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"You can always encrypt traffic that needs it at higher layers; most of these sorts of links were not themselves bulk encrypted." I'm surprised that encryption
by hilbert42 5y ago
"You can always encrypt traffic that needs it at higher layers; most of these sorts of links were not themselves bulk encrypted."
I'm surprised that encryption wasn't (still isn't) the default for all submarine cables given the very high stakes involed - international espionage, their vulnerability and the long history of undersea cable tapping (which I didn't mention above).
You say "Encryption at these data rates was only recently within the realm of feasibility". Right, but 'recently' has been quite a while now - I'd estimate 10-20 years or so as we've had erbium optical switches, etc., in common use for that length of time.
It's now over 25 years since I was first involved in some high-stakes intergovernmental stuff where authentication and encryption were the normal default thinking (it was inconceivable that we'd transmit data across any link or network that was potentially vulnerable to attack unless the data was encrypted and full authentication was deployed). We used common carrier networks and submarine cables would have to have been involved but we did not administer them - hence our assumption that they were vulnerable to attack.
Whilst I wasn't involved directly with those security services, it was clear to me that at the time they didn't want encrypted circuits. Thus, it seems likely that at least part of the reason for the lack encryption even now would have been pressure from them not to deploy it in common-carrier networks.
- sneak 5y agoIt isn't very high stakes, as all the important stuff is already encrypted at higher layers (TLS, VPNs, or both) before it hits the cable, whether the submarine cable is encrypted or not. Only private industry was pretending long haul cables were reasonably private, and even they aren't making that mistake anymore.
- hilbert42 5y agoRight, as I mentioned important stuff is encrypted before it hits the cable. However, my point was that by encrypting submarine cables we introduce a whiff of steganography into the play. Cables using encrypted data streams sans source/destination/IP addresses info make neutral territory - the ocean bottom - redundant for third parties to snoop. When forced onto land their presence is more likely to be detected and after cable station fanouts/distribution points the common tap points no longer exist thus greatly complicating their spying efforts.