> Your observation here really, I think, solves your own problem. It's not my problem; I am not a mathematical Platonist, so I have no issue at all with the id

> Your observation here really, I think, solves your own problem. It's not my problem; I am not a mathematical Platonist, so I have no issue at all with the idea that any claim about mathematical objects "existing" is simply in a different domain from claims about physical objects "existing". However, for someone who is a mathematical Platonist, there is a problem, because mathematical Platonism appears to be claiming that "exist" is not domain-specific. For example, the article under discussion formalizes the "existence" claim as "Ex Mx" (I don't have the backwards "E" on my keyboard), where "Mx" is the predicate "x is a mathematical object"--i.e., it separates the "existence" claim (the quantifier) from the "domain" claim (the predicate). This only makes sense if the quantifier is not domain-specific but general--i.e., if the quantifier is the same one for all possible domains, so that the existence claim is an absolute one. Which, as I noted in my previous comment, and as you appear to agree, is simply not how existential quantifiers in mathematics are supposed to work.