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I think you only regard that theory as "airtight" because you accept the premises of ontological naturalism. What you're basically saying is that it must be th

I think you only regard that theory as "airtight" because you accept the premises of ontological naturalism. What you're basically saying is that it must be this way, because there is no other way to for it to be. But it remains the case that there is exactly no evidence at all for the belief that consciousness is an emergent property of computation. Not some evidence -- no evidence.

ncmncm 5y ago
We know factually that there is computation, because we can observe it happening using wires inserted at the inputs and outputs. The burden is on people who insist there is something else besides computation. Thus far, no evidence means, exactly, no phenomenon, and nothing to be explained.
- sramsay 5y ago
  You may be right about where the burden lies, but your explanation renders the thermostat conscious. Edit: I should put that differently. Your sense of the criteria by which the problem may be considered solved does not preclude thermostat consciousness. And if that is allowed, then yes: the problem is solved. But I sense, again, the assumption of physicalism (or ontological naturalism), and I don't know why that premise admits of no dissent or argument.
  - ncmncm 5y ago
    When a term is undefined, any application of it is undecidable. Are you conscious? Is the thermostat? Y/Y, Y/N, N/Y, N/N are all equally valid conclusions.
    - sramsay 5y ago
      Would you accept the statement "If physicalism is true, then there is nothing here to explain." I'm not setting a trap. I'm just trying to clarify your position.
      - ncmncm 5y ago
        If physicalism is true, then there is nothing here to explain. If physicalism is not true, then there is nothing here to explain. Biologists used to talk about a "vital force". Alive things had it, dead things didn't. Now biology is mature enough to recognize that there is no such force. People chasing consciousness are in the position of the biologists who insisted, in the face of biochemistry, that there was still a vital force. There is a physical phenomenon: we observe people insisting there is such a thing as consciousness. Why do they do this? That is something an explanation could address. Not everybody insists. Are people who don't not conscious? What is common to everybody who insists, and also everybody they insist it about? They all observe themselves experiencing, and act on those observations. So, if there is anything to be defined, it is probably defined by that. We could make a machine that perceives, and perceives itself perceiving. If that machine would not be described by insisters as conscious, I would expect a reason why not.
- Jensson 5y ago
  We know there is computations done in the brain. We don't know whether this is sufficient to create a consciousness. Consciousness doesn't exist as a phenomena in physics, hence there is no scientific explanation how or when it would appear, saying it is an inherent property of computation is therefore nonsense. Humans just know it exists, that is all we can say, everything else is just pseudoscientific bullshit until we can properly tie consciousness to some physics phenomena. Or in another way, if you say "it is an inherent property of computation", then I'd counter "define computation in terms of laws of physics". You can't. Computation is as ill defined as consciousness from the laws of physics perspective.
  - sramsay 5y ago
    I understand what you mean when you say "pseudoscientific bullshit," but it might be better to simply say "non-scientific" in the sense of "beyond the ambit of what science is designed to explain." The problem of "being" (why there is something rather than nothing) is similar. It's not just that we don't have a physics explanation for why anything exists in the first place; it's that physics may not be able to answer that kind of question at all. None of that is necessarily "pseudoscience" or necessarily bullshit (though it's easy enough to find examples of both). I am skeptical of the circularity of the argument, though. There must be a "physics explanation" because physics explains everything. And we know that, because if physics can't explain it, it doesn't exist. And we know that, because physics explains everything. (Not accusing you in particular of making that argument . . .)
    - Jensson 5y ago
      Physics is the field of explaining everything in the universe. Therefore, if physics can't explain a phenomena we don't understand it, as physics is the ultimate explanation we have. I didn't say that if physics can't explain it then it doesn't exist, as you seem to think, just that if physics can't explain it then our understanding of the topic doesn't exist.
      - sramsay 5y ago
        No, no. I did not think you are saying that (that if physics doesn't explain something it doesn't exist). That's why I put in that last line. But now I'm actually not so sure. You seem to not admit of a category of things that physics can't explain. There are things it does not currently explain, things it has not yet explained, things it has explained wrongly, and things it may never explain as an historical matter. But not things it can't explain ("can't" in the sense of "is incapable of"). Do I have you right on that?

