If we confirm that the copies are ‘perfect’ (which is implied when we think about teleportation), then every entity has every right to consider themself ‘the or

If we confirm that the copies are ‘perfect’ (which is implied when we think about teleportation), then every entity has every right to consider themself ‘the original’, and at t=t0 they are indeed by definition indistinguishable. They all have a self, but of course it has to be separate from the original. The only alternatives are that they develop no self, then by definition they are not proper copies, or they would all share a single mind which makes no sense whatsoever. If I install the same piece of software on ten identical computers, they will all think they’re the same, because they have the same serial number, hash, etc. but obviously they’re different instances. I see that accepting this could be problematic if you think you need some divine spark (how are twins reconciled? They’re one individual split in two, after conception). However, I still don’t see a paradox.