> It's pretty obvious where the weakest link is. It isn't, considering how little information I've given you. The weakness of links depend on the threats we mo

> It's pretty obvious where the weakest link is. It isn't, considering how little information I've given you. The weakness of links depend on the threats we model and how we protect the links against such threats. You're lacking a lot of information to evaluate the weakness of links in these contexts. > Also this is pretty inherently contrary to the design of FIDO, because it privileges these private keys as special whereas in FIDO they're random and you can just mint more of them (in FIDO1 it's completely normal to make huge numbers of keys, since you aren't storing them anyway). I've read a bit on that, on how it makes a new key-pair per device-service-user combination. I honestly can't tell if that's an advantage or disadvantage. It at least seems like a disadvantage to have to hold both main key and backup key on new registrations to make sure you don't lose access when you lose a key. Besides being inconvenient, it seems to mean that the backup key has similar chances to being lost as the main key. In contrast, with OpenPGP, you can even store the backup key in a separate location like a safety deposit box and generally forget about it until you need it. > It is true that OpenPGP is much better if you were obliged to do RSA for compatibility reasons, but I think we'd all like to move away from that world even if some of us can't yet. Regarding RSA, I agree. OpenPGP isn't limited to RSA though and has more uses than just direct authentication.