> Based on current evidence we do seem to be soulless biological machines though. We don’t feel like it nor do most of us act like it is, most of the time, but

> Based on current evidence we do seem to be soulless biological machines though. We don’t feel like it nor do most of us act like it is, most of the time, but that doesn’t mean it’s not true. The fact that we (or rather I) have an experience of reality as opposed to not having one is evidence that we are not simply biological machines. And by 'machines' I mean something like Searle's hypothetical Chinese Room, a system that operates based purely on sufficiently complex rules but has no experience of actually speaking Chinese. If you claim this is illusion, then what is experiencing the illusion? [0] At least according to Searle. Other philosophers disagree, as do I. For the purpose of the argument though we will assume there is such a thing as an automata that doesn't have an experience of the world the way you and I do.