I don't think it's by any means uninteresting, and I agree that complexity theory has a role to play in enriching epistemology. That's why I said elsewhere in t

I don't think it's by any means uninteresting, and I agree that complexity theory has a role to play in enriching epistemology. That's why I said elsewhere in this discussion that I think this kind of work is important. However, it's not in any way obvious that there are metaphysical implications to the limits this sort of result would place on knowledge. Facts are (for present purposes) simply to be identified with physical states of affairs. If some physical state of affairs is unknowable (and "System S will be in state R at time T" certainly looks like a physical state of affairs), does that mean it does not (or will not) actually obtain? I have a hard time seeing how one could make that argument, although of course that shouldn't stop you, if you think you have a good angle! To address the particular example under discussion: if you take free will to consist of the impossibility of predicting an agent's actions and conclude that because this prediction is impossible, we are free, you still need to provide a further argument that your definition of free will is the correct one. I'm not prejudging whether or not you could come up with a convincing argument to that effect—it might well be possible. But to my mind, the point of the omniscient narrator example is to add determinism to the system: because our actions are known in advance, they can be known in advance; if they can be known in advance, they must be determined. I take this to be the implicit argument when people suggest that we're not free because God knows what we will do. Obviously there are different ways in which we can understand the modalities of time, and I won't try to pretend that this isn't a contentious area.