3 ms·

It wouldn't require several times more manpower for the FAA to figure out there's something called MCAS that didn't exist before, would it? (Note that I'm talki

It wouldn't require several times more manpower for the FAA to figure out there's something called MCAS that didn't exist before, would it? (Note that I'm talking in the current world we live in, not in a hypothetical world where Boeing would be a mortal enemy of the FAA doing everything within the stretch of human imagination to hide MCAS.)

r3trohack3r 5y ago
Out of curiosity, how confident are you that there aren’t any other novel systems that didn’t exist before on a similar level as MCAS? Having not had a public debacle around them, how much effort would it take for you to personally certify that MCAS is the only novel system of its caliber on these aircraft?
- dataflow 5y ago
  > Out of curiosity, how confident are you that there aren’t any other novel systems that didn’t exist before on a similar level as MCAS? Me? What makes you think I would have information on this? If I had to hazard a random guess, I would think that, if you're talking about the MAX 8, there have been enough leaks and testimonies and whistleblowers that any comparable system would have probably been mentioned somewhere. I have no idea either way, I haven't read everything that's gotten out. But I don't see why a regulator couldn't use various means to figure stuff like this out with reasonably high confidence.
- deleted 5y ago
  [deleted]
- ethbr0 5y ago
  The airplane couldn't have been built without many system diagrams showing MCAS, or a similarly complex component. The FAA should have pulled schematics directly from Boeing engineering during certification. And the FAA should have someone with enough technical expertise and experience look at them. And that person should have said "The submitted information by Boeing doesn't include full details on this subsystem." Whether or not the Boeing test pilot highlighted the system for the FAA is a red herring. It's the FAA's job to find this, regardless of whether someone points them at it. If the FAA doesn't have the technical staffing or expertise to do this, then that's the problem. Charging the test pilot is necessary, but not sufficient. If the FAA infrequently performs this work (certification of a new aircraft), then flex in retired expertise! You can't tell me there aren't qualified, retired candidates (ex-industry or ex-FAA) who would have signed up for a year or two review. And all the better that they don't have career incentives! Essentially, this is the FAA charging Boeing for not doing the FAA's job correctly.
  - HeyLaughingBoy 5y ago
    Now you're talking about the FAA essentially replicating the scope of Boeing's test/QA operation. There are thousands of pages of diagrams and likely millions of lines of code. One person is not going to scan them and say "Here! This is a problem."
mjevans 5y ago
It would be nice if the FAA were able to bill large companies making planes the public is intended to fly on commercially for all of the hours required to process the 'type certification' fully and exhaustively. That process would include validating all aspects of the mechanical specifications and changes of parts (reused already OK parts from the same authorized suppliers would be a quick check-off), mechanical engineering, electrical engineering, computer software, and any changes for maintenance and end operators. Describing it fully like that, I believe the only benefit to 'type certification' should be training for the end users, but major overhauls should require retraining and that should be caught.
ribosometronome 5y ago
From the article: >Because of his alleged deceit, the FAA AEG deleted all reference to MCAS from the final version of the 737 MAX FSB Report published in July 2017 The FAA was aware that this system existed.
- ethbr0 5y ago
  AFAICT (medium certainty), the development sequence went thusly: (1) MCAS added to design, (2) FAA informed about MCAS, (3) MCAS potential control inputs and overrides drastically increased during development, (4) FAA not informed about changes, (5) FAA certifies aircraft on basis of (2). So it's probably most accurate to say "the FAA was aware of the system existing, but incorrect on the details of that system."

r3trohack3r 5y ago

Out of curiosity, how confident are you that there aren’t any other novel systems that didn’t exist before on a similar level as MCAS? Having not had a public debacle around them, how much effort would it take for you to personally certify that MCAS is the only novel system of its caliber on these aircraft?

dataflow 5y ago
> Out of curiosity, how confident are you that there aren’t any other novel systems that didn’t exist before on a similar level as MCAS? Me? What makes you think I would have information on this? If I had to hazard a random guess, I would think that, if you're talking about the MAX 8, there have been enough leaks and testimonies and whistleblowers that any comparable system would have probably been mentioned somewhere. I have no idea either way, I haven't read everything that's gotten out. But I don't see why a regulator couldn't use various means to figure stuff like this out with reasonably high confidence.
deleted 5y ago
[deleted]
ethbr0 5y ago
The airplane couldn't have been built without many system diagrams showing MCAS, or a similarly complex component. The FAA should have pulled schematics directly from Boeing engineering during certification. And the FAA should have someone with enough technical expertise and experience look at them. And that person should have said "The submitted information by Boeing doesn't include full details on this subsystem." Whether or not the Boeing test pilot highlighted the system for the FAA is a red herring. It's the FAA's job to find this, regardless of whether someone points them at it. If the FAA doesn't have the technical staffing or expertise to do this, then that's the problem. Charging the test pilot is necessary, but not sufficient. If the FAA infrequently performs this work (certification of a new aircraft), then flex in retired expertise! You can't tell me there aren't qualified, retired candidates (ex-industry or ex-FAA) who would have signed up for a year or two review. And all the better that they don't have career incentives! Essentially, this is the FAA charging Boeing for not doing the FAA's job correctly.
- HeyLaughingBoy 5y ago
  Now you're talking about the FAA essentially replicating the scope of Boeing's test/QA operation. There are thousands of pages of diagrams and likely millions of lines of code. One person is not going to scan them and say "Here! This is a problem."

mjevans 5y ago

It would be nice if the FAA were able to bill large companies making planes the public is intended to fly on commercially for all of the hours required to process the 'type certification' fully and exhaustively. That process would include validating all aspects of the mechanical specifications and changes of parts (reused already OK parts from the same authorized suppliers would be a quick check-off), mechanical engineering, electrical engineering, computer software, and any changes for maintenance and end operators. Describing it fully like that, I believe the only benefit to 'type certification' should be training for the end users, but major overhauls should require retraining and that should be caught.

ribosometronome 5y ago

From the article: >Because of his alleged deceit, the FAA AEG deleted all reference to MCAS from the final version of the 737 MAX FSB Report published in July 2017 The FAA was aware that this system existed.

ethbr0 5y ago
AFAICT (medium certainty), the development sequence went thusly: (1) MCAS added to design, (2) FAA informed about MCAS, (3) MCAS potential control inputs and overrides drastically increased during development, (4) FAA not informed about changes, (5) FAA certifies aircraft on basis of (2). So it's probably most accurate to say "the FAA was aware of the system existing, but incorrect on the details of that system."