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> What step fails? I already wrote it out twice, and manquer provided a link to the paper (which is also linked from your page, https://bootstrappable.org/ htt
by IncRnd 5y ago
> What step fails?
I already wrote it out twice, and manquer provided a link to the paper (which is also linked from your page, https://bootstrappable.org/ https://bootstrappable.org/) called Reflections on Trusting Trust. This is not a supply chain issue but a trust issue. This is the very reason Thompson's paper was called, Reflections on Trusting Trust.
If you still cannot see this, look at PKI and ask where trust can be broken.
- marcodiego 5y agoAFAIK, Reflections on trust supposes a compromised compiler. I do not see how a compiler whose source code is compromised can be compiled with the described steps. At least its hash would not match.
- IncRnd 5y agoThat's not the case. From Reflections: MORAL The moral is obvious. You can't trust code that you did not totally create yourself. (Especially code from companies that employ people like me.) No amount of source-level verification or scrutiny will protect you from using untrusted code. In demonstrating the possibility of this kind of attack, I picked on the C compiler. I could have picked on any program-handling program such as an assembler, a loader, or even hardware microcode. As the level of program gets lower, these bugs will be harder and harder to detect. A well-installed microcode bug will be almost impossible to detect.
- marcodiego 5y agoThat is the point: trust can be reduced to hardware (considering microcode as hardware). Which is much better than hardware and packagers and tools used by packagers.