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I am no expert on air warfare either, but, in support of your arguments here, I think it is worth pointing out that in the early years of WWII, despite the much
by mannykannot 5y ago
I am no expert on air warfare either, but, in support of your arguments here, I think it is worth pointing out that in the early years of WWII, despite the much-advanced air-warfare technology, neither Germany's bombing of Britain nor Britain's bombing of Germany had the effectiveness that was expected. It is true that Germany made effective use of airplanes in its early invasions, but it did not save them at Stalingrad or Kursk.
One cannot seriously discuss the advantage new technology will bring without considering the opposition's response, which often quickly nullifies the initial advantage, e.g. gas -> gas masks, submarines -> convoys.
- jcranmer 5y agoIn the interwar period, many leading air power theorists were of the opinion that an unrestricted bombing campaign of your enemy's cities would cause them to collapse in a matter of weeks [1]. Needless to say, 100 years of experience in warfare has provided several examples of trying to destroy a country primarily through a bombing campaign, and the number of times this can merely be argued to be successful can be counted on one hand. The number of times it has been unquestionably successful remains at 0. [1] I just re-checked the quotes in J. F. C. Fuller's "The Conduct of War", and the general he quotes gives the timeframe of less than a week, after air superiority has been won, specifically advocating that the war would be won before the enemy has mobilized.
- choeger 5y agoYou should read up on modern (not Soviet) accounts of the battle of Kursk. The effect of the Luftwaffe was huge.
- mannykannot 5y agoAs it failed to stop the Red Army's advance to and into Germany, that is beside the point here. In fact, as Wikipedia puts it "The Battle of Kursk was the first time in the Second World War that a German strategic offensive was halted before it could break through enemy defences and penetrate to its strategic depths. Though the Red Army had succeeded in winter offensives previously, their counter-offensives after the German attack at Kursk were their first successful summer offensives of the war." [my emphasis] The sources given for these observations are not Soviet ones. So the more you emphasize the role of the Luftwaffe at Kursk, the more you support my case!
- choeger 5y agoYou really ought to read up on the matter. Kursk was, on the onset, impossible odds. Yet the Wehrmacht inflicted massive casualties with relatively small own losses. If I am not mistaken, the level of destruction was not reached on a battlefield again until the first US-Iraq war. Of course the German offensive didn't succeed, but the Russian counter offensive didn't, either. The whole thing was a total strategic Soviet success, but operationally and tactically it demonstrated the value of a mechanized, combined-arms firepower doctrine.
- mannykannot 5y agoAnd why ought I read up on the matter? Am I going to find out, contrary to what I have been led to believe, that the Germans' mastery of a mechanized, combined-arms firepower doctrine saved them from the Red Army?