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Knowing that they will get the bomb, the US had no reason to press on in the Pacific. A loss at Midway would have meant savage and immediate attacks on Australi

Knowing that they will get the bomb, the US had no reason to press on in the Pacific. A loss at Midway would have meant savage and immediate attacks on Australia (preceded of course by the takeover of Port Moresby, which was an Australian possession at the time). On the other hand a Japanese victory at Midway would have given Yamamoto the political capital to push for an armistice with America (he was part of the “Treaty” faction in the Imperial Japanese Navy, an armistice was his ultimate goal from the beginning). Japan also had a few tens of thousands of US, British and Australian POWs as a bargaining chip. All in all, both the US and Japan had all the reasons to sign an armistice. In which case the Two-Ocean Navy Act would have been dead. The US would have been able to redirect its industrial might into its other megaprojects at the time, the Manhattan and the B-29 projects, and obviously into everything that was needed for the European campaign. But one could ask, why would the US rely on nukes, when they could grind it out, and eventually crush the Japanese with conventional weapons. The distinction between conventional and nuclear war is a post WWII concept. The question for Roosevelt was “should we lose 100000 people, or should we lose none, and still defeat Japan?” What do you think he would have answered?

jcranmer 5y ago
Japan never had any plans to invade Australia--the idea was rejected early in 1942, even before the Battle of the Coral Sea [1]. Japan instead focused on extending its strategic perimeter and potentially cutting off Australian-US supply routes in the Pacific via Fiji. > All in all, both the US and Japan had all the reasons to sign an armistice. The US doesn't have any good reasons. The US isn't in an unwinnable position; if it just waits a year, it can go on the strategic offensive no matter what. Politically, it would be devastating: the US joins WW2 in part to enact revenge for Pearl Harbor; why should it accept the loss of all influence it had in the Pacific to bow out of the war? Politically, too, it would have been disastrous for US-British relations, especially since the US hadn't had any meaningful contribution to the war with Europe yet. > The US would have been able to redirect its industrial might into its other megaprojects at the time, the Manhattan and the B-29 projects, and obviously into everything that was needed for the European campaign. This ignores the historical fact that the US was already able to simultaneously pursue fighting two large wars, topping up the supplies of everybody else fighting those wars, and pursuing long-shot wonder weapons. The victory at the Battle of Midway happened in spite of focus already being placed on Europe at the time; it's unlikely that you could have meaningfully committed more resources to Europe simply for the lack of capacity to have more resources be committed. [1] It's not implausible that Japan would have reconsidered this, but opposition to the invasion of Australia came largely from the army, not the navy, as the army didn't think it had the troops to take and hold Australia, which would have been a distraction from Japan's primary goal, conquering China. Which wasn't going great.
dragontamer 5y ago
> Knowing that they will get the bomb, the US had no reason to press on in the Pacific. I think you're underestimating the amount of animosity that the Pearl Harbor strike created. When Doolittle's raids basically failed (all bombers crash-landed and destroyed), Doolittle was given a medal of honor for at least kinda-sorta attacking Tokyo. The American people wanted a Pacific fight. The American people also knew that the "real fight" would begin after the Essex carriers arrived, and when the Pearl Harbor battleships were dug up / resurrected from their watery graves. Midway was a surprise: that the USA could win a fight despite being outnumbered. I think the American people would have understood that an outmatched underdog Pacific fleet would lose to a stronger adversary. The fact that the opposite happened: that Midway was a success for the Americans, allowed the USA to scale up Pacific efforts much faster than originally planned. But both Japan and USA knew that the "real fight" would begin in 1943, after the new Battleships and Carriers came online. ------ If the USA lost "Midway", then the USA would have simply had a Midway-like moment come 1943, as the US Navy would begin to outnumber the Japanese by significant margins. For Japan to win at this juncture, it would have had to repeatedly play "reverse-Midway" like battles for the remainder of the war, which seems unlikely. The amount of ships US Congress approved was insane. The USA committed 3 carriers to the battle of Midway. In 1943, it would only take 3 months for 3x new, Essex-class top-of-the-line fleet carriers to replace them. If Japan somehow sunk those 3 new carriers, just 3 months later, we're back to the same situation. In contrast: Japan had barely any industrial capacity to build more ships. (That's why they wanted to invade China after all). The only reason the USA stopped building carriers was because we knew we won the war. --- IMO, the "reverse-Midway" timeline has the USA reaching Japan maybe a year later, and therefore nuking cities instead of using firebombs. But otherwise, the war ends very similarly: USA eventually gaining numeric supremacy and crushing the Japanese fleet. Then using an island hopping mission to get closer-and-closer to Tokyo before unleashing a devastating bombing campaign.
- credit_guy 5y ago
  > The American people wanted a Pacific fight. Maybe so, but the war was larger. The US was part of a coalition. And, while a good payback in the Pacific would have felt quite cool, the nightmare scenario was Stalin coming to terms with Hitler. And as of mid 1942 that was a real possibility. Stalin was at the end of his rope at that point: the second battle of Kharkov [1] had just concluded about one week prior to Midway, with close to 300k Soviet casualties and more than 1200 tanks lost, Sevastopol would fall in less than one month [2], with more than 100k casualties. In the month of July, the Soviets would suffer a crushing defeat at Voronezh [3], where they have almost 600k casualties. In all these cases the ratio of Soviet casualties to Axis casualties is between 5:1 and 10:1, and maybe worse in terms of loss of materiel. You could say that the Soviets could afford the materiel losses because of the Lend-Lease program, but no. Just as a coincidence, just 3 weeks after Midway, the Allies suffer the worse naval disaster in the Atlantic theater [4], the annihilation of the convoy PQ 17. Not only more than 400 tanks went to the bottom of the ocean with the ships that were carrying them, but the Allies suspended the convoys for the next 3 months (at about 2 convoys per month, it means Stalin effectively lost a few thousands of tanks that he could have put to good use). Stalin desperately needed the Allies to attack Germany somewhere, anywhere. But the Allies were not in such good shape either. At the time of Midway, the British and Germans were exchanging blows in Africa at the battle of Gazala [5], which ended with the capture of Tobruk, and the worse British defeat of the war (with the possible exception of Singapore). Malta was on the verge of collapse, and just about one week after Midway the British mounted two relief operations, Harpoon and Vigorous [6],[7], both ended in defeat. Did I mention the Soviets wanted their western Allies to do something? The Brits tried a raid at Dieppe in August [8], it didn't work out that well, with an Allied casualty rate of more than 60% (out of an admittedly small contingent of 6000 men). Eventually the Allies delivered, with the massive Operation Torch (more then 100k troops, for comparison the Normandy landing had a bit more than 150k troops landed). Historians agree however that a "reverse Midway" would have delayed Torch by at least 6 months. Stalin wasn't very happy with Torch, he thought it was quite small and in an inconsequential theater. He would have been even more unhappy with no Torch at all. Now, the US had huge industrial might, but a Soviet Union switching sides would have resulted in a truly scary Colossus. Imagine all the natural resources of the USSR and their manpower and the industrial capacity of Germany. Oh, and the industrial capacity of the USSR itself was nothing to sneeze at, especially with a bit of finishing touches from their new best friends the Nazi engineers. So maybe the Americans were angry for the Japanese perfidious attack at Pearl Harbor, but the war in Europe was not waiting for them to have their revenge. [1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Second_Battle_of_Kharkov https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Second_Battle_of_Kharkov [2] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Siege_of_Sevastopol_(1941%E2%80%931942) https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Siege_of_Sevastopol_(1941%E2%8... [3] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Voronezh_(1942) https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Voronezh_(1942) [4] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Convoy_PQ_17 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Convoy_PQ_17 [5] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Gazala https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Gazala [6] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Harpoon_(1942) https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Harpoon_(1942) [7] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Vigorous https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Vigorous [8] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dieppe_Raid https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dieppe_Raid

