4 ms·

In a nutshell, Wittgenstein showed (or, attempted to show) that much like we can't gain information from logic, we can't gain transcendental meaning (das Mystis

In a nutshell, Wittgenstein showed (or, attempted to show) that much like we can't gain information from logic, we can't gain transcendental meaning (das Mystische) from logic – even, if (or, more precisely, provided that) we discard any meaningless propositions. (Mind that this is in sharp contrast to Kant, who engaged in his Critique of Pure Reason in order to address pure ethics.) It's a bit like "Gödel for transcendentals". But this has been mostly ignored, while the tools used by Wittgenstein have been an inspiration to many.

masswerk 5y ago
Or, if you like it this way, the Halteproblem for transcendental reasoning is universal. There are no computable propositions regarding the mystical. ;-)
klik99 5y ago
Interesting way to put it: "Gödel for transcendentals" - probably only able to put it that way with the benefit of time. The relationship between the Russell/Gödel camp and Wittgenstein is complicated - In some ways at odds (as they grew apart Russell thought Wittgenstein was dedicating his life to not thinking) but I think they were concerned with the same questions. Gödel and Wittgenstein would probably both agree that you can't describe the system from within the system. Gödel was more interested pulling the threads and exploring the edges of that, whereas Wittgenstein took that to mean philosophy (at least as it pertains to living) was a lost cause and distraction from reality. In other words, I feel they were on the same page but had completely different ultimate interests. And ultimately, the Russell camp won - a modern echo of that is the search for the one equation that will describe all of reality, or at least a belief that even if we never find it there is still one out there. Wittgenstein would probably believe that no man made system could fundamentally describe reality. It's largely been ignored, yes, because where do you go from there? Someone who believes in Wittgenstein is probably more likely to join the army or become an architect than become a philosopher, which guarantees that it will be ignored. Evolutionarily it's an idea that doesn't fit into the ecosystem.
- masswerk 5y ago
  You may say that Wittgenstein in his later phase (W II) was more interested in pulling the threads, when he explored concepts like pain as a stand-in for internal evidence (or, as W I put it: the mystical). However, this was also on an entirely different page, as in comprehending the subject as a social process. Mind that I do not mean to suggest any kind of parallelism in a strict sense (hence the emoticon.) Regarding the lost cause as a distraction, I'm not so sure about that. I guess, Wittgenstein would have insisted on this being about all, which was important to us, but nevertheless being out of reach of any kind of theory in the strict sense. (And this is, because – according to Wittgenstein – it is essentially outside of any reality, which is accessibly to us. On the other hand, it may have still reality beyond this, "The contemplation of the world sub specie aeterni is its contemplation as a limited whole." [6.45], "Die Anschauung der Welt sub specie aeterni ist ihre Anschauung als-begrenztes-Ganzes." However, there are no legitimate question that may be actually posed regarding this limited whole, which is reflected just as a feeling from the inside; hence, the proposed riddle – which is really about existence – doesn't exist on any level of disciplined discourse.) Regarding evolutionary fitness, there may have been a niche: According to the Tractatus, the mystical arises, which might have been further explored by some theory of emergence. But this developed only much later and – as far as I know it — a connection was never made.
  - klik99 5y ago
    Yeah, what I meant was Godel was poking at the edges of the logical systems, eventually logically proving that we can't know everything about them, but even afterwards he was still into (simplifying it a bit here) logic-for-it's-own-sake, even though he was exploring how logic is inherently incomplete (not in the Godel sense of incomplete, I just couldn't think of a better word....) Whereas W II does get more specific and deeply explores the real-world implications, partly as a rejection of W I's tendency to speak in abstract, high-level ideas. But W II doesn't dwell on the implications of the inherent fallacy of logic as Godel does, just uses that as a rung in the ladder to somewhere else. And I didn't take it as you making a direct like to Godel, but it's interesting to think about because they were all part of the same zeitgeist which is still strongly echoing in our culture. They didn't see eye-to-eye in their life despite some common threads, and it got me thinking about WHY that was.
samvega_ 5y ago
Kant's critiqe of pure reason was what the title suggests actually, he also argued that logic (i.e pure reason), cannot hammer out ethics (what one ought to do) nor metaphysics (what ultimately is). It's only practical reason which can determine morality, i.e. his point of departure for his ethical theory is the acting being, not pure logic.
- masswerk 5y ago
  And you could even say that Wittgenstein took a somewhat similar route, when he shifted his interest from the unanswerable riddle of existence and its implications to the exploration of meaningful existence as a human being, which is inevitably involved in a social process. (Mind that this is not suggesting any substantial similarities beyond this.)
srcreigh 5y ago
I wonder if it affects the theory of computation in any way. Is it an argument against the church Turing thesis? Is it reason to believe in the existence of computational oracle TM such as a halting oracle TM? To me these questions are related to strong AI. Are creative inputs to normal algorithms fundamentally more effective than normal inputs to creative algorithms? Is there a high degree of intricacy of information such that inputs to the algorithm is somehow more powerful than any algorithm?
- masswerk 5y ago
  Not really, as it is on an entirely different level. According to the Tractatus, any transcendental questions are really about existence. As this is outside of what is graspable inside the world (and only accessible as a concept by the impossible position from looking at the world from outside), it is simply beyond theoretical reach. As any propositions about the real, factual world belong to the natural sciences, this leaves no genuine propositions to philosophy. The subject of these philosophical questions just arises, but can't be argued about – at least, not in a meaningful way in the strict sense. So computation doesn't promise any meaningful answers, nor do these questions lend themselves to computation. Even more so, as nothing genuinely arises from logic (but logic structure). (While some of this may remind of Kant's thing in itself, it is comes from an entirely different direction, namely, a proposed teleology of philosophy, while Kant addresses this from the fundamentals of perception.)

