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> We have already noted that quantum physics offers a world view in which the future is not entirely determined. This indeterminacy is not practical but fundame

by JDEW 5y ago

> We have already noted that quantum physics offers a world view in which the future is not entirely determined. This indeterminacy is not practical but fundamental. It permits us to think that our experience of free will may be real instead of merely subjective. If the outcome of a quantum process is undetermined, there is no fundamental reason to deny that possibility in some neural events which may be a macroscopic amplification of microscopic processes where quantum indeterminacy plays an essential role. I don't see how free will follows from indeterminacy. Just because you can't predict future outcomes from initial values doesn't mean that there is "choice" involved in the evolution of a system.

akimball 5y ago
The quote and your observation are compatible. I would also observe that predictive determinacy does not preclude choice.
- simonh 5y ago
  I am not convinced of their compatibility, as I explained in my sibling post to yours. I think free will of an agent means the choice is determined by the agent's state, because as a materialist I think your state and 'you' are the same thing. I am my state. Any choice that does not principally depend on my state is not my choice, because I am not the cause of it.
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  - jes 5y ago
    How can one know when a choice does or does not principally depend on one’s state? If someone elects to have wheat toast rather than sourdough toast at breakfast, can they really know why they made that choice? It seems like an infinite regress to me.
    - drdeca 5y ago
      I don’t follow. Do you think a material thing outside of the person is plausibly the main cause for the having the one kind of toast over the other? The motion of the limbs appears to be a result of signals sent from the brain. If one believes that one is one’s brain (which, I’m not a materialist, but if I was, it seems to me like the two plausible options would be “a person is their brain(+ body + perhaps their papers and the parts of their environment which they maintain in order to regulate their own actions)” or “people don’t exist”), then it seems straightforward that, like, one’s actions, stemming from one’s brain activity, therefore stem from oneself. And if that’s what one mean by “free will”, that seems reasonably coherent. (If one’s view of what people are is that there are no people, then it also follows that all people have free will. However, this conflicts with my observation of having an internal experience, so I reject the “there are no people” position. Though, seeing as I am not a materialist in part for similar reasons, perhaps people committed to materialism wouldn’t see this as that much of a reason not to conclude that there are no people/selfs, only things (like oneself) which appear to behave like people)
      - jes 5y ago
        Thanks for a thoughtful reply. > I don’t follow. Do you think a material thing outside of the person is plausibly the main cause for the having the one kind of toast over the other? Is there a main cause? What makes one cause a main cause and some other cause a secondary cause? Can we somehow separate people from the environment in which they exist? To my knowledge, reality is one big quantum field, or something similar. I don't know what's underneath quantum mechanics, assuming quantum mechanics is currently the best explanation we have for sweeps arm all of this. > The motion of the limbs appears to be a result of signals sent from the brain. I agree. So how did the brain that sends the signals come into existence? Is the brain that sends the signals able to send the signals, because the body that supports it provides what it needs to operate? > If one’s view of what people are is that there are no people, then it also follows that all people have free will. I don't see the connection here.
        drdeca 5y ago
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simonh 5y ago
Right, this is no different than having a random die roll in our brain have a chance of influencing every decision we make. Randomness washes away agency, it can’t add it. I'm not denying there's any randomness at all, quantum mechanics is a thing. For me free will us about agency. The important thing about a decision I freely make is that I as a free agent am the cause of the decision, not external influences or random effects. That actually demands a high degree of determinism, because it means I, my state, my memories skills preferences and biases determine the outcome. Otherwise it’s not _my_ choice. The catch 22 on that is that I don’t get to decide my state. I can’t choose my genetics, the way my neurons connected when I was a foetus, etc. We are all stuck with who we are. It’s this line of thinking that for example converted me from a retributionist to a reformist on the issue of criminal rehabilitation. I just can’t stand firm against the implacability of the logic. I have no choice.
- akimball 5y ago
  Only if “no different” means not yet observable.
  - ethanbond 5y ago
    Not yet observable and no reason whatsoever to expect that it’s waiting to be discovered, aside from our moral desires. Where in the physical laws of the universe would you even look for free will?
- mjburgess 5y ago
  Indeterminacy here isn't "a roll of the die" in some significant sense. All these things, "genetics, neurones" etc. are chaotic systems. Thus there is only /necessarily/ probabilistic "conditions" on who you are; event at the classical level. It's classical physics which is necessarily indeterminate here /because/ we cannot measure precisely enough. I think this is significant enough to somehow fit it into the picture on free will. Not least, because as you say elsewhere, free will actually requires a level of determinism which may actually be absent from the world. The meaning of the future being "open" here isnt reducible to "a roll of the die". Almost all significant macroscopic systems have a "deterministic gap" between their state today and their state tomorrow. In some sense chaotic systems must be able to "forget their history", as at some point, their historical state sequences will be insufficient to determine their present state. There may be something in this which enables a certain sense of freedom, and a certain lack of it.
dane-pgp 5y ago
I'm not sure if there is a rigorous definition of what "choice" means, but couldn't we define it as "the microscopic quantum processes that occur inside a person's head (and/or body) which lead to particular outcomes which the person has some expectation of and desire for"?
- akimball 5y ago
  It has an ordinary language definition. I would frame it thus: The selection or indication of one class of alternatives as distinct from another class.

