2 ms·
I think that's the wrong lesson here. An0m created two vulnerabilities to its users: - It was specifically marketed to criminal entities. That is, it sharply
by dredmorbius 5y ago
I think that's the wrong lesson here.
An0m created two vulnerabilities to its users:
- It was specifically marketed to criminal entities. That is, it sharply reduced the search space. In a 33 bit world, An0m is 14 bits.
- It was specifically back-doored.
"Roll your own" avoids the 2nd case but not the first. By definition, rolling your own already reduces search space to the domain of interest. (Other means of evidence gathering may be needed, but should be reasonably viablle.)
Instead, what you want is:
- Blend in with the crowd.
- Utilise widely-shared communications protocols, implementations, and tools.
- Ensure that these have secure cryptographic methods and implementations.
- Audit the hell out of these and offer bounties for any vulnerabilities which can be demonstrated.
If at all possible, see to it that widely-used, generally-available communications tools themselves offer secure cryptographic methods and implemntations. And school your minions in their proper and effective use and limits.
- Closi 5y agoAgreed, although I think this is the hard bit: > - Audit the hell out of these and offer bounties for any vulnerabilities which can be demonstrated. The NSA backdoors will be pretty hard to find if they are there - It's not like you are going to see something like "If User == "NSA" Then Divulge_Key()". The backdoor is going to be something like a very subtle bug with how a particular crypto library is implemented, or some obscure buffer oveflow attack, and it probably won't even be discernible from an accidental bug. In reality I doubt there is any way to know if the NSA can eavesdrop, it's a complete coin toss.
- dredmorbius 5y agoAFAIU most of the NSA's capabilities come through workfactor-reduction values --- seed values to cryptographic functions which reduce the time to crack a given message (if the secret seeds are known). Avoiding NIST-recommended ciphers seems to be generally-advisable in this case. There are other backdoors (see the case of Juniper Networks), but there's probably an enumerable set of pracices. One helpful option is to use Free Software tools in which single actors are ulikely to be able to subvert the tool, and many have an interest in its integrity.