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> Yes, even more important than Battle of Midway. I have to disagree here. While a loss of Midway would not have changed the ending of WW2, it would have massi

> Yes, even more important than Battle of Midway. I have to disagree here. While a loss of Midway would not have changed the ending of WW2, it would have massively changed the way the ending was arrived at. By mid-1942 the US was absolutely certain it could produce the bomb. With a loss at Midway, the US would have decided to focus on Germany (as pre-agreed with Churchill and Stalin) and then finish off Japan with the bomb. Germany would have been defeated maybe one year sooner, and the Pacific would have been taken back in no time by the US with a campaign of nuclear bombing. The final conclusion of the war would have been around the same time, Fall 1945. But the US would not have invested so heavily in its Navy; it would not have ended the war with more than 100 aircraft carriers, about 20 of which were full size fleet carriers. The US Navy at the end of WW2 was larger than all the other navies of the world combined. That would definitely not have been the case if the US had lost at Midway, because the terms of any truce with Japan would have stipulated a freeze of the naval buildup. With no armada of aircraft carriers at the end of the war, the course of the Cold War could very well have been different. I guess we'll never know. But because of Midway, the war ended the way it did, with a massive and dominant US Navy. Which kept its dominance for the subsequent 76 years. A loss at Midway (and the subsequent inevitable truce with Japan) would have meant no Essex-class fleet carriers and very likely no Independence-class light carriers. If all 3 carriers at Midway were lost, the US would end the war with only Saratoga and Wasp as its main fleet carriers. Maybe even those would have been scrapped as part of the armistice with Japan. Building carriers then would have been unthinkable. The US, like all other countries were tired of war, and looking forward to peace, and disarmament. The bomb was the perceived guarantor of peace, what need was there for a strong Navy? The theory in the years before the Korean war was that the Navy was a thing of the past, the Air Force was the way to the future. Now, if the US did not have a strong Navy, as soon as the Soviets had the bomb themselves, the balance of power would have been very, very different. But the US did have and continues to have a strong Navy. It is because of this Navy that there are tensions now around Taiwan. Without the US Navy, Taiwan would have been a part of China long time ago. I'm personally happy that the US Navy is what it is, my point is that the victory at Midway made that possible, and we see the fruits of that bright and clear even to this day.

jcranmer 5y ago
> But the US would not have invested so heavily in its Navy; it would not have ended the war with more than 100 aircraft carriers, about 20 of which were full size fleet carriers. The Two-Ocean Navy Act was passed in 1940. The Essex class of carriers was designed around 1939, and Essex herself laid down before Pearl Harbor. Before Midway, the USN had already ordered 13 Essex-class carriers, although another 19 would be ordered subsequent to Midway. In other words, the great naval buildup was already underway well before even Japan attacked the US at Pearl Harbor. Actually, the US had plans to build even more ships that were cancelled because they realized they had already sunk everybody else's navy. > because the terms of any truce with Japan would have stipulated a freeze of the naval buildup. Why would a loss at Midway have necessitated that Japan win the war? By the time of the Battle of Midway, the US has a dozen Essex-class carriers on the slipways. By mid-1943, the US is launching a carrier a month. The Japanese could only manage to start 6 carriers for the rest of the war, and completed half of them. Japan didn't have the industrial base to compete against the US's production. Furthermore, the Japanese never had the capability to meaningfully strike at the US. Even reaching Hawaii took the logistic capabilities of the IJN to its stretching point; there was never any meaningful risk to any US West Coast (or Panama Canal) assets. Japan's only hope was that the US would tire of the war and give up, but they kind of blew that chance with their strike on Pearl Harbor.
- credit_guy 5y ago
  Knowing that they will get the bomb, the US had no reason to press on in the Pacific. A loss at Midway would have meant savage and immediate attacks on Australia (preceded of course by the takeover of Port Moresby, which was an Australian possession at the time). On the other hand a Japanese victory at Midway would have given Yamamoto the political capital to push for an armistice with America (he was part of the “Treaty” faction in the Imperial Japanese Navy, an armistice was his ultimate goal from the beginning). Japan also had a few tens of thousands of US, British and Australian POWs as a bargaining chip. All in all, both the US and Japan had all the reasons to sign an armistice. In which case the Two-Ocean Navy Act would have been dead. The US would have been able to redirect its industrial might into its other megaprojects at the time, the Manhattan and the B-29 projects, and obviously into everything that was needed for the European campaign. But one could ask, why would the US rely on nukes, when they could grind it out, and eventually crush the Japanese with conventional weapons. The distinction between conventional and nuclear war is a post WWII concept. The question for Roosevelt was “should we lose 100000 people, or should we lose none, and still defeat Japan?” What do you think he would have answered?

jcranmer 5y ago

> But the US would not have invested so heavily in its Navy; it would not have ended the war with more than 100 aircraft carriers, about 20 of which were full size fleet carriers. The Two-Ocean Navy Act was passed in 1940. The Essex class of carriers was designed around 1939, and Essex herself laid down before Pearl Harbor. Before Midway, the USN had already ordered 13 Essex-class carriers, although another 19 would be ordered subsequent to Midway. In other words, the great naval buildup was already underway well before even Japan attacked the US at Pearl Harbor. Actually, the US had plans to build even more ships that were cancelled because they realized they had already sunk everybody else's navy. > because the terms of any truce with Japan would have stipulated a freeze of the naval buildup. Why would a loss at Midway have necessitated that Japan win the war? By the time of the Battle of Midway, the US has a dozen Essex-class carriers on the slipways. By mid-1943, the US is launching a carrier a month. The Japanese could only manage to start 6 carriers for the rest of the war, and completed half of them. Japan didn't have the industrial base to compete against the US's production. Furthermore, the Japanese never had the capability to meaningfully strike at the US. Even reaching Hawaii took the logistic capabilities of the IJN to its stretching point; there was never any meaningful risk to any US West Coast (or Panama Canal) assets. Japan's only hope was that the US would tire of the war and give up, but they kind of blew that chance with their strike on Pearl Harbor.

credit_guy 5y ago
Knowing that they will get the bomb, the US had no reason to press on in the Pacific. A loss at Midway would have meant savage and immediate attacks on Australia (preceded of course by the takeover of Port Moresby, which was an Australian possession at the time). On the other hand a Japanese victory at Midway would have given Yamamoto the political capital to push for an armistice with America (he was part of the “Treaty” faction in the Imperial Japanese Navy, an armistice was his ultimate goal from the beginning). Japan also had a few tens of thousands of US, British and Australian POWs as a bargaining chip. All in all, both the US and Japan had all the reasons to sign an armistice. In which case the Two-Ocean Navy Act would have been dead. The US would have been able to redirect its industrial might into its other megaprojects at the time, the Manhattan and the B-29 projects, and obviously into everything that was needed for the European campaign. But one could ask, why would the US rely on nukes, when they could grind it out, and eventually crush the Japanese with conventional weapons. The distinction between conventional and nuclear war is a post WWII concept. The question for Roosevelt was “should we lose 100000 people, or should we lose none, and still defeat Japan?” What do you think he would have answered?