3 ms·
High security services should send a pair of U2F keys to each and every customer when they sign up (or hit a retention/value threshold), with instructions on ho
by sneak 5y ago
High security services should send a pair of U2F keys to each and every customer when they sign up (or hit a retention/value threshold), with instructions on how to store them (that is, different buildings). Then they can use normal app-based 2FA day to day (NOT TOTP as that is phishable), and use the preenrolled U2F hardware tokens as recovery methods when the user inevitably loses their phone and needs to re-enroll their primary 2FA device (the service app on their new phone).
Falling back to SMS to reset 2FA, or Skype calls where you hold up your ID with a CSR or whatever is just asking for shit like this. In bulk the hardware is probably <$5/token, so well under $10/user (probably closer to $5/user even for a pair of tokens). If your CLTV for your high security financial service can’t afford that, go do something else.
This is a solved problem; the fact that financial institutions have not got on board with 10+ year old stable, cheap, widely available technology is a market failure caused by massive overregulation.
Nothing about this is hard, nothing about this is expensive, there’s just a pervasive attitude in financial technology circles of “this is the way we’ve always done it” or “this is the way everyone else does it”, even if those ways encapsulate a ton of waste and risk.
Even without the whole “n+1 tokens, used only as primary 2fa recovery” scheme, I don’t think there’s a single US retail bank that supports U2F even for normal 2FA login. It’s shameful.
This industry is so ridiculously ripe for disruption but it’s so heavily overregulated that nobody that doesn’t suck is allowed to enter the market. Simple was the first to try (and even they had to use a partner bank) and they got erased via acquisition (and I think subsequently shut down).
- thinkharderdev 5y agoAt this point I think the thing holding back U2F is just user experience. It is not "hard" but it is a pain in the ass and most people just find it annoying. The other issue is that you ultimately need some sort of fallback mechanism if someone loses their keys. And it will happen. So you still end up with a process that can be socially engineered, which is generally the weak link in any authentication system.
- sneak 5y agoThe pain in the ass is why it should be used as an primary app-based 2FA recovery mechanism. Doing 2FA via app is fine for most users. The failures happen when users lose their phone and need to reset 2FA. That's where the pain in the ass (but secure pain in the ass) of U2F would come in handy, to re-enroll primary 2FA. Nobody presently has good ways of doing 2FA resets. U2F hardware is a near-perfect solution.
- thinkharderdev 5y agoIt's a near perfect solution assuming nobody ever loses their U2F device.
- moepstar 5y agoThis is why you get two, one primary and one backup - they (Coinbase) actively encourage you to enroll two (or more, i think the limit is 5 or 6). Also, their mobile app recently was updated to support NFC Yubikeys...