundreds of challenges because it’s simple, robust, and anyone can understand how it works and that cheating would require moving millions of pieces of paper in locations around the country, which is very hard to conceal. Try to think about how a complex digital system would offer new avenues for complaint to the same well-funded attackers whose claims are not constrained by facts or reason. As we’ve already seen, even if the new part was perfectly implemented all they’d do is shift to where it interfaces with the real world (“I hit A and it changed it to B!”, “These people weren’t eligible to vote and I just know they voted for the other guy”, etc.). Since it wouldn’t be perfect, it would just afford new angles for misrepresenting things to a willing audience – as we saw with those fake “pcaps” or claims that China was connecting to the voting machine servers.
- 6gvONxR4sf7o 5y agoHell, people have trouble understanding IRV voting. People even get confused by approval voting. The ceiling is low here.
- new_guy 5y agoIf someone is too stupid to understand how voting works, they probably shouldn't be allowed to vote in the first place.
- whitepaint 5y ago> very few people What!? There are 40 M developers worldwide. If you're developer, you can definitely learn how to read a public database. Faking results on a public database is IMPOSSIBLE.
- 6gvONxR4sf7o 5y agoImpossible? That’s a huge leap. Assuming lots of things are implemented as stated, and done so without crucial bugs, maybe. But neither of those things are impossible to mess up.
- darawk 5y ago> Blockchain voting is how we get a world where no one trusts the results of elections because very few people have the knowledge and experience to understand and audit such a system. You mean as opposed to the current system that so many people understand and audit?
- heavyset_go 5y ago> You mean as opposed to the current system that so many people understand and audit? Yes, we already have a trust problem with one of the simplest methods of voting, and the implication is that mathematical obfuscation via cryptography and blockchains can make the trust problem even worse.
- mewpmewp2 5y agoRealistically how often lay people who distrust the system currently audit the votes?
- heavyset_go 5y agoThe last election had volunteers from both sides of the aisle count votes, while a ton of normal people watched them as observers. Last year, we saw a lot of Trump supporters who were convinced the election was stolen act as election observers. The process is easy for them to engage in, as well as to observe, because they're literally just counting votes. Anyone can observe and see for themselves that nothing nefarious is going on, and they don't need to be experts to do so.
- darawk 5y ago> The last election had volunteers from both sides of the aisle count votes, while a ton of normal people watched them as observers. Last year, we saw a lot of Trump supporters who were convinced the election was stolen act as election observers. The process is easy for them to engage in, as well as to observe, because they're literally just counting votes. Anyone can observe and see for themselves that nothing nefarious is going on, and they don't need to be experts to do so. And how did all that work out for public trust in elections? The problem here is that, even if you personally can go validate your local election, anyone can just claim the fraud was somewhere else. A cryptographic voting system allows any citizen to validate the entire election. The value of this is very significant. Right now a right wing website can just claim say, the CA elections were riddled with fraud. The only way to even approach "disproving" that is to request data from the city/state officials...who those people do not trust in the first place. A publicly auditable voting system would short circuit all of those issues. It doesn't need to be interpretable to every single person. What it does need to have is no specific plausible fraud narrative. Right now Trump et al can simply claim ballot stuffing, or any number of other kinds of fraud. Disproving that requires access to records that most people cannot obtain, and so the narrative can retain credibility for those disposed to believing it. It's true that most people will not understand the cryptography underlying an auditable voting system, but they don't need to. In order for someone to implant a fraud narrative, they will need to come up with an explanation for how the fraud occurred. Once they do that, it will be relatively straightforward to debunk those narratives in a clear way, that, critically, does not rely on faith in trusted third parties.
- SXX 5y agoProblem isn't just in ease to audit. Biggest advantage of paper voting is that whole system require a lot of people to participate in orgnization and control over the process. It's a great way to make people really care about politics. And for people who vote when you have to physically come to vote it's not only require effort, but also motivate their peers and family to do the same. And it's good starter of real world political discussion. On other side if voting made low effort and truly remote and anonymous then it's will degrade people's involvment in process even more. PS: Good podcast episode about how social networks decrease people's involvment in real world politics: Hidden Brain: Passion Isn't Enough https://podcasts.apple.com/us/podcast/passion-isnt-enough/id1028908750?i=1000536809823 https://podcasts.apple.com/us/podcast/passion-isnt-enough/id...
- fastball 5y agoYou counting some tiny subset of the votes is not an audit. There is not a single person on earth who could audit an entire federal election on their own. There are multitude people because you need multitude people. I could audit an election in the blockchain tomorrow.
