3 ms·

If you have not already done so, you might want to look into the compatibilism stance in philosophy. Note that I am not suggesting that this will answer your q

If you have not already done so, you might want to look into the compatibilism stance in philosophy. Note that I am not suggesting that this will answer your questions, or that it does so for me. I have a strong suspicion that the most it does is provide some sort of explanation for why we tend to feel we have free will (or, equivalently I think, to define it in a non-intuitive way.) Free will is the real 'hard problem' for materialists who think they have it. Dualists will not even get to that question until they can offer some affirmative hypotheses about whatever is going on in minds.

naasking 5y ago
> or, equivalently I think, to define it in a non-intuitive way. Interesting that you'd frame it that way, because empirical studies have shown that lay people intuitively agree more with Compatibilism [1]. [1] Why Compatibilist Intuitions are not Mistaken: A Reply to Feltz and Millan, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/274892120_Why_Compatibilist_Intuitions_are_not_Mistaken_A_Reply_to_Feltz_and_Millan https://www.researchgate.net/publication/274892120_Why_Compa...
- mannykannot 5y ago
  Interesting, and as the authors have given reason to doubt the "free-will-no-matter-what" explanation of the responses, I withdraw my intuition about what counts as intuitive. I doubt, however, that this will be the last word on the issue. Indeed, in "Questions for a Science of Moral Responsibility", Fischborn writes, about this paper, "In fact, people might even consider that free will is compatible with fatalism, a stronger version of determinism, as long as fatalism does not preclude an agent's actions to derive from their desires and values (Andow & Cova, 2016)" - my emphasis, as that seems to be begging the question in a way. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/319445158_Questions_for_a_Science_of_Moral_Responsibility https://www.researchgate.net/publication/319445158_Questions...
  - naasking 5y ago
    Yes, I think this just confirms the Frankfurt cases. Suppose the Holocaust was fated to happen. It seems reasonable to say that Hitler carried some responsibility for it regardless, while Germans who fought the Nazi party did not. But, I'm perhaps not a typical Compatibilist, as I think in a meaningful sense that we are more blameworthy the more deterministic we are [1]. [1] https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=28819641 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=28819641

naasking 5y ago

> or, equivalently I think, to define it in a non-intuitive way. Interesting that you'd frame it that way, because empirical studies have shown that lay people intuitively agree more with Compatibilism [1]. [1] Why Compatibilist Intuitions are not Mistaken: A Reply to Feltz and Millan, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/274892120_Why_Compatibilist_Intuitions_are_not_Mistaken_A_Reply_to_Feltz_and_Millan https://www.researchgate.net/publication/274892120_Why_Compa...

mannykannot 5y ago
Interesting, and as the authors have given reason to doubt the "free-will-no-matter-what" explanation of the responses, I withdraw my intuition about what counts as intuitive. I doubt, however, that this will be the last word on the issue. Indeed, in "Questions for a Science of Moral Responsibility", Fischborn writes, about this paper, "In fact, people might even consider that free will is compatible with fatalism, a stronger version of determinism, as long as fatalism does not preclude an agent's actions to derive from their desires and values (Andow & Cova, 2016)" - my emphasis, as that seems to be begging the question in a way. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/319445158_Questions_for_a_Science_of_Moral_Responsibility https://www.researchgate.net/publication/319445158_Questions...
- naasking 5y ago
  Yes, I think this just confirms the Frankfurt cases. Suppose the Holocaust was fated to happen. It seems reasonable to say that Hitler carried some responsibility for it regardless, while Germans who fought the Nazi party did not. But, I'm perhaps not a typical Compatibilist, as I think in a meaningful sense that we are more blameworthy the more deterministic we are [1]. [1] https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=28819641 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=28819641