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A good fingerprint reader is cryptographically bound to the fingerprints stored on the device through e.g. a private key available only to the fingerprint chip.
by mattashii 5y ago
A good fingerprint reader is cryptographically bound to the fingerprints stored on the device through e.g. a private key available only to the fingerprint chip. Replacing the fingerprint reader would therefore require the user to add their fingerprints to the system once again.
- marcodiego 5y agoIs that how it is done these days? Also this will not prevent a physical identical fingerprint model attack: https://www.darkreading.com/endpoint/researchers-fool-biometric-scanners-with-3d-printed-fingerprints https://www.darkreading.com/endpoint/researchers-fool-biomet...
- lom 5y agoI’ve seen the EFF mention that the police is working technologies that will allow them do this amass. Also see the article OP (me) mentioned in link 2. Biometric passwords have less protection under the law in the US.
- mattashii 5y ago> Is that how it is done these days? Well, I don't know the exact specifics, but that's how I would implement security for biometrics input devices. Apart from that, I seem to recall that Apple does something with validating various sensors and rejecting "unknown" sensors (although that might be based on sensor make/model/SN and not necessarily cryptographic) > Also this will not prevent a physical identical fingerprint model attack Correct, but no fingerprint reader that is only a fingerprint reader will prevent such an attack: No lock is made to be unopenable by (a copy of) the key to that lock. If your fingerprint is the key, a good enough physical copy of the fingerprint will open the locked device.