6 ms·

The only way we could "continue to reason" is if there were a systematic way of taking claims about the environment, say C and translating them into some "neutr

The only way we could "continue to reason" is if there were a systematic way of taking claims about the environment, say C and translating them into some "neutral language", C'. This was Husserl's project. But it's a failure. Consider the case where realism is true: the environment causes us to enter a brain state which is ambiguious, so we cannot recover perfect information about the enviroment. Eg., light hits our eyes from a 3D room in a largely 2D way so we get depth perception wrong. A common occurance. This means that there is a metaphysics, say R, where if R is true then all descriptions derivative/about anything metal may be systematically false. In this sense realism is a scepticism about the "netural language" idealism presumes. Since this scepticism is at least coherent/possible, there is no neutral language. ie., the global sceptic says P(I am human|Scepticism) = 0 for a particualr Scepticism, eg., "youre in a dream" etc. The idealist says: let's translate to a neutral language. P(Perceptions seem as if human|Scepticism) = 1 The realist says this is not 1, and may be zero, eg., when P(Perceptions seem as-if human|AmbiguousBrainState) = 0 So realism offers a scepticism that idealism cannot overcome. There is no neutral language. And so reasoning does become impossible. Eg., consider the claim "the object is 1m away" has to be translated to "perceptions seem as-if objects are 1m away" but in the case of an ambgious perception there is no fact about what "seems as-if" -- so you loose the ability to even talk about objects being at any distnace. And since perceptions are bascially always ambigous there is no means by which you can translate objective claims into neutral subjective ones. The choice to reason becomes the choice of a domain (of concepts) with which to interpret claims. A priori there is no neutral choices (eg., Idealism is NOT neutral!) -- so any sceptical choice becomes a decline to reasoning as such or a positive claim about the way the world is.

vidarh 5y ago
> The only way we could "continue to reason" is if there were a systematic way of taking claims about the environment, say C and translating them into some "neutral language", C'. By this argument, we can't continue to reason, as we can't falsify the hypothesis that we might be in a simulation. We clearly can continue to reason, on the basis of working within a set of assumptions / axioms that presume that what appears to be physical reality is physical reality. That we can't disprove that it isn't physical reality is irrelevant.
- mjburgess 5y ago
  This is my point! We cannot presume scepticism. Conditioning on any global scepticism disables reasoning. Any any alternative is "positivistic" in the sense that it positsts against scepticism. Idealism, ie., the false belief that there is a neutral language of "experience alone" is a posit against scepticism and presumes quite a radical metaphysics. My point is that one alwayas has to condition on some positive account of the objectiuve content of our concepts in order to reason.
  - vidarh 5y ago
    I have no idea what you're trying to say here or how it is meant to relate to the hypothesis of to possibility that our reality is a simulation. The way you describe idealism also makes no sense to me. The way I understand what you wrote does not match Berkeley's subjective idealism at all. You call it false, but it's an unfalsifiable philosophical view, so while we can reject it as meaningless, you have no basis for saying it is false.
    - mjburgess 5y ago
      The idealists claim is a genetic fallacy: that since the product of the objective, the subjective, has a property P so must its origin. ie., the objective is Ideal because the subjective is Ideal. In later idealism this became formalised as the claim that there is a "language of the subjective" -- but it is clear that Berkeley thinks this also. ie., that you can "describe your experiences as such". This claim is false, and is basically just a restatement of the same genetic fallacy. Language describes the objective (eg., "I am in a room"), not the subjective. It is just asserted that since the objective = subjective, then this language is "ontologically neutral" -- ie., it "avoids metaphysics". It does not! (1) the claim about the objective is metaphysical; (2) the language is still about the objective. The idealists need there to be a "neutral language of the subjective" to avoid the challenge of scepticism -- ie., that all our claims are false. But there is no neutral language. You cannot just "describe the subjective" to substitue for "describng the objetive". To see this, suppose realism is true (ie., that you really are in a 3d space, with light hitting your eyes, etc.). In this situation you have an ambigious perception: it neither seems as-if you are 1m from the tv nor 2m (eg., consider the duck-rabbit illusion). In this situation there is the objective claim "i am 1m from the tv" but no possible subjective reference for that claim. The subjective is ambiguous with respect to the objective. So idealism fails in its reply to scepticism: the subjective is ambiguous. So what? Well then there is no reply to scepticism. If you believe all our claims are false then there is no "neutral language" to translate them into for the sake of "practical reasoning". To be sincere in this belief, you cannot reason. Any sceptic (including idealists) who engages in conversation and claims to hold a global sceptical belief are just acting incoherently. They are, in fact, doing metaphysics. Whatever "neutral language" they translate "ordinary claims" into entails a non-neutral set of metaphysical commitments. So to "reason at all" is to choose a metaphysics. To connect this with the simulation point: to believe we are actually in a total simulation you are either (1)incapable of reasoning; or (2) asserting a contrary metaphysics without any justification whatsoever.