by JDEW 5y ago

akimball 5y ago

The quote and your observation are compatible. I would also observe that predictive determinacy does not preclude choice.

simonh 5y ago
I am not convinced of their compatibility, as I explained in my sibling post to yours. I think free will of an agent means the choice is determined by the agent's state, because as a materialist I think your state and 'you' are the same thing. I am my state. Any choice that does not principally depend on my state is not my choice, because I am not the cause of it.
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- jes 5y ago
  How can one know when a choice does or does not principally depend on one’s state? If someone elects to have wheat toast rather than sourdough toast at breakfast, can they really know why they made that choice? It seems like an infinite regress to me.
  - drdeca 5y ago
    I don’t follow. Do you think a material thing outside of the person is plausibly the main cause for the having the one kind of toast over the other? The motion of the limbs appears to be a result of signals sent from the brain. If one believes that one is one’s brain (which, I’m not a materialist, but if I was, it seems to me like the two plausible options would be “a person is their brain(+ body + perhaps their papers and the parts of their environment which they maintain in order to regulate their own actions)” or “people don’t exist”), then it seems straightforward that, like, one’s actions, stemming from one’s brain activity, therefore stem from oneself. And if that’s what one mean by “free will”, that seems reasonably coherent. (If one’s view of what people are is that there are no people, then it also follows that all people have free will. However, this conflicts with my observation of having an internal experience, so I reject the “there are no people” position. Though, seeing as I am not a materialist in part for similar reasons, perhaps people committed to materialism wouldn’t see this as that much of a reason not to conclude that there are no people/selfs, only things (like oneself) which appear to behave like people)
    - jes 5y ago
      Thanks for a thoughtful reply. > I don’t follow. Do you think a material thing outside of the person is plausibly the main cause for the having the one kind of toast over the other? Is there a main cause? What makes one cause a main cause and some other cause a secondary cause? Can we somehow separate people from the environment in which they exist? To my knowledge, reality is one big quantum field, or something similar. I don't know what's underneath quantum mechanics, assuming quantum mechanics is currently the best explanation we have for sweeps arm all of this. > The motion of the limbs appears to be a result of signals sent from the brain. I agree. So how did the brain that sends the signals come into existence? Is the brain that sends the signals able to send the signals, because the body that supports it provides what it needs to operate? > If one’s view of what people are is that there are no people, then it also follows that all people have free will. I don't see the connection here.
      - drdeca 5y ago

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simonh 5y ago

Right, this is no different than having a random die roll in our brain have a chance of influencing every decision we make. Randomness washes away agency, it can’t add it. I'm not denying there's any randomness at all, quantum mechanics is a thing. For me free will us about agency. The important thing about a decision I freely make is that I as a free agent am the cause of the decision, not external influences or random effects. That actually demands a high degree of determinism, because it means I, my state, my memories skills preferences and biases determine the outcome. Otherwise it’s not _my_ choice. The catch 22 on that is that I don’t get to decide my state. I can’t choose my genetics, the way my neurons connected when I was a foetus, etc. We are all stuck with who we are. It’s this line of thinking that for example converted me from a retributionist to a reformist on the issue of criminal rehabilitation. I just can’t stand firm against the implacability of the logic. I have no choice.

akimball 5y ago
Only if “no different” means not yet observable.
- ethanbond 5y ago
  Not yet observable and no reason whatsoever to expect that it’s waiting to be discovered, aside from our moral desires. Where in the physical laws of the universe would you even look for free will?
mjburgess 5y ago
Indeterminacy here isn't "a roll of the die" in some significant sense. All these things, "genetics, neurones" etc. are chaotic systems. Thus there is only /necessarily/ probabilistic "conditions" on who you are; event at the classical level. It's classical physics which is necessarily indeterminate here /because/ we cannot measure precisely enough. I think this is significant enough to somehow fit it into the picture on free will. Not least, because as you say elsewhere, free will actually requires a level of determinism which may actually be absent from the world. The meaning of the future being "open" here isnt reducible to "a roll of the die". Almost all significant macroscopic systems have a "deterministic gap" between their state today and their state tomorrow. In some sense chaotic systems must be able to "forget their history", as at some point, their historical state sequences will be insufficient to determine their present state. There may be something in this which enables a certain sense of freedom, and a certain lack of it.

dane-pgp 5y ago

I'm not sure if there is a rigorous definition of what "choice" means, but couldn't we define it as "the microscopic quantum processes that occur inside a person's head (and/or body) which lead to particular outcomes which the person has some expectation of and desire for"?

akimball 5y ago
It has an ordinary language definition. I would frame it thus: The selection or indication of one class of alternatives as distinct from another class.