4 ms·

The app can be configured to require a PIN/fingerprint to authenticate you. The 2 factors become control of the phone and your fingerprint.

brendoelfrendo 5y ago
Fingerprint is fine, maybe, sort of, for situations where your threat model doesn't involve someone compelling you to put your finger on the device. But PINs are just a step backward and I'm not sure why we should get on-board with replacing one form of knowledge auth with a weaker form of knowledge auth.
llampx 5y ago
If you have a fingerprint or can hack it, it basically will let you into the phone and into the auth app.
- mattashii 5y ago
  Yep. But no-one ever leaves their fingerprints on their phone, so this is 100% safe. /s
- marcodiego 5y ago
  I always thought fingerprint readers were weaker security than passwords. I mean, fingerprints can be legally obtained and it is much easier to put a hacked fingerprint reader (that always gives your real fingerprint to your device) than breaking strong encryption.
  - mattashii 5y ago
    A good fingerprint reader is cryptographically bound to the fingerprints stored on the device through e.g. a private key available only to the fingerprint chip. Replacing the fingerprint reader would therefore require the user to add their fingerprints to the system once again.
    - marcodiego 5y ago
      Is that how it is done these days? Also this will not prevent a physical identical fingerprint model attack: https://www.darkreading.com/endpoint/researchers-fool-biometric-scanners-with-3d-printed-fingerprints https://www.darkreading.com/endpoint/researchers-fool-biomet...
      - lom 5y ago
        I’ve seen the EFF mention that the police is working technologies that will allow them do this amass. Also see the article OP (me) mentioned in link 2. Biometric passwords have less protection under the law in the US.
      - mattashii 5y ago
        > Is that how it is done these days? Well, I don't know the exact specifics, but that's how I would implement security for biometrics input devices. Apart from that, I seem to recall that Apple does something with validating various sensors and rejecting "unknown" sensors (although that might be based on sensor make/model/SN and not necessarily cryptographic) > Also this will not prevent a physical identical fingerprint model attack Correct, but no fingerprint reader that is only a fingerprint reader will prevent such an attack: No lock is made to be unopenable by (a copy of) the key to that lock. If your fingerprint is the key, a good enough physical copy of the fingerprint will open the locked device.
- marcodiego 5y ago
  Also, whatever is used as password must satisfy at least these 2 requirements: - It should be known only by you and - it should be easy to change in case it is compromised. Fingerprints fails both requirements. They may be good identifiers, but are terrible passwords.
  - Spivak 5y ago
    Why does this idea keep being perpetuated? Biometric auth is not "a picture of my fingerprint is the password." Imagine a human guard tasked with authenticating people with a database of fingerprints. Someone comes up says that they're John Jameson, the guard takes their hand and makes an impression with some ink and paper and then compares it to impression they have on file for Mr. Jameson. Could you hack this system by lifting John's prints? Nope! Why? Because the real trick to biometric auth isn't that your fingerprint is secret, it's that it's somewhere between difficult to impossible (depending on the metric) to produce a living breathing human with the same biometric readings as you. The strength of a biometric auth system is determined by how well it can determine that the reading it's taking is coming from a human. You don't ever have to rotate your fingerprint or your face because it doesn't need to be secret for these systems to work.
    - marcodiego 5y ago
      As I said: fingerprints are good identifiers, not good passwords.

brendoelfrendo 5y ago

Fingerprint is fine, maybe, sort of, for situations where your threat model doesn't involve someone compelling you to put your finger on the device. But PINs are just a step backward and I'm not sure why we should get on-board with replacing one form of knowledge auth with a weaker form of knowledge auth.

llampx 5y ago

If you have a fingerprint or can hack it, it basically will let you into the phone and into the auth app.

mattashii 5y ago
Yep. But no-one ever leaves their fingerprints on their phone, so this is 100% safe. /s
marcodiego 5y ago
I always thought fingerprint readers were weaker security than passwords. I mean, fingerprints can be legally obtained and it is much easier to put a hacked fingerprint reader (that always gives your real fingerprint to your device) than breaking strong encryption.
- mattashii 5y ago
  A good fingerprint reader is cryptographically bound to the fingerprints stored on the device through e.g. a private key available only to the fingerprint chip. Replacing the fingerprint reader would therefore require the user to add their fingerprints to the system once again.
  - marcodiego 5y ago
    Is that how it is done these days? Also this will not prevent a physical identical fingerprint model attack: https://www.darkreading.com/endpoint/researchers-fool-biometric-scanners-with-3d-printed-fingerprints https://www.darkreading.com/endpoint/researchers-fool-biomet...
    - lom 5y ago
      I’ve seen the EFF mention that the police is working technologies that will allow them do this amass. Also see the article OP (me) mentioned in link 2. Biometric passwords have less protection under the law in the US.
    - mattashii 5y ago
      > Is that how it is done these days? Well, I don't know the exact specifics, but that's how I would implement security for biometrics input devices. Apart from that, I seem to recall that Apple does something with validating various sensors and rejecting "unknown" sensors (although that might be based on sensor make/model/SN and not necessarily cryptographic) > Also this will not prevent a physical identical fingerprint model attack Correct, but no fingerprint reader that is only a fingerprint reader will prevent such an attack: No lock is made to be unopenable by (a copy of) the key to that lock. If your fingerprint is the key, a good enough physical copy of the fingerprint will open the locked device.
marcodiego 5y ago
Also, whatever is used as password must satisfy at least these 2 requirements: - It should be known only by you and - it should be easy to change in case it is compromised. Fingerprints fails both requirements. They may be good identifiers, but are terrible passwords.
- Spivak 5y ago
  Why does this idea keep being perpetuated? Biometric auth is not "a picture of my fingerprint is the password." Imagine a human guard tasked with authenticating people with a database of fingerprints. Someone comes up says that they're John Jameson, the guard takes their hand and makes an impression with some ink and paper and then compares it to impression they have on file for Mr. Jameson. Could you hack this system by lifting John's prints? Nope! Why? Because the real trick to biometric auth isn't that your fingerprint is secret, it's that it's somewhere between difficult to impossible (depending on the metric) to produce a living breathing human with the same biometric readings as you. The strength of a biometric auth system is determined by how well it can determine that the reading it's taking is coming from a human. You don't ever have to rotate your fingerprint or your face because it doesn't need to be secret for these systems to work.
  - marcodiego 5y ago
    As I said: fingerprints are good identifiers, not good passwords.