>You may have the same soul - for very approximately defined definitions of soul - but you certainly don't have the same identity. This is a contradiction in t

>You may have the same soul - for very approximately defined definitions of soul - but you certainly don't have the same identity. This is a contradiction in terms for me. I have no idea how soul and identity could be different. We apparently think differently. Changing tastes in music or finding out one's response to a new situation are not inconsistencies or changes to identity, from my perspective. I don't understand what you mean about "we can't know" emotional and mental states. I can't know your mental state. But it doesn't mean anything to say I can't know my mental state. Who is "I" then? How can there be a mental state of someone who doesn't exist? If a series of 1000 cars was built, what is the paint code for #1001? I'm doubtful that actions or behaviors can really be inconsistent. I'd prefer to say that when observing someone else, the totality of their actions can be confusing to where I give up trying to model their mental state. But that doesn't mean there isn't one. And sort of, like, the physical world is defined as being consistent, isn't it? Identity has to be based on physical processes, and therefore I think I'd even say that can't be inconsistent. In principle, there would be a set of numbers that would fully describe a person over time, and it would have to satisfy physical law, and that's inherently consistent. What can be inconsistent, I think, is explanations for actions and properties of the self. I think it's good to focus on resolving the reasoning and explanations that are used to rationalize everything, but not to confuse it with one's actions and identity.