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I'm trying to be as specific as possible. Bitcoin’s block reward converges to zero. Miners need incentives to existing. The TX fee, which will replace the bloc
by kylelee99 5y ago
I'm trying to be as specific as possible.
Bitcoin’s block reward converges to zero. Miners need incentives to existing. The TX fee, which will replace the block reward, exists only when the big block is processed.
The cost of disk storage continues to drop. Miners do not necessarily need to store all data. Please refer to Chapter 7 of the White Paper. I expect that the service to store all data will be provided by another specialized company.
Miners eliminate double-spending attacks according to their own interests. For this reason, I referred to as a police officer.
What do you think are the benefits that a small number of miners can achieve by forming a cartel? Isn't it just an effort not to put a specific TX in a block? Or they reject blocks of honest miners.
Competition from a handful of specialized honest miners prevents double-spending attacks. They handle larger TX with lower fees. This is a completely different form of storage from centralized data storage. Because you don't have to depend on anyone.
All of this was what Satoshi expected. He designed Bitcoin like this.
Thought Bitcoin as a Protocol set in stone for its lifetime
“The nature of Bitcoin is such that once version 0.1 was released, the core design was set in stone for the rest of its lifetime.” (June 17, 2010)
Source: https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=195.msg1611#msg1611 https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=195.msg1611#msg1611
Predicted the emergence of server farms with specialized hardware
“The current system where every user is a network node is not the intended configuration for large scale. That would be like every Usenet user runs their own NNTP server. The design supports letting users just be users. The more burden it is to run a node, the fewer nodes there will be. Those few nodes will be big server farms. The rest will be client nodes that only do transactions and don't generate.” (July 29, 2010)
Source: https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=532.msg6306#msg6306 https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=532.msg6306#msg6306
1MB block size limit should be temporary because it would never scale
“Satoshi didn't have a 1MB limit in it. The limit was originally Hal Finney's idea. Both Satoshi and I objected that it wouldn't scale at 1MB. Hal was concerned about a potential DoS attack though, and after discussion, Satoshi agreed. The 1MB limit was there by the time Bitcoin launched. But all 3 of us agreed that 1MB had to be temporary because it would never scale.” (Feb. 7, 2015)
Source: https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=946236.msg10388435#msg10388435 https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=946236.msg10388435#m...
Thought massive on-chain scaling would be possible at low cost, and now it is
“Visa processed 37 billion transactions in FY2008, or an average of 100 million transactions per day. That many transactions would take 100GB of bandwidth, or the size of 12 DVD or 2 HD quality movies, or about $18 worth of bandwidth at current prices. If the network were to get that big, it would take several years, and by then, sending 2 HD movies over the Internet would probably not seem like a big deal.” (Nov. 3, 2008)
Source: https://satoshi.nakamotoinstitute.org/emails/cryptography/2/ https://satoshi.nakamotoinstitute.org/emails/cryptography/2/
Transactions will be processed within 10 seconds on snack machine
“I believe it'll be possible for a payment processing company to provide as a service the rapid distribution of transactions with good-enough checking in something like 10 seconds or less.” (July 17, 2010)
Source: https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=423 https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=423
- rglullis 5y ago> What do you think are the benefits that a small number of miners can achieve by forming a cartel? Isn't it just an effort not to put a specific TX in a block? No. If it is more profitable for the miners to go rogue and start selling "double-spending a service" where they create massive chain reorgs, they will. Any blockchain that can not deal with the scenario of the miners going rogue is worth absolutely zero. All the quotes you are pulling from the forums are at best covering only the "happy-path scenario" or handwaving the fundamental issues we would have with one chain being so fundamental and yet controlled by a handful of miners. Satoshi's proposals only work if the value of the network is low enough to not be interesting for malicious actors.
- kylelee99 5y agoThe word “honest” appears 16 times in the Bitcoin whitepaper. Bitcoin is designed with a greater incentive for honest miners to deter attacks. Your and my predictions for the "happy-path scenario" are different. BitcoinSV is empirically demonstrating that it can be expanded according to Satoshi's design. Still, most people, including you, don't seem to want to see it. Satoshi designed and made predictions. I hope that you will see it without prejudice that it is now a reality. Finally, I would like to thank you very much for all of your patience, listening, and replying.
- kylelee99 5y agoThe word “honest” appears 16 times in the Bitcoin whitepaper. Bitcoin is designed with a greater incentive for honest miners to deter attacks. Your and my predictions for the "happy-path scenario" are different. BitcoinSV is empirically demonstrating that it can be expanded according to Satoshi's design. Still, most people, including you, don't seem to want to see it. Satoshi designed and made predictions. I hope that you will see it without prejudice that it is now a reality. Finally, I would like to thank you very much for all of your patience, listening, and replying.
- rglullis 5y ago> I hope that you will see it without prejudice that it is now a reality. I've said in the very first comment. The problem is not about now, the problem for BSV is that it ignores dynamic changes in the system across time. You can not say that anyone "is empirically demonstrating that it can be expanded" for future scenarios by using current conditions. It's a very basic mistake, and you keep insisting on it. You talk about static variables in the system (few specialized miners, others just run nodes) without explaining how this will ever reach an equilibrium. You keep using circular logic to justify your reasoning: "miners will be incentivized to be honest because the paper says miners will be honest due to incentives" is not a valid argument until you show the calculation of the cost/reward for being honest vs for colluding. Worst of all, you start with the premise that "Satoshi's design" is the final solution and that everyone pointing out its flaws are just stupid not to see it. From reading your comments, it seems almost like you treat the paper as some Revealed Truth and that the different actors are just supposed to fulfill their predetermined roles. > I would like to thank you very much for all of your patience, listening, and replying. Yeah, I'm done with that now. I said in the beginning that bitcoin maxis (no matter which fork of it) are either naive or crooks. You don't seem to be a crook, but you haven't convinced me out of the alternative.