In this case you have a unit which reports directly to the sheriff, who in turn answers to no authority besides the voters. And the people (and journalists) hav

In this case you have a unit which reports directly to the sheriff, who in turn answers to no authority besides the voters. And the people (and journalists) have a very limited ability to audit the inner workings of a police department. With the reforms I mentioned we're adding additional, independent forms of oversight. A regional police administration could be required by law to randomly audit and publish reports on the activities of a local department, and an accreditation board can require their own audits. Most importantly, is tying accreditation to funding. Officers will report corruption if that corruption could lead to de-crediting, which in turns means layoffs, pay cuts, and reduced equipment. It will even change the incentives for police unions. When police misconduct has the potential to cut into the bottom line of officers, it is in the best interests of unions to also help minimize misconduct. And collective bargaining agreements are with the police departments, not with the accrediting body, meaning unions would have limited influence over certification standards. Absolutely these sorts of solutions are not a panacea, and there is still plenty of room for things to go wrong. Corruption at the higher echelons of state-wide authorities would have more impact due to this centralization of authority. The accrediting body has to walk a fine line: it needs to be seen as a body of peers by police officers (in the same way lawyers view the BAR association) while at the same time enforcing best practices and leading reforms. There's a balancing act there that has to be done right. And even with all of this corruption can still happen, but it might re-align incentives and work to reduce some of the serious issues we see with America's police forces.