vidarh 5y ago

> The only way we could "continue to reason" is if there were a systematic way of taking claims about the environment, say C and translating them into some "neutral language", C'. By this argument, we can't continue to reason, as we can't falsify the hypothesis that we might be in a simulation. We clearly can continue to reason, on the basis of working within a set of assumptions / axioms that presume that what appears to be physical reality is physical reality. That we can't disprove that it isn't physical reality is irrelevant.

mjburgess 5y ago
This is my point! We cannot presume scepticism. Conditioning on any global scepticism disables reasoning. Any any alternative is "positivistic" in the sense that it positsts against scepticism. Idealism, ie., the false belief that there is a neutral language of "experience alone" is a posit against scepticism and presumes quite a radical metaphysics. My point is that one alwayas has to condition on some positive account of the objectiuve content of our concepts in order to reason.
- vidarh 5y ago
  I have no idea what you're trying to say here or how it is meant to relate to the hypothesis of to possibility that our reality is a simulation. The way you describe idealism also makes no sense to me. The way I understand what you wrote does not match Berkeley's subjective idealism at all. You call it false, but it's an unfalsifiable philosophical view, so while we can reject it as meaningless, you have no basis for saying it is false.
  - mjburgess 5y ago
    The idealists claim is a genetic fallacy: that since the product of the objective, the subjective, has a property P so must its origin. ie., the objective is Ideal because the subjective is Ideal. In later idealism this became formalised as the claim that there is a "language of the subjective" -- but it is clear that Berkeley thinks this also. ie., that you can "describe your experiences as such". This claim is false, and is basically just a restatement of the same genetic fallacy. Language describes the objective (eg., "I am in a room"), not the subjective. It is just asserted that since the objective = subjective, then this language is "ontologically neutral" -- ie., it "avoids metaphysics". It does not! (1) the claim about the objective is metaphysical; (2) the language is still about the objective. The idealists need there to be a "neutral language of the subjective" to avoid the challenge of scepticism -- ie., that all our claims are false. But there is no neutral language. You cannot just "describe the subjective" to substitue for "describng the objetive". To see this, suppose realism is true (ie., that you really are in a 3d space, with light hitting your eyes, etc.). In this situation you have an ambigious perception: it neither seems as-if you are 1m from the tv nor 2m (eg., consider the duck-rabbit illusion). In this situation there is the objective claim "i am 1m from the tv" but no possible subjective reference for that claim. The subjective is ambiguous with respect to the objective. So idealism fails in its reply to scepticism: the subjective is ambiguous. So what? Well then there is no reply to scepticism. If you believe all our claims are false then there is no "neutral language" to translate them into for the sake of "practical reasoning". To be sincere in this belief, you cannot reason. Any sceptic (including idealists) who engages in conversation and claims to hold a global sceptical belief are just acting incoherently. They are, in fact, doing metaphysics. Whatever "neutral language" they translate "ordinary claims" into entails a non-neutral set of metaphysical commitments. So to "reason at all" is to choose a metaphysics. To connect this with the simulation point: to believe we are actually in a total simulation you are either (1)incapable of reasoning; or (2) asserting a contrary metaphysics without any justification whatsoever.