jcranmer 5y ago

Japan never had any plans to invade Australia--the idea was rejected early in 1942, even before the Battle of the Coral Sea [1]. Japan instead focused on extending its strategic perimeter and potentially cutting off Australian-US supply routes in the Pacific via Fiji. > All in all, both the US and Japan had all the reasons to sign an armistice. The US doesn't have any good reasons. The US isn't in an unwinnable position; if it just waits a year, it can go on the strategic offensive no matter what. Politically, it would be devastating: the US joins WW2 in part to enact revenge for Pearl Harbor; why should it accept the loss of all influence it had in the Pacific to bow out of the war? Politically, too, it would have been disastrous for US-British relations, especially since the US hadn't had any meaningful contribution to the war with Europe yet. > The US would have been able to redirect its industrial might into its other megaprojects at the time, the Manhattan and the B-29 projects, and obviously into everything that was needed for the European campaign. This ignores the historical fact that the US was already able to simultaneously pursue fighting two large wars, topping up the supplies of everybody else fighting those wars, and pursuing long-shot wonder weapons. The victory at the Battle of Midway happened in spite of focus already being placed on Europe at the time; it's unlikely that you could have meaningfully committed more resources to Europe simply for the lack of capacity to have more resources be committed. [1] It's not implausible that Japan would have reconsidered this, but opposition to the invasion of Australia came largely from the army, not the navy, as the army didn't think it had the troops to take and hold Australia, which would have been a distraction from Japan's primary goal, conquering China. Which wasn't going great.

