I believe that "Science" is not a monolith and our language/culture currently lacks the model necessary to distinguish between "significant and unlikely to chan

I believe that "Science" is not a monolith and our language/culture currently lacks the model necessary to distinguish between "significant and unlikely to change" versus "specific, moment in time" science. I'm actually struggling to articulate this concept myself because I'm having trouble picking two existing words to describe it. When I say "significant and unlikely to change" I'm referring to thinks like physical laws, kinematics, chemistry, that sort of thing. The "science" of these fields is essentially "settled" and there is not a reproducibility crisis in this domain. There is a high level of trust in this kind of scientific knowledge. Contrast this to "specific, moment in time" studies, with things like nutrition, social sciences, economics, policy, etc. You could call these soft sciences, but I don't think that concept does it justice. We deal with this domain constantly when arguing via back-and-forth citations online. You can find dozens of studies that assert X is true and dozens of others that assert X is false. A paper might have been published in a reputable journal but that does not mean it is now the "Truth" in the same way that we ascribe studies in the first category. For instance, a paper published about evolutionary psychology is not as true as evolution itself. Yet, we bucket both into the same category of "Science". There is a massive reproducibility crisis in this domain and it really does seem like many studies are only "true" in the confines of that study when it happened. When people cite this kind of science they piggyback off of the reputation of the first kind. I think that is the crux of the issue mentioned in the article.