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> But the US would not have invested so heavily in its Navy; it would not have ended the war with more than 100 aircraft carriers, about 20 of which were full s

> But the US would not have invested so heavily in its Navy; it would not have ended the war with more than 100 aircraft carriers, about 20 of which were full size fleet carriers. The Two-Ocean Navy Act was passed in 1940. The Essex class of carriers was designed around 1939, and Essex herself laid down before Pearl Harbor. Before Midway, the USN had already ordered 13 Essex-class carriers, although another 19 would be ordered subsequent to Midway. In other words, the great naval buildup was already underway well before even Japan attacked the US at Pearl Harbor. Actually, the US had plans to build even more ships that were cancelled because they realized they had already sunk everybody else's navy. > because the terms of any truce with Japan would have stipulated a freeze of the naval buildup. Why would a loss at Midway have necessitated that Japan win the war? By the time of the Battle of Midway, the US has a dozen Essex-class carriers on the slipways. By mid-1943, the US is launching a carrier a month. The Japanese could only manage to start 6 carriers for the rest of the war, and completed half of them. Japan didn't have the industrial base to compete against the US's production. Furthermore, the Japanese never had the capability to meaningfully strike at the US. Even reaching Hawaii took the logistic capabilities of the IJN to its stretching point; there was never any meaningful risk to any US West Coast (or Panama Canal) assets. Japan's only hope was that the US would tire of the war and give up, but they kind of blew that chance with their strike on Pearl Harbor.

credit_guy 5y ago
Knowing that they will get the bomb, the US had no reason to press on in the Pacific. A loss at Midway would have meant savage and immediate attacks on Australia (preceded of course by the takeover of Port Moresby, which was an Australian possession at the time). On the other hand a Japanese victory at Midway would have given Yamamoto the political capital to push for an armistice with America (he was part of the “Treaty” faction in the Imperial Japanese Navy, an armistice was his ultimate goal from the beginning). Japan also had a few tens of thousands of US, British and Australian POWs as a bargaining chip. All in all, both the US and Japan had all the reasons to sign an armistice. In which case the Two-Ocean Navy Act would have been dead. The US would have been able to redirect its industrial might into its other megaprojects at the time, the Manhattan and the B-29 projects, and obviously into everything that was needed for the European campaign. But one could ask, why would the US rely on nukes, when they could grind it out, and eventually crush the Japanese with conventional weapons. The distinction between conventional and nuclear war is a post WWII concept. The question for Roosevelt was “should we lose 100000 people, or should we lose none, and still defeat Japan?” What do you think he would have answered?
- jcranmer 5y ago
  Japan never had any plans to invade Australia--the idea was rejected early in 1942, even before the Battle of the Coral Sea [1]. Japan instead focused on extending its strategic perimeter and potentially cutting off Australian-US supply routes in the Pacific via Fiji. > All in all, both the US and Japan had all the reasons to sign an armistice. The US doesn't have any good reasons. The US isn't in an unwinnable position; if it just waits a year, it can go on the strategic offensive no matter what. Politically, it would be devastating: the US joins WW2 in part to enact revenge for Pearl Harbor; why should it accept the loss of all influence it had in the Pacific to bow out of the war? Politically, too, it would have been disastrous for US-British relations, especially since the US hadn't had any meaningful contribution to the war with Europe yet. > The US would have been able to redirect its industrial might into its other megaprojects at the time, the Manhattan and the B-29 projects, and obviously into everything that was needed for the European campaign. This ignores the historical fact that the US was already able to simultaneously pursue fighting two large wars, topping up the supplies of everybody else fighting those wars, and pursuing long-shot wonder weapons. The victory at the Battle of Midway happened in spite of focus already being placed on Europe at the time; it's unlikely that you could have meaningfully committed more resources to Europe simply for the lack of capacity to have more resources be committed. [1] It's not implausible that Japan would have reconsidered this, but opposition to the invasion of Australia came largely from the army, not the navy, as the army didn't think it had the troops to take and hold Australia, which would have been a distraction from Japan's primary goal, conquering China. Which wasn't going great.
- dragontamer 5y ago
  > Knowing that they will get the bomb, the US had no reason to press on in the Pacific. I think you're underestimating the amount of animosity that the Pearl Harbor strike created. When Doolittle's raids basically failed (all bombers crash-landed and destroyed), Doolittle was given a medal of honor for at least kinda-sorta attacking Tokyo. The American people wanted a Pacific fight. The American people also knew that the "real fight" would begin after the Essex carriers arrived, and when the Pearl Harbor battleships were dug up / resurrected from their watery graves. Midway was a surprise: that the USA could win a fight despite being outnumbered. I think the American people would have understood that an outmatched underdog Pacific fleet would lose to a stronger adversary. The fact that the opposite happened: that Midway was a success for the Americans, allowed the USA to scale up Pacific efforts much faster than originally planned. But both Japan and USA knew that the "real fight" would begin in 1943, after the new Battleships and Carriers came online. ------ If the USA lost "Midway", then the USA would have simply had a Midway-like moment come 1943, as the US Navy would begin to outnumber the Japanese by significant margins. For Japan to win at this juncture, it would have had to repeatedly play "reverse-Midway" like battles for the remainder of the war, which seems unlikely. The amount of ships US Congress approved was insane. The USA committed 3 carriers to the battle of Midway. In 1943, it would only take 3 months for 3x new, Essex-class top-of-the-line fleet carriers to replace them. If Japan somehow sunk those 3 new carriers, just 3 months later, we're back to the same situation. In contrast: Japan had barely any industrial capacity to build more ships. (That's why they wanted to invade China after all). The only reason the USA stopped building carriers was because we knew we won the war. --- IMO, the "reverse-Midway" timeline has the USA reaching Japan maybe a year later, and therefore nuking cities instead of using firebombs. But otherwise, the war ends very similarly: USA eventually gaining numeric supremacy and crushing the Japanese fleet. Then using an island hopping mission to get closer-and-closer to Tokyo before unleashing a devastating bombing campaign.

