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You may say that Wittgenstein in his later phase (W II) was more interested in pulling the threads, when he explored concepts like pain as a stand-in for intern

You may say that Wittgenstein in his later phase (W II) was more interested in pulling the threads, when he explored concepts like pain as a stand-in for internal evidence (or, as W I put it: the mystical). However, this was also on an entirely different page, as in comprehending the subject as a social process. Mind that I do not mean to suggest any kind of parallelism in a strict sense (hence the emoticon.) Regarding the lost cause as a distraction, I'm not so sure about that. I guess, Wittgenstein would have insisted on this being about all, which was important to us, but nevertheless being out of reach of any kind of theory in the strict sense. (And this is, because – according to Wittgenstein – it is essentially outside of any reality, which is accessibly to us. On the other hand, it may have still reality beyond this, "The contemplation of the world sub specie aeterni is its contemplation as a limited whole." [6.45], "Die Anschauung der Welt sub specie aeterni ist ihre Anschauung als-begrenztes-Ganzes." However, there are no legitimate question that may be actually posed regarding this limited whole, which is reflected just as a feeling from the inside; hence, the proposed riddle – which is really about existence – doesn't exist on any level of disciplined discourse.) Regarding evolutionary fitness, there may have been a niche: According to the Tractatus, the mystical arises, which might have been further explored by some theory of emergence. But this developed only much later and – as far as I know it — a connection was never made.

klik99 5y ago
Yeah, what I meant was Godel was poking at the edges of the logical systems, eventually logically proving that we can't know everything about them, but even afterwards he was still into (simplifying it a bit here) logic-for-it's-own-sake, even though he was exploring how logic is inherently incomplete (not in the Godel sense of incomplete, I just couldn't think of a better word....) Whereas W II does get more specific and deeply explores the real-world implications, partly as a rejection of W I's tendency to speak in abstract, high-level ideas. But W II doesn't dwell on the implications of the inherent fallacy of logic as Godel does, just uses that as a rung in the ladder to somewhere else. And I didn't take it as you making a direct like to Godel, but it's interesting to think about because they were all part of the same zeitgeist which is still strongly echoing in our culture. They didn't see eye-to-eye in their life despite some common threads, and it got me thinking about WHY that was.

klik99 5y ago

Yeah, what I meant was Godel was poking at the edges of the logical systems, eventually logically proving that we can't know everything about them, but even afterwards he was still into (simplifying it a bit here) logic-for-it's-own-sake, even though he was exploring how logic is inherently incomplete (not in the Godel sense of incomplete, I just couldn't think of a better word....) Whereas W II does get more specific and deeply explores the real-world implications, partly as a rejection of W I's tendency to speak in abstract, high-level ideas. But W II doesn't dwell on the implications of the inherent fallacy of logic as Godel does, just uses that as a rung in the ladder to somewhere else. And I didn't take it as you making a direct like to Godel, but it's interesting to think about because they were all part of the same zeitgeist which is still strongly echoing in our culture. They didn't see eye-to-eye in their life despite some common threads, and it got me thinking about WHY that was.