> Nothing you can find out about wavelengths, cones, rods, neurons and so on will tell you why you see red the specific way you do, and whether my perception of

> Nothing you can find out about wavelengths, cones, rods, neurons and so on will tell you why you see red the specific way you do, and whether my perception of red corresponds to yours or my "red" is actually your "green". This is begging the question. You're assuming that color qualia exist in the way that objects do. That "my red" and "your green" are not just properties of personal experience, but refer to objects that could be identified, drawn out, moved around and compared like the ordinary objects in our world. The basic mistake of qualia theory is to assume that qualia share any of the properties of physical objects or even abstract concepts. That qualia are entities distinct and stable enough to be placed side by side, compared and contrasted, the way you could compare rocks or different software architectures. I suspect that this makes about as much sense as asserting that square circles exist. You can say it, you can even kinda-sorta imagine it, but you can do that with a lot of things that fall apart on closer inspection. For all we know, p-zombies are square circles. We think that they're a coherent concept because we can kinda-sorta imagine them, but we're nowhere near knowing that they're a coherent concept. There is such a thing as trusting feelings and intuitions and imaginations too much, especially in the incredibly abstract context of somehow reifying your experiences and attempting to understand what they "are". There are a lot of things that people used to feel strongly about, like "heavier objects fall faster". Many people still didn't believe Galileo was right when he proved it false with his experiments. Even when he did the experiment right before their eyes. The feelings and intuitions were too strong. Such is the case with qualia, I think. I don't know if we'll ever be able to prove the intuitions wrong and illuminate the true nature of consciousness, like Galileo, but that doesn't mean our prescientific intuitions are correct by default. P-zombies and qualia are embellishments of our prescientific intuitions, not rigorous or scientific versions of them.