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This is not only the territory of dubiously useful counterfactuals, but also doesn't square with the actual history of the day. Some of the faults I see with t

This is not only the territory of dubiously useful counterfactuals, but also doesn't square with the actual history of the day. Some of the faults I see with this way of thinking: A. The pieces of modern 'combined arms' forces, like tanks and war planes, were not advanced to the point where they could achieve the 'combined' part. The entire reason why these weapons work so effectively in modern doctrine is that they operate together with infantry. Tanks of this era were brand new, extremely experimental weapons. They moved at the speed of a 100+ year old tractor. This is not a weapon yet capable of being deployed en masse and just winning the war like that. B. To suggest that these weapons were 'capable' of winning the war, but just weren't deployed correctly or in enough numbers is to project incompetence on to military leaders of the past. Clearly they did try these things, and they did not work. There was no reason to expect that if tanks with 1918 level technology didn't achieve much success, then they should have just tried throwing more at the equation, or to expect modern combined arms doctrine to just spring out of their minds fully formed. C. It's been touched on in the (very good) original post, but the land of the western front, torn up by artillery and barbed wire, was not the suitable environment for mechanized warfare to be developed. Doctrine can't spring forth from nowhere to solve a problem. It has to accompany these changes in military technology under conditions that allow commanders to experience what this technology is and isn't good at, and 100 year old trucks were certainly not going to be great at blitzing across crater-strewn Flanders. D. You suggest this all may have been a matter of no ready-to-go industry existing for these new weapons. I would argue that if there was ever a thought they had a solution involving these tools, the massive armament industry of WW1 could easily have been brought to bear upon making them. Now I am really, really far from a military aircraft history guy. So I don't feel super comfortable commenting on the air theory, but from my limited reading I believe the problem to be one of engine design and general new-ness of these things as weapons themselves (just like tanks). The Wrights flew their powered plane in the end of 1903. WW1 is almost exactly 10 years after that. Again, it is unreasonable to expect the technology to be at the point to support modern doctrine. These were brand new, and engines were simply not both strong and light enough to create the kinds of war planes you'd see in the next 30 years. To summarize though, again, I think the most salient point is really just that people of the past are often not as illogical about these things as you might expect. They wanted to end the war. If there was even a sliver of a chance of any of these weapons being 'the' breakthrough, they would have pushed the technology as far as it can go to find it. The fact that they did not, is evidence enough. If the solution was simple, it wouldn't have been a stalemate.

WesleyLivesay 5y ago
This is a great response. I often describe this as the 'video game tech tree' problem. It is very easy to know where to put time/resources when you know what the next step of the tech tree is and how it will help solve problems. At the time it is far more difficult to know which of the many possible options will result in a tool/outcome that will be the solution to the current problems.
mannykannot 5y ago
I am no expert on air warfare either, but, in support of your arguments here, I think it is worth pointing out that in the early years of WWII, despite the much-advanced air-warfare technology, neither Germany's bombing of Britain nor Britain's bombing of Germany had the effectiveness that was expected. It is true that Germany made effective use of airplanes in its early invasions, but it did not save them at Stalingrad or Kursk. One cannot seriously discuss the advantage new technology will bring without considering the opposition's response, which often quickly nullifies the initial advantage, e.g. gas -> gas masks, submarines -> convoys.
- jcranmer 5y ago
  In the interwar period, many leading air power theorists were of the opinion that an unrestricted bombing campaign of your enemy's cities would cause them to collapse in a matter of weeks [1]. Needless to say, 100 years of experience in warfare has provided several examples of trying to destroy a country primarily through a bombing campaign, and the number of times this can merely be argued to be successful can be counted on one hand. The number of times it has been unquestionably successful remains at 0. [1] I just re-checked the quotes in J. F. C. Fuller's "The Conduct of War", and the general he quotes gives the timeframe of less than a week, after air superiority has been won, specifically advocating that the war would be won before the enemy has mobilized.
- choeger 5y ago
  You should read up on modern (not Soviet) accounts of the battle of Kursk. The effect of the Luftwaffe was huge.

WesleyLivesay 5y ago

This is a great response. I often describe this as the 'video game tech tree' problem. It is very easy to know where to put time/resources when you know what the next step of the tech tree is and how it will help solve problems. At the time it is far more difficult to know which of the many possible options will result in a tool/outcome that will be the solution to the current problems.

mannykannot 5y ago

I am no expert on air warfare either, but, in support of your arguments here, I think it is worth pointing out that in the early years of WWII, despite the much-advanced air-warfare technology, neither Germany's bombing of Britain nor Britain's bombing of Germany had the effectiveness that was expected. It is true that Germany made effective use of airplanes in its early invasions, but it did not save them at Stalingrad or Kursk. One cannot seriously discuss the advantage new technology will bring without considering the opposition's response, which often quickly nullifies the initial advantage, e.g. gas -> gas masks, submarines -> convoys.

jcranmer 5y ago
In the interwar period, many leading air power theorists were of the opinion that an unrestricted bombing campaign of your enemy's cities would cause them to collapse in a matter of weeks [1]. Needless to say, 100 years of experience in warfare has provided several examples of trying to destroy a country primarily through a bombing campaign, and the number of times this can merely be argued to be successful can be counted on one hand. The number of times it has been unquestionably successful remains at 0. [1] I just re-checked the quotes in J. F. C. Fuller's "The Conduct of War", and the general he quotes gives the timeframe of less than a week, after air superiority has been won, specifically advocating that the war would be won before the enemy has mobilized.
choeger 5y ago
You should read up on modern (not Soviet) accounts of the battle of Kursk. The effect of the Luftwaffe was huge.