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It's unlikely that "they" can break TLS protected traffic at scale, however, it's likely that they don't need to. Usually, TLS is terminated on a load balancer
by fguerraz 5y ago
It's unlikely that "they" can break TLS protected traffic at scale, however, it's likely that they don't need to.
Usually, TLS is terminated on a load balancer and then the data in the data-centre flows in clear text. I is good practice to encrypt internal traffic but few companies do it because of the overhead. So "they" could sniff unencrypted traffic there, if they pay the data-centre providers.
Also, NSA is known to have modified network gear [1], so if they do that on a load balancer (or hack a software one) they can just sniff the encrypted traffic downstream and extract the session keys from the equipment. Then they can just decrypt the traffic without having to actually break RSA/ECC.
Other governments have had less subtle approaches by doing MITM attacks with compromised certificate roots, which is now somewhat mitigated with certificate pinning in modern browsers.
And of course there is the topic of secure protocols but compromised by design apps, such as WhatsApp. Even admitting that the Signal protocol is implemented correctly in WhatsApp, because the app is closed-source, they can read the unencrypted traffic from the app itself, and if they get caught doing it, they can say it's for moderation purposes [2].
If all of the above fails, you can always rely on Pegasus or similar. Once you have a rootkit on the device, you have access to everything in clear-text.
[1] https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2014/05/photos-of-an-nsa-upgrade-factory-show-cisco-router-getting-implant/ https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2014/05/photos-of-an-nsa...
[2] https://gizmodo.com/whatsapp-moderators-can-read-your-messages-1847629241 https://gizmodo.com/whatsapp-moderators-can-read-your-messag...
- hilbert42 5y ago"Also, NSA is known to have modified network gear <...> they can just sniff the encrypted traffic downstream and extract the session keys from the equipment. Then they can just decrypt the traffic without having to actually break RSA/ECC." Exactly, this fact seems to have been lost on many. There's nothing wrong with using encryption on a day-to-day basis such as when we use https web pages, or buy something online, or when we don't want Google to read our email but it's another matter altogether when the stakes are much higher such as, say, leaking human rights abuses from within the confines of a totalitarian state. When the stakes are high there are many other considerations to address. Not only do you have to consider what happens inside a server but also think about its physical security along with the possibility that data recovery tools may be used by the State to recover a copy of a critical email you sent after which you deleted. And that's just for staters. An important rule to always assume and to adhere to before going online is that it's a safe bet that the State will be able to access anything you say or do on your PC, smartphone and or when you are online - and that it will be able to do so long after the event.