credit_guy 5y ago

Knowing that they will get the bomb, the US had no reason to press on in the Pacific. A loss at Midway would have meant savage and immediate attacks on Australia (preceded of course by the takeover of Port Moresby, which was an Australian possession at the time). On the other hand a Japanese victory at Midway would have given Yamamoto the political capital to push for an armistice with America (he was part of the “Treaty” faction in the Imperial Japanese Navy, an armistice was his ultimate goal from the beginning). Japan also had a few tens of thousands of US, British and Australian POWs as a bargaining chip. All in all, both the US and Japan had all the reasons to sign an armistice. In which case the Two-Ocean Navy Act would have been dead. The US would have been able to redirect its industrial might into its other megaprojects at the time, the Manhattan and the B-29 projects, and obviously into everything that was needed for the European campaign. But one could ask, why would the US rely on nukes, when they could grind it out, and eventually crush the Japanese with conventional weapons. The distinction between conventional and nuclear war is a post WWII concept. The question for Roosevelt was “should we lose 100000 people, or should we lose none, and still defeat Japan?” What do you think he would have answered?

jcranmer 5y ago
Japan never had any plans to invade Australia--the idea was rejected early in 1942, even before the Battle of the Coral Sea [1]. Japan instead focused on extending its strategic perimeter and potentially cutting off Australian-US supply routes in the Pacific via Fiji. > All in all, both the US and Japan had all the reasons to sign an armistice. The US doesn't have any good reasons. The US isn't in an unwinnable position; if it just waits a year, it can go on the strategic offensive no matter what. Politically, it would be devastating: the US joins WW2 in part to enact revenge for Pearl Harbor; why should it accept the loss of all influence it had in the Pacific to bow out of the war? Politically, too, it would have been disastrous for US-British relations, especially since the US hadn't had any meaningful contribution to the war with Europe yet. > The US would have been able to redirect its industrial might into its other megaprojects at the time, the Manhattan and the B-29 projects, and obviously into everything that was needed for the European campaign. This ignores the historical fact that the US was already able to simultaneously pursue fighting two large wars, topping up the supplies of everybody else fighting those wars, and pursuing long-shot wonder weapons. The victory at the Battle of Midway happened in spite of focus already being placed on Europe at the time; it's unlikely that you could have meaningfully committed more resources to Europe simply for the lack of capacity to have more resources be committed. [1] It's not implausible that Japan would have reconsidered this, but opposition to the invasion of Australia came largely from the army, not the navy, as the army didn't think it had the troops to take and hold Australia, which would have been a distraction from Japan's primary goal, conquering China. Which wasn't going great.
dragontamer 5y ago
> Knowing that they will get the bomb, the US had no reason to press on in the Pacific. I think you're underestimating the amount of animosity that the Pearl Harbor strike created. When Doolittle's raids basically failed (all bombers crash-landed and destroyed), Doolittle was given a medal of honor for at least kinda-sorta attacking Tokyo. The American people wanted a Pacific fight. The American people also knew that the "real fight" would begin after the Essex carriers arrived, and when the Pearl Harbor battleships were dug up / resurrected from their watery graves. Midway was a surprise: that the USA could win a fight despite being outnumbered. I think the American people would have understood that an outmatched underdog Pacific fleet would lose to a stronger adversary. The fact that the opposite happened: that Midway was a success for the Americans, allowed the USA to scale up Pacific efforts much faster than originally planned. But both Japan and USA knew that the "real fight" would begin in 1943, after the new Battleships and Carriers came online. ------ If the USA lost "Midway", then the USA would have simply had a Midway-like moment come 1943, as the US Navy would begin to outnumber the Japanese by significant margins. For Japan to win at this juncture, it would have had to repeatedly play "reverse-Midway" like battles for the remainder of the war, which seems unlikely. The amount of ships US Congress approved was insane. The USA committed 3 carriers to the battle of Midway. In 1943, it would only take 3 months for 3x new, Essex-class top-of-the-line fleet carriers to replace them. If Japan somehow sunk those 3 new carriers, just 3 months later, we're back to the same situation. In contrast: Japan had barely any industrial capacity to build more ships. (That's why they wanted to invade China after all). The only reason the USA stopped building carriers was because we knew we won the war. --- IMO, the "reverse-Midway" timeline has the USA reaching Japan maybe a year later, and therefore nuking cities instead of using firebombs. But otherwise, the war ends very similarly: USA eventually gaining numeric supremacy and crushing the Japanese fleet. Then using an island hopping mission to get closer-and-closer to Tokyo before unleashing a devastating bombing campaign.