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I don't even understand the threat model for this, and why it's better than the fingerprint sensor built into the laptop. Seems like it's just writing the softw
by karmakaze 5y ago
I don't even understand the threat model for this, and why it's better than the fingerprint sensor built into the laptop. Seems like it's just writing the software elsewhere. What's up with the micro Yubikeys always left in a usb port operable by anyone made even less sense, so a step up.
- yoz-y 5y agoThe threat model is that people can't ssh to your machine in order to elevate their access (e.g. corporate VPN), because they can't physically touch the key. Example: whatever happened when major Twitter accounts were compromised.
- karmakaze 5y agoYes, but how is that different than if the software integrated with the sensor built into the hardware, like when 1Password uses the laptop's fingerprint reader?
- yoz-y 5y agoThere are some technicalities (I'm not sure what they are, but some orgs may want to have some boxes ticked for corporate approval of a tool). Then there is the fact that you can actually use the key in multiple machines, even those that don't have biometrics (e.g. desktops) Personal use case: I have my 1password account locked with a YubiKey, which means that if somebody would steal my credentials they can't get in without one of my devices. However, I still can technically use it from a browser on a friend's computer if I really needed to.
- g_p 5y agoCompared with a button based yubikey, someone else can't trivially tap this one if it's left behind, as you say. From a threat model perspective, biometrics are far from perfect. This setup avoids disclosing the biometric to the host system though - the yubikey itself validates the biometric and signs (or doesn't sign) a response with an internal protected private key. If you had a sensor built into a laptop or workstation, you are trusting that sensor. Some old ones used to expose raw fingerprint data to the operating system, which is clearly bad. If the user brings their own reader, you don't need to expose any biometric information beyond the yubikey itself (which is issued per user), so a host compromise or a rogue system won't be able to compromise someone's biometrics. Admittedly in this case a lot of the threat models that make sense would involve shared computers etc, and those have their own security issues.