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Number 19 is a clinker. Banach-Tarski applies only to objects in real-number space, but there are no such objects. For that to work, objects have to be infinite
by ncmncm 5y ago
Number 19 is a clinker. Banach-Tarski applies only to objects in real-number space, but there are no such objects. For that to work, objects have to be infinitely divisible, but all of our objects are made out of atoms.
Real-numbered space is a good enough approximation to our experience that we hardly ever encounter a model failure like this one.
- 0xmarcin 5y agoAlso this only works when the highly contested Axiom of Choice is used.
- BalinKing 5y agoBut isn't Banach-Tarski one of the main reasons why AoC is highly contested in the first place? (I don't know much about higher math, so this only my amateur impression.)
- kcolford 5y agoIt's also contested because while intuitive to a countable set of countable sets, generalizing to higher cardinals is not intuitive. Although the same could be said of the Power Law as well...
- intuitionist 5y agoThe paradoxical decomposition of the free group doesn’t rely on choice though, and that’s arguably the “heart” of BT.
- mjburgess 5y agoI'd deny that our objects do not live in a real space. Spacetime is real-valued. The issue isn't the reals, but that "solid object" isn't defined properly, ie., the sets under question don't have well-defined volumes. As soon as you fix that problem, via measure theory, the paradox resolves. You dont need to ditch real numbers.
- zarzavat 5y ago> Spacetime is real-valued There's really no evidence for this, as far as we know the real numbers are a pure mathematical invention and don't have any physicality. Even if you want to say that spacetime is dense (i.e. infinitely divisible), there's an infinite number of fields like that, the real numbers are just a convenient superset. There's no evidence that spacetime is dense either, and many practical ways in which it is not, as an obvious upper bound if you took all the energy in the observable universe to make one photon, it would still have a finite wavelength.
- Pyramus 5y agoThat is correct and should be highlighted more. In a way the real numbers are a model (or maybe a 'language') to describe physical phenomena. They work exceptionally well at that, but they are not backed by evidence and do come with (theoretical) limitations. This bachelor's thesis is a good starting point [1], search for 'finite precision physics' or 'intuitionistic math/physics'. [1] https://www.math.ru.nl/~landsman/Tein.pdf https://www.math.ru.nl/~landsman/Tein.pdf
- mjburgess 5y agoWell this is a popular idea imported from comptuer science, but there's absolutely no evidence for it -- and plenty against. Eg., QM is only linear in infinitely-dimensional real-spaces, etc. Essentially of a physics uses real spaces indispensably. There is no evidence whatsoever that this is dispensible; other than the fever dreams of discrete mathematicians.
- jerf 5y agoRemember, though: QM is wrong. Relativity also depends on continuous spaces, but it is also wrong. All the theories in physics that depend on continuous space are also wrong. By "wrong", I mean, we know they can't predict everything correctly. QM itself can't derive relativity. Relativity doesn't have QM in it, and break down at extremes like black holes. They're both very, very, very accurate in their domains, but physics knows that neither theory has the domain of "the entire universe". This is not a wild claim by an HN commenter, this is consensus in the physics world, just perhaps not phrased in the way you're used to. It's possible the eventual Grand Unified Theory will still have continuous space at its bottom, but it's also entirely possible it won't. Loop quantum gravity doesn't. And personally I expect some sort of new hybrid between continuous and discrete based on physics history; whenever in the past we've had a similar situation where it couldn't be X for this reason, but it couldn't be the obvious Not-X for some other reason, it has turned out to be something that had a bit of both in them, but wasn't either of them.
- CJefferson 5y agoI agree. Also, until you get super technical, it isn't really any different to "if you take the natural numbers, and split them into odd and even, you get two copies of the natural numbers".
- ColinWright 5y agoI disagree ... the "two copies of the natural numbers" is sorta fine, except that they're more "spread out" so it's not at all surprising. The surprising thing about BT is that the "pieces" are "moved around" ... there's no expansion or contraction. Yes, the natural number thing helps to understand that simply counting things doesn't help, but the "rigid motion" aspect of BT takes it further.
- CJefferson 5y agoTrue, that is the subtle bit -- but I think most people misunderstand (I'm not saying you are!), and don't realise you can always split an infinity into two -- this is just about splitting a sphere into some 'point clouds' such that you can cleverly stitch them back together into the same original space. In particular, the 'cutting' really makes no real-world sense (at least, as far as I can understand).
- ColinWright 5y agoI agree that the "cutting" makes no real world sense. In a way, that's one of the points of the exercise. And I agree that most people don't (initially) understand that an infinite set can be divided into two infinite sets that kinda "look the same", such as dividing Z (or N) into the evens and odds. But BT is more than that. What follows isn't really for you, but is for anyone following the conversation. Let's take a set A. It's a subset of the unit sphere, and it's a carefully chosen, special set, not just any random set. It's complicated to define, and requires the Axiom of Choice to do so, but that's what the BT theorem does ... it shows us how to define the set A. One of the properties of A is that we can rotate it into a new position, r(A), where none of the points of r(A) are in the same position as any points of the original position, A. So the sets r(A) and A have a zero intersection. For the set A there are lots of possible choices of r ... we pick a specific one that has some special properties. Again, the BT theorem is all about showing us how to do this. Now we take the union: B = A u r(A) The bizarre thing is this. If we've chosen A and r (and therefore by implication, B) carefully enough, it ends up that there's another rotation, call it s, such that s(B)=A, the set we started with. So whatever the volume of A, the volume of A u r(A) must be twice that, but that's B, and B can be rotated to give A back to us. So B must have the same volume as A. So 2 times V(A) must equal V(A), so A must have zero volume. Well, we can kinda cope with that. But if we've chosen A carefully enough, we find that a small, finite number of them, carefully chosen and rotated appropriately, together make up effectively the entire sphere (we miss out countably many points, but they have zero total volume, and we can fix that up later). So if finitely many copies of A make up a solid sphere, they can't have zero volume. And that's the "paradox". The conclusion is that we can't assign a concept of "volume" to the set A, and this is explained a little more in a blog post I've submitted here before: https://www.solipsys.co.uk/new/ThePointOfTheBanachTarskiTheorem.html?UJ06HN https://www.solipsys.co.uk/new/ThePointOfTheBanachTarskiTheo... There's a lot more going on than just the "I can split infinite sets into multiple pieces that kinda look the same as the original", although that is certainly part of it, and lots of people already find that hard to take. To any who has got this far, I hope that's useful.
- hikarudo 5y agoFeynman talks about exactly this in his book "Surely you're joking, Mr. Feynman": "Then I got an idea. I challenged them: "I bet there isn't a single theorem that you can tell me - what the assumptions are and what the theorem is in terms I can understand - where I can't tell you right away whether it's true or false." It often went like this: They would explain to me, "You've got an orange, OK? Now you cut the orange into a finite number of pieces, put it back together, and it's as big as the sun. True or false?" "No holes." "Impossible! "Ha! Everybody gather around! It's So-and-so's theorem of immeasurable measure!" Just when they think they've got me, I remind them, "But you said an orange! You can't cut the orange peel any thinner than the atoms." "But we have the condition of continuity: We can keep on cutting!" "No, you said an orange, so I assumed that you meant a real orange." So I always won. If I guessed it right, great. If I guessed it wrong, there was always something I could find in their simplification that they left out.