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You can inspect or easily get the decryption keys traffic on devices you control such as your PC or your Web Browser. If you control the OS but not the applicat
by zamadatix 5y ago
You can inspect or easily get the decryption keys traffic on devices you control such as your PC or your Web Browser. If you control the OS but not the applications you choose to run set up an explicit proxy and inspect there. On devices you don't control the OS or applications of (of which includes other people's devices anyways) the choice of HTTP or HTTPS doesn't change anything as the device/application always has the ability to make payloads opaque they just won't be authenticated at the protocol layer in the case of HTTP. Not using HTTPS for the traffic you do control does not impact traffic you don't control it just leaks more information about you and opens more attack vectors.
The most common cases of MitM are actually service providers, both with HTTP and DNS, typically to serve ads or sell telemetry. Individually targeted attacks are important but lower on the list in terms of real world impact at the moment.
Outside of the falsehood that you need HTTPS to conceal exfiltration of information for apps you don't control how is HTTPS enabling you to become incredibly vulnerable to other attack vectors?
- xg15 5y agoThis is true, however the current push to enforce HTTPS everywhere normalizes encrypted traffic. If encrypted or obfuscated connections were rare, you could make a filter that only lets through inspectable connections and deploy it without much breakage. If all connections are encrypted, you cannot distinguish between safe and suspicious traffic at all. Together with eSNI, DoH and QUIC, the goal is pretty explicitly to treat the network as an adversary. That's a good thing if you really don't trust the network but a bad thing if you lose control over your own network.
- zamadatix 5y agoAgain, you can inspect or easily get the decryption keys traffic on devices you control such as your PC or your Web Browser. If you control the OS but not the applications you choose to run set up an explicit proxy and inspect there. If the app doesn't follow explicit system proxies add your transparent proxy key to the root store. If the app ignores that then congratulations, you're at "you could make a filter that only lets through inspectable connections and deploy it without much breakage" without getting rid of the benefits of Encryption to do so. Encryption is not what makes the app communication opaque, inability to control the device does. The external network IS an adversary when it comes to your data. If you truly controlled your data at the start then you can specify where the external network begins. By default that is when it leaves your PC but it does not always have to be that point.