dragontamer 5y ago

> Knowing that they will get the bomb, the US had no reason to press on in the Pacific. I think you're underestimating the amount of animosity that the Pearl Harbor strike created. When Doolittle's raids basically failed (all bombers crash-landed and destroyed), Doolittle was given a medal of honor for at least kinda-sorta attacking Tokyo. The American people wanted a Pacific fight. The American people also knew that the "real fight" would begin after the Essex carriers arrived, and when the Pearl Harbor battleships were dug up / resurrected from their watery graves. Midway was a surprise: that the USA could win a fight despite being outnumbered. I think the American people would have understood that an outmatched underdog Pacific fleet would lose to a stronger adversary. The fact that the opposite happened: that Midway was a success for the Americans, allowed the USA to scale up Pacific efforts much faster than originally planned. But both Japan and USA knew that the "real fight" would begin in 1943, after the new Battleships and Carriers came online. ------ If the USA lost "Midway", then the USA would have simply had a Midway-like moment come 1943, as the US Navy would begin to outnumber the Japanese by significant margins. For Japan to win at this juncture, it would have had to repeatedly play "reverse-Midway" like battles for the remainder of the war, which seems unlikely. The amount of ships US Congress approved was insane. The USA committed 3 carriers to the battle of Midway. In 1943, it would only take 3 months for 3x new, Essex-class top-of-the-line fleet carriers to replace them. If Japan somehow sunk those 3 new carriers, just 3 months later, we're back to the same situation. In contrast: Japan had barely any industrial capacity to build more ships. (That's why they wanted to invade China after all). The only reason the USA stopped building carriers was because we knew we won the war. --- IMO, the "reverse-Midway" timeline has the USA reaching Japan maybe a year later, and therefore nuking cities instead of using firebombs. But otherwise, the war ends very similarly: USA eventually gaining numeric supremacy and crushing the Japanese fleet. Then using an island hopping mission to get closer-and-closer to Tokyo before unleashing a devastating bombing campaign.

credit_guy 5y ago
> The American people wanted a Pacific fight. Maybe so, but the war was larger. The US was part of a coalition. And, while a good payback in the Pacific would have felt quite cool, the nightmare scenario was Stalin coming to terms with Hitler. And as of mid 1942 that was a real possibility. Stalin was at the end of his rope at that point: the second battle of Kharkov [1] had just concluded about one week prior to Midway, with close to 300k Soviet casualties and more than 1200 tanks lost, Sevastopol would fall in less than one month [2], with more than 100k casualties. In the month of July, the Soviets would suffer a crushing defeat at Voronezh [3], where they have almost 600k casualties. In all these cases the ratio of Soviet casualties to Axis casualties is between 5:1 and 10:1, and maybe worse in terms of loss of materiel. You could say that the Soviets could afford the materiel losses because of the Lend-Lease program, but no. Just as a coincidence, just 3 weeks after Midway, the Allies suffer the worse naval disaster in the Atlantic theater [4], the annihilation of the convoy PQ 17. Not only more than 400 tanks went to the bottom of the ocean with the ships that were carrying them, but the Allies suspended the convoys for the next 3 months (at about 2 convoys per month, it means Stalin effectively lost a few thousands of tanks that he could have put to good use). Stalin desperately needed the Allies to attack Germany somewhere, anywhere. But the Allies were not in such good shape either. At the time of Midway, the British and Germans were exchanging blows in Africa at the battle of Gazala [5], which ended with the capture of Tobruk, and the worse British defeat of the war (with the possible exception of Singapore). Malta was on the verge of collapse, and just about one week after Midway the British mounted two relief operations, Harpoon and Vigorous [6],[7], both ended in defeat. Did I mention the Soviets wanted their western Allies to do something? The Brits tried a raid at Dieppe in August [8], it didn't work out that well, with an Allied casualty rate of more than 60% (out of an admittedly small contingent of 6000 men). Eventually the Allies delivered, with the massive Operation Torch (more then 100k troops, for comparison the Normandy landing had a bit more than 150k troops landed). Historians agree however that a "reverse Midway" would have delayed Torch by at least 6 months. Stalin wasn't very happy with Torch, he thought it was quite small and in an inconsequential theater. He would have been even more unhappy with no Torch at all. Now, the US had huge industrial might, but a Soviet Union switching sides would have resulted in a truly scary Colossus. Imagine all the natural resources of the USSR and their manpower and the industrial capacity of Germany. Oh, and the industrial capacity of the USSR itself was nothing to sneeze at, especially with a bit of finishing touches from their new best friends the Nazi engineers. So maybe the Americans were angry for the Japanese perfidious attack at Pearl Harbor, but the war in Europe was not waiting for them to have their revenge. [1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Second_Battle_of_Kharkov https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Second_Battle_of_Kharkov [2] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Siege_of_Sevastopol_(1941%E2%80%931942) https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Siege_of_Sevastopol_(1941%E2%8... [3] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Voronezh_(1942) https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Voronezh_(1942) [4] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Convoy_PQ_17 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Convoy_PQ_17 [5] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Gazala https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Gazala [6] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Harpoon_(1942) https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Harpoon_(1942) [7] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Vigorous https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Vigorous [8] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dieppe_Raid https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dieppe_Raid