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We've spent years and years and years trying to train people to resist phishing. It doesn't work. Even actual literal security professionals fall for it. If you
by UncleMeat 5y ago
We've spent years and years and years trying to train people to resist phishing. It doesn't work. Even actual literal security professionals fall for it. If you use a thing with such common known failure modes, it is your responsibility for using that thing.
Phishing is enormously more common than sim-swapping because, as described in TFA, it can be fully automated. Going from SMS to TOTP fixes a rare attack but does not fix a common attack.
- Laforet 5y agoSo what other options do we have available? We have tried client certificates, hardware tokens, biometrics and a tonne of heuristics. None of these could do much to stop an attack when the user is cooperating with the scammer.
- UncleMeat 5y agoWebauthn works. You cannot sign a message for the wrong origin. The core problem here is that everybody needs access to some sort of hardware to do this and they need systems to handle the inevitable loss of that hardware.
- withinboredom 5y agoLiterally Windows and MacOS has this built-in. But you’re right, the hard part is losing the token or it breaking. I slammed one Yubikey in a door, breaking it in half. I’m on my backup but I still find services where I didn’t enroll the backup and have to go through a lengthy process to regain access to my account (or create a new one).
- jdavis703 5y agoHardware tokens and biometrics are better because it makes it harder for the scammer to describe a plausible scenario to intercept the authentication. In one of the linked articles the scammers pretended to send a one-time token and asked the victim to read it back. This is the same process my top-10 US-based bank uses, so it wouldn’t necessarily raise any red flags.
- jorvi 5y agoI think against somewhat trained people only spear phishing is effective which is the type of phishing that can’t be automated
- UncleMeat 5y agoThe data does not seem to support this. Yes, spear phishing is even more effective. But oodles and oodles and oodles of exercises demonstrate that people, even experts, fall for phishing.
- formerly_proven 5y agoExperts fall for phishing because many businesses, including and especially financial institutions (PayPal and eBay are easily some of the worst offenders here), make it essentially impossible to tell phishing from their "legit" mails.
- remexre 5y agoDoesn't WebAuthn fix phishing? I was under the impression the secrets are tied to individual origins by the browser.
- UncleMeat 5y agoIt does. This is why every service should be making active plans to push in this direction. We've struggled with this problem for ages and it is now completely solved.
- GekkePrutser 5y agoDoes it really though? I love Webauthn. It is so much better than passwords. But I don't think it means the end of phishing. Phishers will evolve too and find new tricks. Just like they did here with OTP interception bots. For example a phishing site could trick me into authenticating into a fake site, and give them a session at the real site as a result. They won't have my actual credentials but they could have a session which is enough to do a lot of damage. I don't think Webauthn guarantees that the site I'm authenticating to is the site I'm supposed to (though I may be wrong here, I didn't read into it too deeply). As far as I know it still relies on TLS for that, and regular phishing and typosquatting show that this is not airtight. It would be great if the authentication worked both ways, the server would authenticate to the client as well as it does to the server. It does raise a few other questions too. If every site uses Webauthn, I will have to update every site when I get a new yubikey. That's going to be a PITA. A solution for that would be using an identity service.. Like "Sign in with Google". But I would never trust a commercial service like Google, Facebook, Microsoft for this. It would have to be something open and privacy-safe.
- UncleMeat 5y ago> For example a phishing site could trick me into authenticating into a fake site, and give them a session at the real site as a result. The fake site needs to be hosted somewhere, presumably not on the same origin as the real site. As such, your key will be unable to sign a message for the phishing site regardless of how hard you try. This is the core difference with SMS/TOTP. With those models nothing stops you from handing the material over to a site on a different origin and letting them reflect that material to the target site. With webauthn, the thing you hand the phishing site is useless for authenticating on the target site.
- loudmax 5y agoIn my experience, banks and other online institutions have spent years training their customers to fall for phishing attempts by sending legit emails with embedded links. People take it for granted that emails coming into their inbox that contain links to login pages really are from their bank, because that's how their bank behaves normally.
- stanleydrew 5y agoI hadn't ever thought about this but you're right. Best practice for sensitive services like banks should be to have no links at all in emails. I don't think that's likely to change though.
- danhor 5y agoEven worse, they sometimes try really hard to be indistingushable. I recently got a mail from an insurance company that they were upgrading the login method (red flag). The domain in the link contained wasn't the main domain but a separate customer service domain (red flag 2). And the main login didn't work as expected before clicking the link in the mail (at least that redirected to the main domain). It really can't get much worse.