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The federal reserve was able to intervene in much the same way in the US post lehman by being a lender of last resort and getting credit flowing again. The bigg

The federal reserve was able to intervene in much the same way in the US post lehman by being a lender of last resort and getting credit flowing again. The bigger problem with the 2009 crash was the massive recession that followed as the economic sectors built up around the housing bubble struggled to recover. If China's housing bubble collapses, it could still cause a big recession there with high unemployment while the economy adapts/adjusts.

JumpCrisscross 5y ago
> federal reserve was able to intervene in much the same way in the US post lehman by being a lender of last resort and getting credit flowing again But ex ante there wasn't assurance it would do so. In that interval, between the collapse and the aide, there was a lot of economic damage done. Far more than simply pivoting away from construction-fueled growth would explain. (The lesson was learned: our response in Covid is a recognition that moral hazard must take a back seat to systemic risk.)
- jkhdigital 5y ago
  > a recognition that moral hazard must take a back seat to systemic risk Moral hazard is a major source of systemic risk. And extreme wealth inequality.
  - JumpCrisscross 5y ago
    > Moral hazard is a major source of systemic risk This is unsupported by the literature. Moral hazard creates risk. It has no special power to create systemic risk. Systemic risk is created by risk interconnects (the more opaque the better), predominantly, and crises of faith, less dominantly. (The latter is more of a classic case. If the government is collapsing, yes, you have systemic financial risk, but, one, that's obvious, and two, that's not the most pressing problem.) Once you're done mopping up the systemic risk, nothing stops you from curing the moral hazard. If China bails out Evergrande, I don't think the executives will have a fun time. In America, post-crisis regulation was sharpened to limit the chance of future bailouts. (Though, in my opinion, not enough.)

JumpCrisscross 5y ago

> federal reserve was able to intervene in much the same way in the US post lehman by being a lender of last resort and getting credit flowing again But ex ante there wasn't assurance it would do so. In that interval, between the collapse and the aide, there was a lot of economic damage done. Far more than simply pivoting away from construction-fueled growth would explain. (The lesson was learned: our response in Covid is a recognition that moral hazard must take a back seat to systemic risk.)

jkhdigital 5y ago
> a recognition that moral hazard must take a back seat to systemic risk Moral hazard is a major source of systemic risk. And extreme wealth inequality.
- JumpCrisscross 5y ago
  > Moral hazard is a major source of systemic risk This is unsupported by the literature. Moral hazard creates risk. It has no special power to create systemic risk. Systemic risk is created by risk interconnects (the more opaque the better), predominantly, and crises of faith, less dominantly. (The latter is more of a classic case. If the government is collapsing, yes, you have systemic financial risk, but, one, that's obvious, and two, that's not the most pressing problem.) Once you're done mopping up the systemic risk, nothing stops you from curing the moral hazard. If China bails out Evergrande, I don't think the executives will have a fun time. In America, post-crisis regulation was sharpened to limit the chance of future bailouts. (Though, in my opinion, not enough.)