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For Marx, alienation had a specific, technical definition, meaning alienation from one’s labor. In The German Ideology, Marx expounds a totally materialistic a

For Marx, alienation had a specific, technical definition, meaning alienation from one’s labor. In The German Ideology, Marx expounds a totally materialistic anthropology, wherein man is material which creates itself through labor, and as such, human history is the history of material. Within this anthropology, alienation does not retain the common meaning, and Marx indeed stopped referring to it in his “mature” work (see Althusser). “Stomach with legs” is maybe a bit vulgar, but only a bit. It is incredibly difficult to overstate Marx’s materialism.

sudosysgen 5y ago
That is quite incorrect. Marx understands the act of production as an act that allows you to interrogate your own existence, and its relation to the existence of others - how you fit in to their lives, and in the shared experience that you have with those that use your production. Straight from the horse's mouth : >Let us suppose that we had carried out production as human beings. Each of us would have, in two ways, affirmed himself, and the other person. (i) In my production I would have objectified my individuality, its specific character, and, therefore, enjoyed not only an individual manifestation of my life during the activity, but also, when looking at the object, I would have the individual pleasure of knowing my personality to be objective, visible to the senses, and, hence, a power beyond all doubt. (ii) In your enjoyment, or use, of my product I would have the direct enjoyment both of being conscious of having satisfied a human need by my work, that is, of having objectified man's essential nature, and of having thus created an object corresponding to the need of another man's essential nature ... Our products would be so many mirrors in which we saw reflected our essential nature. Marx, "Comment on James Mill", 1844. Here we can see that there is an explicit social dimension to alienation - it is far from the "totally materialistic anthropology" you attribute. Indeed Marx recongizes a purely material dimension from alienation, but in his texts this is only a small part of it - he explicitly identifies the purely material alienation as causing the alienation from the act of production, the alienation from the act of production causing alienation from one's own essence (Marx understands working for the benefit of others as being part of the human essence, insofar as helping a friend, working for mutual survival, that helps situate the social circumstance in the act of actually doing something, so the act of producing for wages instead of production to help someone, to help oneself or for expression as inherently against the essence of humanity) , and finally this process in the reverse causing alienation from the community.
- huetius 5y ago
  Can you help me understand which part of this is not materialism?
  - sudosysgen 5y ago
    It is materialist in the phylosophical sense in that it puts material in the somewhat dominant position to ideas. It is clearly not a material anthropology, nor is the history being brought forth the history of stuff, it's clearly about the relationships people build when helping each other. It's also clear that the word "alienation" retains its original meaning - he is talking about the psychological disconnect between people and their community and the breakdown of their relationships.
    - huetius 5y ago
      It is not to “clearly” visible to me that this is not a materialist anthropology. It was his explicit purpose in TGI to strip the concept of human nature of its ideal dimension, meaning Platonic, humanistic, moral, ethico-religious, unscientific “mystifications,” in order to reveal man’s species-being as a social animal, distinct from the other animals only in its capacity for (social) self-actualization through labor. Even in your own excerpt, our social relations are described in terms of relations of production (which can be more or less satisfying). Is it perhaps this aspect of his thought which is preserved in the affluent, technological, society, and which brings alienation, as a lapse from an ideal, normative order of being, to its extreme pitch?
      - sudosysgen 5y ago
        Ideal dimension did not mean "humanistic, moral". It can certainly refer to the religious dimension of the ethic, but humanism and morals are certainly not rejected by materialist philosophy! In fact, Marx drew heavily on Fuerbach, which was one of the most preeminent humanists. Perhaps the confusion lies with the idea of anthropological materialism, meaning materialism centered around humanist goals. In the excerpt, social relations are not described as being only relations of productions, it's merely that relations of production are the ones being talked about. But it is clear to anyone that the relations of production are some of the most important and indeed most of our social relations are relations of production. But certainly, it's the non-material relations which are the focus here, not the actual product. As far as the species-being of humans being only different from animals insofar as we can self-actualize through labor, this is a bit of a reduction. Self-actualization through labour, where labour is any productive act, done for any imagined purpose - it's more than the productive act, it's the creativity and freedom with which that act is taken that to Marx distinguish human from animal. Clearly this difference assumes to human a unique creative, free, conscious aspect, so while to Marx this is made evident through these creative acts, these acts differentiate us because they embody our creativity, consciousness, and freedom, not merely because of their product. In that Marx is no different from the humanists before him, he simply focuses on the expression of human nature on the set of all social relations that make it evident. The reason why he does this is because he believes that human nature expresses itself differently depending on the circumstance, and so that appealing on a Platonic ideal of human nature that is absolutely perfect and unchanging is incorrect, therefore he refers to species-being as the current embodiment of human nature. To go back to your earlier point, yes, it is a way of understanding the human without any Platonic, religious, or mystical ready-made truth. But it is at the same time humanistic and moral. There is no denial of the freedom, the feelings, the subjectivity and the relationships of people, instead they are actually central, and they are instead understood through the material world where they express themselves. What is denied is the existence of a perfect, idealized, untouchable component to these things that is completely separate and inscrutable from the material world. So if the objection to the theory of alienation is that it sees all social relations as ultimately based on "stuff", that is not the case, which is why Marx makes a distinction between social relations writ large and social relations.

