> The question is IMO as valid as "if I poke you with this pen, do you feel it different enough than what I feel if I poked myself?" Funnily enough, Wittgenste

> The question is IMO as valid as "if I poke you with this pen, do you feel it different enough than what I feel if I poked myself?" Funnily enough, Wittgenstein also famously looked at pain as well [0] in the context of his famous private language argument, and he comes to the same conclusions as he does about perception and language. It should be noted that Wittgenstein's central point is about the intelligibility of color, or perception, or pain, or a private language. He is not denying the existence of pain, or of what could be considered "first person priority", as a sensation. But he's commenting on the logical necessity of a public intelligibility for it. For him that intelligibility comes about through behavior or public criterions, that is, what we might call pain-behavior wrapped up in a public form of life. > I still wanna know if they feel it any different and how different. Wittgenstein's whole point, really, is that you can get an answer by asking them because, after all, you're speaking the same public language. That is also why pain, as it is intelligible, has a history. [0]: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/private-language/ https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/private-language/