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At the time of Nixon going to China: USSR was a formidable power and nuclear war was a real threat. The collapse of the Soviet Union was beyond anyone's expect

At the time of Nixon going to China: USSR was a formidable power and nuclear war was a real threat. The collapse of the Soviet Union was beyond anyone's expectation. Both sides of the strait insisted on there being just one China. Taiwan was heavily armed and every man must serve in the military. Not only could they fend off any attack, they actually harbored hope of eventually recovering the mainland.

hilbert42 5y ago
Right, I've no disagreement with that but it's only part of a bigger picture. I'm old enough to have lived though the thick of it - and also the Cuban Missile Crisis. Back then, the only notable trade the West had had with China was buying its fireworks (fireworks and some foodstuffs (ginger in syrup etc.) were the only goods that anyone in the West would have ever encountered with Made in China written on them). At the time, I'd often come home from school, put on my shortwave radio and listen to both Radios Moscow and Peking (Beijing) who were continually trying to outcompete one another in the propaganda wars with the West (it was fascinating listening). Both stations were very powerful and they had multiple frequencies spotted all over the SW band, they had a worldwide voice and they could be heard clearly no matter where one tuned - Voice of America was a joke by comparison. Whilst Moscow and Peking weren't always on the friendliest terms with each other, this was of precious little comfort to us in the West as both were Communist dicatorships - and with the West's stupid anticommunist fervor of that time - one that almost bordered on mania rather than having any sense of proportion or rationality - this was a huge deal, the stakes and tensions were very high and thus the situation was very dangerous. It is very difficult to get across to a modern audience what it was like to have lived through those times and how fearful many, many people were back then. The couple of days before and after October 24, 1962 were especially harrowing as we weren't sure whether we'd even be around to wake up the following morning. In 1978, at the time of China's Third Plenum under the chairmanship of Deng Xiaoping when China brought in its economic reforms, the West was strategically in the best position it's ever been in to reengage with China but it largely missed the nuances this policy change would bring to the long-term relationship. There's little doubt that one of the West's principal concerns was that China's opening up meant that tensions were easing and would ease further but in its relief the West failed to develop a decent long-term strategy to deal with China. In hindsight, it's clear that China's long-term strategy was much more defined and clearcut from the outset. The fact is that the West has largely screwed up its reengagement with China and there's no doubt China has been the shrewdest player and has well outsmarted the West. It should have been obvious to Western strategists at the time that it wouldn't be plain sailing and that great diplomatic care would be needed, for even then it was already clear that China had a long memory and was in no mood to take any more of the disgrace and humiliation that both the West (principally the UK) and Japan had inflicted upon it over the past few hundred years (the Opium Wars, Japan's invasion etc., etc.). I'm on China's side here - if I were a Chinese citizen I'd have had exactly the same view after the ill treatment China had been dished out. That said, Western interests needed to be maintained but done so fairly - and thus we should not have let China's authoritarian political system push back as hard as it's done in recent years. It's going to be a real balancing act from here on if we're to stop everything coming off the rails.

hilbert42 5y ago

Right, I've no disagreement with that but it's only part of a bigger picture. I'm old enough to have lived though the thick of it - and also the Cuban Missile Crisis. Back then, the only notable trade the West had had with China was buying its fireworks (fireworks and some foodstuffs (ginger in syrup etc.) were the only goods that anyone in the West would have ever encountered with Made in China written on them). At the time, I'd often come home from school, put on my shortwave radio and listen to both Radios Moscow and Peking (Beijing) who were continually trying to outcompete one another in the propaganda wars with the West (it was fascinating listening). Both stations were very powerful and they had multiple frequencies spotted all over the SW band, they had a worldwide voice and they could be heard clearly no matter where one tuned - Voice of America was a joke by comparison. Whilst Moscow and Peking weren't always on the friendliest terms with each other, this was of precious little comfort to us in the West as both were Communist dicatorships - and with the West's stupid anticommunist fervor of that time - one that almost bordered on mania rather than having any sense of proportion or rationality - this was a huge deal, the stakes and tensions were very high and thus the situation was very dangerous. It is very difficult to get across to a modern audience what it was like to have lived through those times and how fearful many, many people were back then. The couple of days before and after October 24, 1962 were especially harrowing as we weren't sure whether we'd even be around to wake up the following morning. In 1978, at the time of China's Third Plenum under the chairmanship of Deng Xiaoping when China brought in its economic reforms, the West was strategically in the best position it's ever been in to reengage with China but it largely missed the nuances this policy change would bring to the long-term relationship. There's little doubt that one of the West's principal concerns was that China's opening up meant that tensions were easing and would ease further but in its relief the West failed to develop a decent long-term strategy to deal with China. In hindsight, it's clear that China's long-term strategy was much more defined and clearcut from the outset. The fact is that the West has largely screwed up its reengagement with China and there's no doubt China has been the shrewdest player and has well outsmarted the West. It should have been obvious to Western strategists at the time that it wouldn't be plain sailing and that great diplomatic care would be needed, for even then it was already clear that China had a long memory and was in no mood to take any more of the disgrace and humiliation that both the West (principally the UK) and Japan had inflicted upon it over the past few hundred years (the Opium Wars, Japan's invasion etc., etc.). I'm on China's side here - if I were a Chinese citizen I'd have had exactly the same view after the ill treatment China had been dished out. That said, Western interests needed to be maintained but done so fairly - and thus we should not have let China's authoritarian political system push back as hard as it's done in recent years. It's going to be a real balancing act from here on if we're to stop everything coming off the rails.