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Recoverable passwords are what everyone means when they say "plaintext". You're positing a distinction that doesn't exist.
by ajross 15y ago
Recoverable passwords are what everyone means when they say "plaintext". You're positing a distinction that doesn't exist.
- ddlatham 15y agoThat's not true. Some people say "We keep your password encrypted" instead of in plaintext, and make the dubious claim that they are then safe. It's good to help them understand the distinction that even if the passwords are encrypted, it's still a problem if they are recoverable.
- ceejayoz 15y agoThere's absolutely a distinction. Reversibly encrypted passwords aren't ideal, but it does at least make a database dump less useful to someone who manages a SQL injection exploit.
- tptacek 15y agoNo, it means that getting the actual raw passwords is now a fun little puzzle for anyone who gets SQLI. News flash for the (hopefully small) collection of people who may be kidding themselves on this point: unless you've gone to significant lengths to mitigate this specific problem, if you give up the SQL for your website, you've probably given up the box, too. How likely is it that you're THAT company, the one that hardened their database server and app architecture so that it can survive someone who compromises SQL, and that you actually have SQLI? And, if you're THAT company, how likely is it that you're storing reversably encrypted passwords? And if you're THAT company, how likely is it that you're simply mailing them back to customers on request? It's not likely.
- ceejayoz 15y agoOne would hope that the encryption key wouldn't be in the database. The point remains - there is a benefit to reversibly encrypted passwords versus plaintext ones. It's certainly not ideal, but it's better than nothing.
- tptacek 15y agoRespectfully, who gives a shit if it's in the database? If you lose the database, you lose the box. You're done. Whatever information you were storing reversably anywhere in your data center, you are going to lose. Don't store reversably encrypted passwords: full stop.
- ceejayoz 15y ago> If you lose the database, you lose the box. Hardly. The SQL injection may have occurred with a limited-access SQL user. The encryption algorithm might be strong enough to give you years or decades of protection against brute forcing. etc. etc. etc. > Don't store reversably encrypted passwords: full stop. Absolutely. I'm just pointing out that "there's no difference between plaintext and reversibly encrypted passwords" is a blatant lie.
- tptacek 15y agoYou already responded to the comment where I said it's possible to rig up a database so that your app server might survive SQLI, so let me just wrap this unproductive little thread up by saying: I don't believe you. If I see you mailing user passwords back to users, I will bet on SQLI losing all those passwords every time, at any odds. Nerds like us are always going to come up with some twister counterfactual scenario where someone somewhere could do something unexpected. I don't care. None of this is relevant to the issue at hand. This company probably isn't even encrypting passwords, but whether they do or they don't: if they get owned up, they're losing all of them.
- drdaeman 15y agoIf your email provider supports CRAM-MD5 or DIGEST-MD5 authentication (on SMTP, POP3 or IMAP) — they're storing your password either in plaintext or reversibly encrypted. If your ISP provides PPPoE, PPTP or IPsec-less L2TP connectivity and support CHAP, MS-CHAPv2 or PEAPv0/EAP-MSCHAPv2 authentication — they're probably storing your password in plaintext. And while the email providers'd better start dropping this practice (as most mobile phones nowadays support SSL/TLS) and use TLS, ISPs are better stay with plaintext passwords. Wiretapping Ethernet, DSL line or open WiFi hotspot is orders of magnitude easier than hacking into the database. Obviously, that's only until the day majority of SOHO routers and other client hardware would support EAP-TLS.