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But Hasegawa and other historians have shown that Japan’s leaders were in fact quite savvy, well aware of their difficult position, and holding out for strategi
by Mz 15y ago
But Hasegawa and other historians have shown that Japan’s leaders were in fact quite savvy, well aware of their difficult position, and holding out for strategic reasons. Their concern was not so much whether to end the conflict, but how to end it while holding onto territory, avoiding war crimes trials, and preserving the imperial system. The Japanese could still inflict heavy casualties on any invader, and they hoped to convince the Soviet Union, still neutral in the Asian theater, to mediate a settlement with the Americans. Stalin, they calculated, might negotiate more favorable terms in exchange for territory in Asia. It was a long shot, but it made strategic sense.
This piece sounds very plausible to me and helps make this new theory sound fairly solid as far as the ultimate conclusion that Russia's declaration of war was the final straw. The article really doesn't convince me that the nuclear bombs played no role. It indicates that after the first one was dropped, Japan sent a message to their ambassador in Moscow asking him to press for a reply from the Russians. The article says: The bombing added a “sense of urgency,” Hasegawa says, but the plan remained the same. So there was concern, there was a reaction, but apparently not what we have been historically taught that the bombs simply caused the Japanese to cave in horror and surrender unconditionally. No, they opted to surrender to the US in preference to a Russian invasion as the lesser evil. It sounds like a savvy decision making process when faced with sucky options.