3 ms·

> I side with the view that ontologies are merely useful tools in epistemology, subject to modification and qualification as our knowledge increases This is in

> I side with the view that ontologies are merely useful tools in epistemology, subject to modification and qualification as our knowledge increases This is incoherent. How can knowledge even exist if there are no natural kinds? What exactly would you be knowing in their absence? One can be mistaken about a particular predication, but knowledge isn't even possible if you deny the reality of natural kinds. Knowledge presupposes universals and universals presuppose natural kinds. I don't even know what is useful about natural kinds if they don't exist. How could you even talk about usefulness in their absence? You've denied the very possibility of even having a measure of usefulness! You seem to be taking a vaguely Kantian view of the world, except that you've gone further by denying that the categories of the mind are fixed AND that noumena are real. Kant himself is incoherent. If noumena are unknowable and all we have are phenomena and some mental schemata, then why posit noumena in the first place? What's the justification? In your case, how would you even make the claim you've made? Look at this statement: "I think the fact that we are self-aware makes it difficult (in the "it's not helpful" sense) to revoke our individuality if we participate in something bigger than ourselves." Putting aside the revolting notion of revoking my individuality like some collectivist (sorry, I'm a person, I have individuality, thanks), who is "we"? Wouldn't that denote at least suggest a genus, if not a species? That's just the beginning. Even if we accept that science reifies some things (which it does; science is to a large degree instrumentalist, but I know that only because I am capable of theoretical knowledge), that still presumes the existence of natural kinds and a broader capacity to know them. Science just becomes a way of organizing data for practical purposes (like laws that classify shellfish as fruit or whatever) and less a theoretical enterprise interested in knowing things as they actually are. The only workable solution is one that assumes the mind can know reality in principle. It can make mistakes, it can be in error, but it is capable of knowing. Skepticism is unworkable and nothing is worse than a kind of domesticated, halfway house skepticism that fails to notice the non-skeptical baggage that's being smuggled in through the backdoor to produce this half-hearted in-between. Either accept that knowledge is possible, or accept insanity. You cannot coherently straddle both.

mannykannot 5y ago
Given the very broad range of views on what, if anything, counts as a natural kind [1,2], it would seem that if I am being incoherent, philosophy as a whole is being incoherent, and if knowledge cannot even exist if there are no natural kinds, then we have not even taken the first steps to knowledge! What happens in practice, of course, is that we propose that the world is a certain way based on our experiences so far, without being hung up on the question of whether we have truly identified the real 'natural kinds' and are talking about them. We seek to validate, or refute, extend and/or replace these opinions, through further study of the world, in a process that is the opposite of the skepticism that you seem to think my position implies. If you find it helpful to think that 'natural kind' is a natural kind, then go ahead, but the fact that you know something about the world (a premise I am not disputing) does not make your assumption about natural kinds a metaphysical necessity and a prerequisite for knowledge. After all, we have, over the millennia, held many now demonstrably-false ideas about what sort of things there are in the world, yet that has not prevented us from learning more. One other thing: you wrote "putting aside the revolting notion of revoking my individuality like some collectivist..." Firstly, note how you are presenting an emotional reaction as if it were an argument. Secondly, if you had paid attention to my previous post, you would have seen that I am arguing that our individuality should not be put aside on account of the arguments in the article. Before you start bandying words like "incoherent" and "insanity", you should be a little more careful with your own arguments. [1] https://iep.utm.edu/nat-kind/ https://iep.utm.edu/nat-kind/ [2] https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/natural-kinds/#MetNatKin https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/natural-kinds/#MetNatKin
dsr_ 5y ago
1. You're arguing with the author, who isn't here. 2. The problem with your approach is that people instantaneously leap from "capable of knowing" to "knowing", and they do this all the time. So anything that reminds you that you are definitely wrong is a useful tool, just as ontologies are helpful tools (and wrong). 3. "genus" does not exist. "species" does not exist. "clade" could exist in limited cases but is inevitably incomplete. (Consider that you are pointing at creatures and their offspring without thinking about their microbiomes, among other things.)

mannykannot 5y ago

Given the very broad range of views on what, if anything, counts as a natural kind [1,2], it would seem that if I am being incoherent, philosophy as a whole is being incoherent, and if knowledge cannot even exist if there are no natural kinds, then we have not even taken the first steps to knowledge! What happens in practice, of course, is that we propose that the world is a certain way based on our experiences so far, without being hung up on the question of whether we have truly identified the real 'natural kinds' and are talking about them. We seek to validate, or refute, extend and/or replace these opinions, through further study of the world, in a process that is the opposite of the skepticism that you seem to think my position implies. If you find it helpful to think that 'natural kind' is a natural kind, then go ahead, but the fact that you know something about the world (a premise I am not disputing) does not make your assumption about natural kinds a metaphysical necessity and a prerequisite for knowledge. After all, we have, over the millennia, held many now demonstrably-false ideas about what sort of things there are in the world, yet that has not prevented us from learning more. One other thing: you wrote "putting aside the revolting notion of revoking my individuality like some collectivist..." Firstly, note how you are presenting an emotional reaction as if it were an argument. Secondly, if you had paid attention to my previous post, you would have seen that I am arguing that our individuality should not be put aside on account of the arguments in the article. Before you start bandying words like "incoherent" and "insanity", you should be a little more careful with your own arguments. [1] https://iep.utm.edu/nat-kind/ https://iep.utm.edu/nat-kind/ [2] https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/natural-kinds/#MetNatKin https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/natural-kinds/#MetNatKin

dsr_ 5y ago

1. You're arguing with the author, who isn't here. 2. The problem with your approach is that people instantaneously leap from "capable of knowing" to "knowing", and they do this all the time. So anything that reminds you that you are definitely wrong is a useful tool, just as ontologies are helpful tools (and wrong). 3. "genus" does not exist. "species" does not exist. "clade" could exist in limited cases but is inevitably incomplete. (Consider that you are pointing at creatures and their offspring without thinking about their microbiomes, among other things.)