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They can easily crack content using 1024-bit Diffie-Hellman key exchanges with hardcoded parameters, which used to be common in VPN software and some servers. T
by marcan_42 5y ago
They can easily crack content using 1024-bit Diffie-Hellman key exchanges with hardcoded parameters, which used to be common in VPN software and some servers. There was a big collective facepalm in the crypto community when this was revealed. Basically, they found a way to spend a lot of compute power once to crack a parameter set, then they can use it basically for free for any sessions using those parameters.
Other than that and backdoored software (e.g. stuff using RSA Bsafe with Dual-EC-DRBG, which has an NSA backdoor, or those Juniper VPNs which used the same), I don't think they can do much about modern TLS besides exploit obvious flaws in the implementations.
- goalieca 5y agoVpn configurations are so often poorly chosen and we should not let critical infrastructure run on outdated IPsec for instance. It may seem natural to build such infrastructure for a life span of 20-30 years but do you remember what state of the art was back in 2001? Most of that is now basically considered broken. Software is living and should never be « set-and-forget »
- analognoise 5y agoWhat? Software is immortal and binary - there are no transcription errors or mutations in a correct copy routine. Why shouldn't software be set and forget? Don't Ada and VHDL have massive amounts of re-use of things written in the 80's and 90's?
- sidpatil 5y agoThe software may not change, but the world around it does.
- analognoise 5y agoThat's bullshit I regularly re-use old code. Let's just admit it - that's a cover for today's bad programmers.
- sidpatil 5y agoI should clarify: I'm talking about software related to security. I'm sure you wouldn't want to use outdated broken crypto just because libraries already exist for it, for example.
- analognoise 5y agoThat's a great counterexample.
- hilbert42 5y ago"- there are no transcription errors or mutations in a correct copy routine." You only know it's correct after you verify the fact so formally that should read ...correct copy and verify routine. Incidentally, we used to have switches to verify after copy such as /v but programming sloppiness and impatience - in having to wait extra time for the verify - has meant that the entropy for data processing integrity has increase as a consequence. Right, no one seems to give a damn about such matters these days.
- analognoise 5y agoIt's sad.
- goalieca 5y ago> Why shouldn't software be set and forget? Even if you had bug-free hardware and formally verified software, your cryptography is broken and your kit has side channel issues that were never dreamed of 20 years ago.
- qeternity 5y ago> I don't think they can do much about modern TLS besides exploit obvious flaws in the implementations Which unfortunately means they can do quite a bit as we've seen, implementation is often much trickier than theory.
- nielsbot 5y agoMakes sense. I think my question was also: for high interest targets could they dedicate enough computing power to crack encryption most people consider secure enough. They don't have to crack everything, just one or two very important targets. I guess we can't really know unless there are more leaks.