- nuerow 5y ago> You counting some tiny subset of the votes is not an audit. We, it actually is. Audits serve to verify the results from one or more constituencies. Unless you somehow believe that each and every constituency has bee tampered with, you focus your attention onto the "tiny subset" that you deemed questionable. > There is not a single person on earth who could audit an entire federal election on their own. There are multitude people because you need multitude people. I don't understand why you feel that's relevant. An election involves public participation, and the goal is to ensure the public that the process is fair and reliable. If enough people find that the results are not reliable in any way then they are able to verify it themselves. If however only half a dozen voters in a universe of a few hundred thousand voters disagree with the result, and the vast majority of the electorate doesn't agree with the half dozen sceptics, then where's the value in it? I mean, this whole hypothetical scenario relies on the assumption that a party/candidate that has a sizeable support is somehow not able or interested in verifying election results, but a single isolated individual is?
- fastball 5y ago> If enough people find that the results are not reliable in any way then they are able to verify it themselves The whole point is that they can't. They need to rely on other people to verify the results. They cannot "verify it themselves". > hypothetical scenario relies on The hypothetical scenario relies on wanting the benefits of digital voting (of which there are many) without the major downside (of which there is one). A publicly verifiable ledger gives you the benefits of digital without the major downside, which is that generally with anything digital you can commit fraud at scale.
- acdha 5y ago> I could audit an election in the blockchain tomorrow. No, you could confirm that a set of electronic records was internally consistent. That is only a small part of an election audit: you'd also need to confirm that only eligible voters voted a single time each and that their vote was recorded the way they intended. Needing a multitude of people is a security advantage of the current system: it means that any attempts at cheating need a ton of people, from both parties and the local government, to collude together because there's no way to automate changing thousands of paper ballots and the corresponding seals — the real world doesn't have an “UPDATE votes SET …” shortcut. Contrast that with a blockchain system: when it's challenged, you're in one of two situations. If all you have are electronic records, you've just reinvented the Diebold scandals of the 2000s where you're trying to assess how much you can believe that a complex software system does not contain a bug or exploitable flaw because there's no solid proof. If you use voter-validated paper ballots, you do a standard hand recount — and you don't need a blockchain at all because the thing providing security is the robust well-tested paper balloting system.
- jMyles 5y agoAlthough I agree with much of the thrust of your comment, and especially that complexity is best understood as a sacrifice of trust, I don't fully understand your qualm with respect to the difficulty of this particular type of audit. The paper ballot is like counting with an abacus: you need to actually witness the proceeding to be able to verify the accuracy of the result. A vote on a public ledger is easy to verify, even with an extremely rudimentary understanding of the technology, and the verification can be performed at any time in posterity.
- JanisErdmanis 5y agoA big problem with verification is that with it one needs to prove that the vote had come from a legitimate voter and that he had not voted at most once. If the proof for legitimacy is not part of the vote it may have been just inserted by the system.
- thaumasiotes 5y ago> With paper voting, anyone who can count can participate in a recount or audit. Auditing is generally impossible with paper voting. Not in principle, but it is incompatible in principle with anonymous ballots. When an explicit goal of the system is that it's impossible to answer the question "where did this come from?", an audit is dead before it starts. What would you think of an "audit" of a company that concluded, in full, "they have $15,000,000 of assets"?
- SXX 5y agoHow is audit implssible? Anonymous ballots are only hide who specific person voted for. All other information is possible to verify. Electoral roll exist, counting of people voted vs total number of ballots per area is possible, etc. Exit polls also exist. Yeah US have it's thing with vote-by-mail especially due to covid, but before that most of important data points were easy to audit.
- thaumasiotes 5y agoAnonymous ballots by their nature cannot be distinguished from fraudulent ballots. You can't verify that a particular ballot was ever cast, only that you have it now. You also can't verify that a ballot that was genuinely cast was cast by the same person listed on the voter roll. > Electoral roll exist, counting of people voted vs total number of ballots per area is possible, etc. Lyndon Johnson probably committed election fraud. There was no problem with the number of ballots. There was no problem with the electoral rolls. Vote counting is of course not an instantaneous process. It did happen that some votes for Johnson were discovered late. And it's interesting to note that the voters who cast them voted in alphabetical order. But that could be a coincidence. What if they'd voted in a different order, by a less lopsided margin? How would you audit the ballots? > Exit polls also exist. Considering the most recent news about exit polls is "they're diverging from the actual results and we aren't sure why", this isn't a very strong point.
- acdha 5y ago> You can't verify that a particular ballot was ever cast, only that you have it now. You also can't verify that a ballot that was genuinely cast was cast by the same person listed on the voter roll. There’s only one part of this which isn’t wrong. You can verify that the ballots were given to registered voters at a particular polling station where they were sealed, transported securely, and tallied without the seals being broken – these days, all with video surveillance except for the actual person filling out the ballot. The current system does that with a mix of bipartisan volunteers and government workers, making it hard to tamper with unless you have a truly massive conspiracy which manages to avoid revealing any trace of its existence. The only thing you can’t do is say that person A voted for candidate B, because that would guarantee attempts at coercion.