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What are the political costs of blockading the Malacca straights? China sentiment worldwide is at rock-bottom due to wolf warrior diplomacy and belt and road c
by dnautics 5y ago
What are the political costs of blockading the Malacca straights? China sentiment worldwide is at rock-bottom due to wolf warrior diplomacy and belt and road corruption, Xinjiang, etc. Hell, public sentiment for boycotting the Beijing Olympics is >50% in Canada. If china invades Taiwan, I'd be surprised if most countries don't jump at the chance to screw over china.
It might not even be necessary to work that hard at a blockade. If there's any hot action in the south china sea, most oil shippers are going to cease operations voluntarily because they don't want their ship to be accidentally shot down by either side.
>100 days
That's 3 months. Not very much.
- sudosysgen 5y agoWhat countries are downstream of the Malacca Straits? The world is much more than the US and Canada. The EU itself would face a terrible economic crisis. There's no way of blockading only China. The US has no way of knowing if a boat is going/coming from Cambodia, Vietnam, or even South Korea without stationing assets very close to the border with China, which we know is really not practical. The vast majority of countries in the world will simply not care if China invades Taiwan. Why would they? The BRI is actually seen as a positive, not negative, by a lot of people in developing countries that benefit from pretty good deals and development. China knows it needs the BRI to hedge against a US blockade and thus make it not worthwhile, so they're willing to give pretty good deals comparatively. I assure you, the vast majority of the world will not mind. What they will mind is the US blocking off 30-50% of their foreign trade in a blockade and causing a massive economic downturn. There's no way around that. 100 days of straight reserves is a lot. If they're still importing from Russia at full capacity that's even more, around 150 days, and they would certainly increase the reserves before any kind of invasion. That's without rationing, which they certainly would do. By rationing non essential civilian use, and increasing Russian imports as well as domestic production, and increasing reserves, they would last a year. That's a full year for them to construct more domestic exploitation, more imports from Russia and Central Asia, and alternatives. The war might very well be over by then as both sides run out of precision munitions. As far as action in the SCS, I just don't see it lasting more than a month, unless the US is trying to impose a blockade. What would the contention be once China has invaded Taiwan? There is no way the US could invade and liberate Taiwan back, so what would be the point? Just shooting at civilian ships and try not to get found from a submarine while lacking air superiority surrounded by Chinese sonobuoys and UUVs? I don't see the strategic goal that would lead to a confrontation in the SCS for months after the fall of Taiwan, nor do I see how US surface ships could survive. As for companies not wanting to do it, have you considered that many of those companies are Chinese? What do you expect them to do, nothing? Some are even Chinese state-owned enterprises. I could even see the PLA making these ships unmanned as bait in the SCS to get submarines to shoot at them with passive sonar rigged in unbeknownst to the submarine, triggering a launch of China's air-launched anti-submarine torpedoes.