masswerk 5y ago

Or, if you like it this way, the Halteproblem for transcendental reasoning is universal. There are no computable propositions regarding the mystical. ;-)

klik99 5y ago

Interesting way to put it: "Gödel for transcendentals" - probably only able to put it that way with the benefit of time. The relationship between the Russell/Gödel camp and Wittgenstein is complicated - In some ways at odds (as they grew apart Russell thought Wittgenstein was dedicating his life to not thinking) but I think they were concerned with the same questions. Gödel and Wittgenstein would probably both agree that you can't describe the system from within the system. Gödel was more interested pulling the threads and exploring the edges of that, whereas Wittgenstein took that to mean philosophy (at least as it pertains to living) was a lost cause and distraction from reality. In other words, I feel they were on the same page but had completely different ultimate interests. And ultimately, the Russell camp won - a modern echo of that is the search for the one equation that will describe all of reality, or at least a belief that even if we never find it there is still one out there. Wittgenstein would probably believe that no man made system could fundamentally describe reality. It's largely been ignored, yes, because where do you go from there? Someone who believes in Wittgenstein is probably more likely to join the army or become an architect than become a philosopher, which guarantees that it will be ignored. Evolutionarily it's an idea that doesn't fit into the ecosystem.

masswerk 5y ago
You may say that Wittgenstein in his later phase (W II) was more interested in pulling the threads, when he explored concepts like pain as a stand-in for internal evidence (or, as W I put it: the mystical). However, this was also on an entirely different page, as in comprehending the subject as a social process. Mind that I do not mean to suggest any kind of parallelism in a strict sense (hence the emoticon.) Regarding the lost cause as a distraction, I'm not so sure about that. I guess, Wittgenstein would have insisted on this being about all, which was important to us, but nevertheless being out of reach of any kind of theory in the strict sense. (And this is, because – according to Wittgenstein – it is essentially outside of any reality, which is accessibly to us. On the other hand, it may have still reality beyond this, "The contemplation of the world sub specie aeterni is its contemplation as a limited whole." [6.45], "Die Anschauung der Welt sub specie aeterni ist ihre Anschauung als-begrenztes-Ganzes." However, there are no legitimate question that may be actually posed regarding this limited whole, which is reflected just as a feeling from the inside; hence, the proposed riddle – which is really about existence – doesn't exist on any level of disciplined discourse.) Regarding evolutionary fitness, there may have been a niche: According to the Tractatus, the mystical arises, which might have been further explored by some theory of emergence. But this developed only much later and – as far as I know it — a connection was never made.
- klik99 5y ago
  Yeah, what I meant was Godel was poking at the edges of the logical systems, eventually logically proving that we can't know everything about them, but even afterwards he was still into (simplifying it a bit here) logic-for-it's-own-sake, even though he was exploring how logic is inherently incomplete (not in the Godel sense of incomplete, I just couldn't think of a better word....) Whereas W II does get more specific and deeply explores the real-world implications, partly as a rejection of W I's tendency to speak in abstract, high-level ideas. But W II doesn't dwell on the implications of the inherent fallacy of logic as Godel does, just uses that as a rung in the ladder to somewhere else. And I didn't take it as you making a direct like to Godel, but it's interesting to think about because they were all part of the same zeitgeist which is still strongly echoing in our culture. They didn't see eye-to-eye in their life despite some common threads, and it got me thinking about WHY that was.

samvega_ 5y ago

Kant's critiqe of pure reason was what the title suggests actually, he also argued that logic (i.e pure reason), cannot hammer out ethics (what one ought to do) nor metaphysics (what ultimately is). It's only practical reason which can determine morality, i.e. his point of departure for his ethical theory is the acting being, not pure logic.

masswerk 5y ago
And you could even say that Wittgenstein took a somewhat similar route, when he shifted his interest from the unanswerable riddle of existence and its implications to the exploration of meaningful existence as a human being, which is inevitably involved in a social process. (Mind that this is not suggesting any substantial similarities beyond this.)

srcreigh 5y ago

I wonder if it affects the theory of computation in any way. Is it an argument against the church Turing thesis? Is it reason to believe in the existence of computational oracle TM such as a halting oracle TM? To me these questions are related to strong AI. Are creative inputs to normal algorithms fundamentally more effective than normal inputs to creative algorithms? Is there a high degree of intricacy of information such that inputs to the algorithm is somehow more powerful than any algorithm?

masswerk 5y ago
Not really, as it is on an entirely different level. According to the Tractatus, any transcendental questions are really about existence. As this is outside of what is graspable inside the world (and only accessible as a concept by the impossible position from looking at the world from outside), it is simply beyond theoretical reach. As any propositions about the real, factual world belong to the natural sciences, this leaves no genuine propositions to philosophy. The subject of these philosophical questions just arises, but can't be argued about – at least, not in a meaningful way in the strict sense. So computation doesn't promise any meaningful answers, nor do these questions lend themselves to computation. Even more so, as nothing genuinely arises from logic (but logic structure). (While some of this may remind of Kant's thing in itself, it is comes from an entirely different direction, namely, a proposed teleology of philosophy, while Kant addresses this from the fundamentals of perception.)