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> so California was planning on using the rest of the grid as a buffer Was this actually a plan, or just what ended up happening? My understanding is that CAI

by rrss 5y ago

> so California was planning on using the rest of the grid as a buffer Was this actually a plan, or just what ended up happening? My understanding is that CAISO has continued their resource adequacy program to ensure that there is guaranteed supply to meet the expected demand (plus margin), but the problem is that this program was developed before renewables and therefore the central metric is peak demand (which happens around 5pm), which is insufficient for planning when there is a lot of solar & wind generation, because then the most critical period is after peak demand (around 7pm). In other words, I thought that CAISO failed to plan properly, not that they planned to lean heavily on imports.

rsj_hn 5y ago
> Was this actually a plan, or just what ended up happening? It's a good question, and depends on your perspective. I said "planned to" because that is what the state has historically been doing -- relying on the rest of the west coast grid for 25-30% of its electricity, especially for swing capacity. https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=46156 https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=46156 "The California Independent System Operator is soliciting power producers across the West to sell more megawatts to the state in July and August in anticipation of regionwide heat waves that will substantially boost electricity demand." -- back in 2021. (https://www.wsj.com/articles/california-scrambles-to-find-electricity-this-summer-as-blackout-risks-grow-11625666400?mod=article_inline https://www.wsj.com/articles/california-scrambles-to-find-el...) So the grid has always been what's bailed California out from it's poor energy policies and what has saved California during the summer. Now one can call this lack of planning, but if something's been going on for a few decades, then at some point it has to become part of the plan, although maybe not an official plan written down anywhere. But when someone discovers that the unofficial plan is not going to not work anymore, then you need to scramble. FYI, the whole Enron electricity scandal was all about selling energy to California, because California is constantly in need of energy. Why they didn't wake up after that scandal and start building out more energy sources remains a mystery. Instead, they went in the other direction to reduce domestic capacity. But that's not all, because a lot of the private utilities are being given mandates to get more green energy sources and storage that they are going to have a hard time meeting. You can't simply order someone to get battery power that lasts through the night when batteries last 4 hours. This is discussed in the article: "“We are literally on the cutting edge” of rapidly adding renewables, Mr. Wan [PG&E] said. “And along with that, there are some things we are learning by trial and error, and we are taking some risks in the process.”" In other words, you have the legislature giving mandates that the CPUC can't meet, and then the CPUC gives mandates to the producers that they can't meet, but everyone is shaking each other's hand at what a green future they are building. Meanwhile, the lights in California are kept on by coal and gas fired plants in the rest of the country. That system obviously doesn't work if the rest of the country tries to adopt California's model.
- rrss 5y ago
  Thanks for your reply. There are several different classes of electricity imports, and I think it is important to consider them separately - there are imports under long term contracts, opportunistic imports due to lower prices in the short term market, and short term contingency imports (when CAISO is freaking out due to unexpectedly high demand or low supply, or both). I guess I had incorrectly assumed we were discussing contingency imports. California does import a ton of electricity from outside the state. I don’t think it is accurate to characterize most of this as a bailout - the majority of this imported supply is either secured under contract well in advance, or used instead of available in-state supply when it is cheaper. Neither of these cases are saving California from it’s poor energy policies, these are part of California’s energy policies. IMO, your description only applies to the third class I mentioned above (emergency imports). These imports include a lot of different sources - a lot of coal and gas, but also a lot of wind, solar, and hydroelectric (especially from the Pacific Northwest). I agree that California’s shift to renewables has been poorly planned and done too fast, but I don’t think this is simply because California imports a lot of electricity in general. The issue is really handling the period after peak demand when demand is dropping but supply is dropping faster (solar & wind) - right now this is not handled well and there was apparently no plan to handle it well, and it leads to leaning a lot on unplanned imports, as you highlighted. > FYI, the whole Enron electricity scandal was all about selling energy to California, because California is constantly in need of energy. Why they didn't wake up after that scandal and start building out more energy sources remains a mystery. Instead, they went in the other direction to reduce domestic capacity. FWIW, the current resource adequacy program used in California was developed in response to this mess in 2001.

by rrss 5y ago

rsj_hn 5y ago

> Was this actually a plan, or just what ended up happening? It's a good question, and depends on your perspective. I said "planned to" because that is what the state has historically been doing -- relying on the rest of the west coast grid for 25-30% of its electricity, especially for swing capacity. https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=46156 https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=46156 "The California Independent System Operator is soliciting power producers across the West to sell more megawatts to the state in July and August in anticipation of regionwide heat waves that will substantially boost electricity demand." -- back in 2021. (https://www.wsj.com/articles/california-scrambles-to-find-electricity-this-summer-as-blackout-risks-grow-11625666400?mod=article_inline https://www.wsj.com/articles/california-scrambles-to-find-el...) So the grid has always been what's bailed California out from it's poor energy policies and what has saved California during the summer. Now one can call this lack of planning, but if something's been going on for a few decades, then at some point it has to become part of the plan, although maybe not an official plan written down anywhere. But when someone discovers that the unofficial plan is not going to not work anymore, then you need to scramble. FYI, the whole Enron electricity scandal was all about selling energy to California, because California is constantly in need of energy. Why they didn't wake up after that scandal and start building out more energy sources remains a mystery. Instead, they went in the other direction to reduce domestic capacity. But that's not all, because a lot of the private utilities are being given mandates to get more green energy sources and storage that they are going to have a hard time meeting. You can't simply order someone to get battery power that lasts through the night when batteries last 4 hours. This is discussed in the article: "“We are literally on the cutting edge” of rapidly adding renewables, Mr. Wan [PG&E] said. “And along with that, there are some things we are learning by trial and error, and we are taking some risks in the process.”" In other words, you have the legislature giving mandates that the CPUC can't meet, and then the CPUC gives mandates to the producers that they can't meet, but everyone is shaking each other's hand at what a green future they are building. Meanwhile, the lights in California are kept on by coal and gas fired plants in the rest of the country. That system obviously doesn't work if the rest of the country tries to adopt California's model.

rrss 5y ago
Thanks for your reply. There are several different classes of electricity imports, and I think it is important to consider them separately - there are imports under long term contracts, opportunistic imports due to lower prices in the short term market, and short term contingency imports (when CAISO is freaking out due to unexpectedly high demand or low supply, or both). I guess I had incorrectly assumed we were discussing contingency imports. California does import a ton of electricity from outside the state. I don’t think it is accurate to characterize most of this as a bailout - the majority of this imported supply is either secured under contract well in advance, or used instead of available in-state supply when it is cheaper. Neither of these cases are saving California from it’s poor energy policies, these are part of California’s energy policies. IMO, your description only applies to the third class I mentioned above (emergency imports). These imports include a lot of different sources - a lot of coal and gas, but also a lot of wind, solar, and hydroelectric (especially from the Pacific Northwest). I agree that California’s shift to renewables has been poorly planned and done too fast, but I don’t think this is simply because California imports a lot of electricity in general. The issue is really handling the period after peak demand when demand is dropping but supply is dropping faster (solar & wind) - right now this is not handled well and there was apparently no plan to handle it well, and it leads to leaning a lot on unplanned imports, as you highlighted. > FYI, the whole Enron electricity scandal was all about selling energy to California, because California is constantly in need of energy. Why they didn't wake up after that scandal and start building out more energy sources remains a mystery. Instead, they went in the other direction to reduce domestic capacity. FWIW, the current resource adequacy program used in California was developed in response to this mess in 2001.