sudosysgen 5y ago

That is quite incorrect. Marx understands the act of production as an act that allows you to interrogate your own existence, and its relation to the existence of others - how you fit in to their lives, and in the shared experience that you have with those that use your production. Straight from the horse's mouth : >Let us suppose that we had carried out production as human beings. Each of us would have, in two ways, affirmed himself, and the other person. (i) In my production I would have objectified my individuality, its specific character, and, therefore, enjoyed not only an individual manifestation of my life during the activity, but also, when looking at the object, I would have the individual pleasure of knowing my personality to be objective, visible to the senses, and, hence, a power beyond all doubt. (ii) In your enjoyment, or use, of my product I would have the direct enjoyment both of being conscious of having satisfied a human need by my work, that is, of having objectified man's essential nature, and of having thus created an object corresponding to the need of another man's essential nature ... Our products would be so many mirrors in which we saw reflected our essential nature. Marx, "Comment on James Mill", 1844. Here we can see that there is an explicit social dimension to alienation - it is far from the "totally materialistic anthropology" you attribute. Indeed Marx recongizes a purely material dimension from alienation, but in his texts this is only a small part of it - he explicitly identifies the purely material alienation as causing the alienation from the act of production, the alienation from the act of production causing alienation from one's own essence (Marx understands working for the benefit of others as being part of the human essence, insofar as helping a friend, working for mutual survival, that helps situate the social circumstance in the act of actually doing something, so the act of producing for wages instead of production to help someone, to help oneself or for expression as inherently against the essence of humanity) , and finally this process in the reverse causing alienation from the community.

huetius 5y ago
Can you help me understand which part of this is not materialism?
- sudosysgen 5y ago
  It is materialist in the phylosophical sense in that it puts material in the somewhat dominant position to ideas. It is clearly not a material anthropology, nor is the history being brought forth the history of stuff, it's clearly about the relationships people build when helping each other. It's also clear that the word "alienation" retains its original meaning - he is talking about the psychological disconnect between people and their community and the breakdown of their relationships.
  - huetius 5y ago
    It is not to “clearly” visible to me that this is not a materialist anthropology. It was his explicit purpose in TGI to strip the concept of human nature of its ideal dimension, meaning Platonic, humanistic, moral, ethico-religious, unscientific “mystifications,” in order to reveal man’s species-being as a social animal, distinct from the other animals only in its capacity for (social) self-actualization through labor. Even in your own excerpt, our social relations are described in terms of relations of production (which can be more or less satisfying). Is it perhaps this aspect of his thought which is preserved in the affluent, technological, society, and which brings alienation, as a lapse from an ideal, normative order of being, to its extreme pitch?
    - sudosysgen 5y ago
      Ideal dimension did not mean "humanistic, moral". It can certainly refer to the religious dimension of the ethic, but humanism and morals are certainly not rejected by materialist philosophy! In fact, Marx drew heavily on Fuerbach, which was one of the most preeminent humanists. Perhaps the confusion lies with the idea of anthropological materialism, meaning materialism centered around humanist goals. In the excerpt, social relations are not described as being only relations of productions, it's merely that relations of production are the ones being talked about. But it is clear to anyone that the relations of production are some of the most important and indeed most of our social relations are relations of production. But certainly, it's the non-material relations which are the focus here, not the actual product. As far as the species-being of humans being only different from animals insofar as we can self-actualize through labor, this is a bit of a reduction. Self-actualization through labour, where labour is any productive act, done for any imagined purpose - it's more than the productive act, it's the creativity and freedom with which that act is taken that to Marx distinguish human from animal. Clearly this difference assumes to human a unique creative, free, conscious aspect, so while to Marx this is made evident through these creative acts, these acts differentiate us because they embody our creativity, consciousness, and freedom, not merely because of their product. In that Marx is no different from the humanists before him, he simply focuses on the expression of human nature on the set of all social relations that make it evident. The reason why he does this is because he believes that human nature expresses itself differently depending on the circumstance, and so that appealing on a Platonic ideal of human nature that is absolutely perfect and unchanging is incorrect, therefore he refers to species-being as the current embodiment of human nature. To go back to your earlier point, yes, it is a way of understanding the human without any Platonic, religious, or mystical ready-made truth. But it is at the same time humanistic and moral. There is no denial of the freedom, the feelings, the subjectivity and the relationships of people, instead they are actually central, and they are instead understood through the material world where they express themselves. What is denied is the existence of a perfect, idealized, untouchable component to these things that is completely separate and inscrutable from the material world. So if the objection to the theory of alienation is that it sees all social relations as ultimately based on "stuff", that is not the case, which is why Marx makes a distinction between social relations writ large and social relations.