ncmncm 5y ago

We know factually that there is computation, because we can observe it happening using wires inserted at the inputs and outputs. The burden is on people who insist there is something else besides computation. Thus far, no evidence means, exactly, no phenomenon, and nothing to be explained.

sramsay 5y ago
You may be right about where the burden lies, but your explanation renders the thermostat conscious. Edit: I should put that differently. Your sense of the criteria by which the problem may be considered solved does not preclude thermostat consciousness. And if that is allowed, then yes: the problem is solved. But I sense, again, the assumption of physicalism (or ontological naturalism), and I don't know why that premise admits of no dissent or argument.
- ncmncm 5y ago
  When a term is undefined, any application of it is undecidable. Are you conscious? Is the thermostat? Y/Y, Y/N, N/Y, N/N are all equally valid conclusions.
  - sramsay 5y ago
    Would you accept the statement "If physicalism is true, then there is nothing here to explain." I'm not setting a trap. I'm just trying to clarify your position.
    - ncmncm 5y ago
      If physicalism is true, then there is nothing here to explain. If physicalism is not true, then there is nothing here to explain. Biologists used to talk about a "vital force". Alive things had it, dead things didn't. Now biology is mature enough to recognize that there is no such force. People chasing consciousness are in the position of the biologists who insisted, in the face of biochemistry, that there was still a vital force. There is a physical phenomenon: we observe people insisting there is such a thing as consciousness. Why do they do this? That is something an explanation could address. Not everybody insists. Are people who don't not conscious? What is common to everybody who insists, and also everybody they insist it about? They all observe themselves experiencing, and act on those observations. So, if there is anything to be defined, it is probably defined by that. We could make a machine that perceives, and perceives itself perceiving. If that machine would not be described by insisters as conscious, I would expect a reason why not.
Jensson 5y ago
We know there is computations done in the brain. We don't know whether this is sufficient to create a consciousness. Consciousness doesn't exist as a phenomena in physics, hence there is no scientific explanation how or when it would appear, saying it is an inherent property of computation is therefore nonsense. Humans just know it exists, that is all we can say, everything else is just pseudoscientific bullshit until we can properly tie consciousness to some physics phenomena. Or in another way, if you say "it is an inherent property of computation", then I'd counter "define computation in terms of laws of physics". You can't. Computation is as ill defined as consciousness from the laws of physics perspective.
- sramsay 5y ago
  I understand what you mean when you say "pseudoscientific bullshit," but it might be better to simply say "non-scientific" in the sense of "beyond the ambit of what science is designed to explain." The problem of "being" (why there is something rather than nothing) is similar. It's not just that we don't have a physics explanation for why anything exists in the first place; it's that physics may not be able to answer that kind of question at all. None of that is necessarily "pseudoscience" or necessarily bullshit (though it's easy enough to find examples of both). I am skeptical of the circularity of the argument, though. There must be a "physics explanation" because physics explains everything. And we know that, because if physics can't explain it, it doesn't exist. And we know that, because physics explains everything. (Not accusing you in particular of making that argument . . .)
  - Jensson 5y ago
    Physics is the field of explaining everything in the universe. Therefore, if physics can't explain a phenomena we don't understand it, as physics is the ultimate explanation we have. I didn't say that if physics can't explain it then it doesn't exist, as you seem to think, just that if physics can't explain it then our understanding of the topic doesn't exist.
    - sramsay 5y ago
      No, no. I did not think you are saying that (that if physics doesn't explain something it doesn't exist). That's why I put in that last line. But now I'm actually not so sure. You seem to not admit of a category of things that physics can't explain. There are things it does not currently explain, things it has not yet explained, things it has explained wrongly, and things it may never explain as an historical matter. But not things it can't explain ("can't" in the sense of "is incapable of"). Do I have you right on that?