7 ms·

> This seems like a weird take, but maybe I don't understand. Are you saying that the other parties are equally at fault for failing to prevail in negotiation a

> This seems like a weird take, but maybe I don't understand. Are you saying that the other parties are equally at fault for failing to prevail in negotiation against the unions? Well, first, we've not actually been discussing any specifics about arbitration. The most specific we've been is acknowledging that arbitration is a point of failure, and that police unions are involved in negotiating over the arbitration framework. Neither of those things points explicitly to police unions as a point of blame. For example, arbitration problems often stem from lack of evidence, lack of consistency in application, and lack of increased punishment for repeat problem officers; none of these problems are directly related to the contracts negotiated by police unions (obviously they are indirectly related). Blaming police unions, simply because they represent officers, which is their mandate, is an oversimplification. Additionally, systems like arbitration, or the arbitration framework contract negotiation, is predicated on the idea that both interested parties represent their position adequately, in good faith, and without conflict of interests (among other things); this is not always the case, but is the side that is representing their position adequately and in good faith (i.e. police unions, making it harder to fire "good" officers) to blame? Another example, in other terms, many people are punished unnecessarily by judicial systems because of inadequate defense (i.e. ineffective assistance of counsel), but is the prosecutor always to blame? It's not that other parties are necessarily at fault for failing in negotiation, but that assumes that those parties adequately represented their interests (in this case, one of those interests would be the public interest), which is certainly not a given. > I am not claiming that unions are a net detriment to police union workers, simply that there are tradeoffs. With this in mind, I guess I should've rephrased my initial question. I should've said "can you provide some insight into how police unions work poorly for police officers generally (i.e. their members)?" Obviously there are cases where police unions (and other unions) work poorly for individuals, but I meant where they work poorly for their members overall. This is why I think your reply fails to fit my intended framing and I was rejecting the premise from that perspective.

s1artibartfast 5y ago
>Additionally, systems like arbitration, or the arbitration framework contract negotiation, is predicated on the idea that both interested parties represent their position adequately, in good faith, and without conflict of interests... IT sounds like you are more familiar with the termination arbitration process, and I cede that there are likely processes that the non-union parties could implement to make the process more effective. I do wonder the degree to which these processes are also battlegrounds for conflict and negotiation. You bring up the interesting topic of equal footing adversarial systems, particularly around the adequacy of representation. The point I find interesting is defining what constitutes adequate representation, and the impact of the base rules of adversarial systems. System design can be uneven and determines the relative power of each party to impose costs, implications of loss, and 'skin in the game'. Such differences go beyond the competence of counsel, or even resources available. A good example of system influence is negotiation between a prosecutor vs criminal defendant. For example, the law provides the prosecution huge systematic leverage in plea bargain negotiations. The defendant carries nearly all of the risk if negotiations fail, while the prosecution has relative risk and little at stake. I think there are analogs labor law, where there are a vast number of systemic factors involved in negotiations beyond union terms and the business cost to provide those terms (e.g. legal liability if an impasse is reached, restrictions on ability to source alternative labor, ect) >With this in mind, I guess I should've rephrased my initial question. I should've said "can you provide some insight into how police unions work poorly for police officers generally (i.e. their members)?" Obviously there are cases where police unions (and other unions) work poorly for individuals, but I meant where they work poorly for their members overall. This is why I think your reply fails to fit my intended framing and was rejecting the premise from that perspective. I think the simplest generally applicable failing is the retention of low performing or loose cannon officers. My understanding is that there are low performing individuals who are retained and make the job more difficult and less efficient for the rest of workers. There is a tradeoff between the ability of job security for all, and the ability to weed out such individuals that unions and their counterparties have been able to resolve. This does not preclude that the status quo may still present net benefit overall to general union members, or that the status quo is worse than the alternatives. That said, I do think the vast majority of unions work well for most of their members. Living in California, I wholeheartedly wish that public union counterparties were more effective in negotiations, and more effective stewards of the public funds, and the work quality provided by the unions.

s1artibartfast 5y ago

>Additionally, systems like arbitration, or the arbitration framework contract negotiation, is predicated on the idea that both interested parties represent their position adequately, in good faith, and without conflict of interests... IT sounds like you are more familiar with the termination arbitration process, and I cede that there are likely processes that the non-union parties could implement to make the process more effective. I do wonder the degree to which these processes are also battlegrounds for conflict and negotiation. You bring up the interesting topic of equal footing adversarial systems, particularly around the adequacy of representation. The point I find interesting is defining what constitutes adequate representation, and the impact of the base rules of adversarial systems. System design can be uneven and determines the relative power of each party to impose costs, implications of loss, and 'skin in the game'. Such differences go beyond the competence of counsel, or even resources available. A good example of system influence is negotiation between a prosecutor vs criminal defendant. For example, the law provides the prosecution huge systematic leverage in plea bargain negotiations. The defendant carries nearly all of the risk if negotiations fail, while the prosecution has relative risk and little at stake. I think there are analogs labor law, where there are a vast number of systemic factors involved in negotiations beyond union terms and the business cost to provide those terms (e.g. legal liability if an impasse is reached, restrictions on ability to source alternative labor, ect) >With this in mind, I guess I should've rephrased my initial question. I should've said "can you provide some insight into how police unions work poorly for police officers generally (i.e. their members)?" Obviously there are cases where police unions (and other unions) work poorly for individuals, but I meant where they work poorly for their members overall. This is why I think your reply fails to fit my intended framing and was rejecting the premise from that perspective. I think the simplest generally applicable failing is the retention of low performing or loose cannon officers. My understanding is that there are low performing individuals who are retained and make the job more difficult and less efficient for the rest of workers. There is a tradeoff between the ability of job security for all, and the ability to weed out such individuals that unions and their counterparties have been able to resolve. This does not preclude that the status quo may still present net benefit overall to general union members, or that the status quo is worse than the alternatives. That said, I do think the vast majority of unions work well for most of their members. Living in California, I wholeheartedly wish that public union counterparties were more effective in negotiations, and more effective stewards of the public funds, and the work quality provided by the unions.