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If you care mostly about web browsers or equivalent technology, because you make an actual web site, for visiting with web browsers, probably no, everything is
by tialaramex 5y ago
If you care mostly about web browsers or equivalent technology, because you make an actual web site, for visiting with web browsers, probably no, everything is fine, anybody who would be broken by this is probably already annoyed for something else your modern site does.
If your only TLS clients are under your control (e.g. you own an app, the app uses HTTPS or some other TLS protocol to talk to your servers) then you should be able to easily work out if there's any problem [edited to add: Hint, use a tool to wind their clock forward past the deadline by a day or so and see what happens] and decide whether and how to mitigate such problems.
But, if you allow third parties (customers, suppliers, or worst of all, the General Public) to use some protocol (whether that's a RESTful HTTPS server or some custom text protocol from the 1980s) over TLS, you are potentially in for a lot of trouble when DST Root CA X3 expires and you should be on top of that by now.
* If you need everybody and their dog to connect using rusty garbage from last century, too bad, figure out which certificates you need to pay $$$ for to make that happen and authorise the purchases today. In this case though I'm astonished Let's Encrypt has ever worked for you. DST Root X3 was widely accepted, but it was hardly the most popular.
* If you can live with some clients dropping away e.g. because it's a free service anyway, or your SLA or other Ts&Cs say that you use Let's Encrypt and so it's actually in some sense "their problem" when this breaks, or you just hate money and love being sued, you can do nothing.
* Otherwise you really need to figure out what fraction of your users will blow up. You should be capturing User Agent info (if HTTPS) and metrics on the types of cipher suite used and other fingerprints that can help you figure out what's connecting and thus what to expect. You need to be contacting "at risk" customers if possible to warn them what's about to happen and point them to resources for what they should do:
1. Software upgrades. Archaic OpenSSL is the biggest problem, if they can go to a much new OpenSSL it's much less likely they're suffering.
2. Trust store updates. By now, just telling them to rip out the (expiring) DST Root CA X3 cert if they have it might be easier than trying to figure out whether it's safe to leave it. But keep it or leave it, they need to make sure they trust ISRG Root X1.