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That's where Hanson's idea of futarchy (as opposed to prediction markets) comes into play. You don't bet on an event A, you bet on A given B or on A given not B
by hugh-avherald 5y ago
That's where Hanson's idea of futarchy (as opposed to prediction markets) comes into play. You don't bet on an event A, you bet on A given B or on A given not B. So the prediction market wouldn't be for an asset paying $1 if there's a streaker, but for two assets: one which pays $1 if there's a streaker given there's 100 or more security guards and $1 if there's a streaker given there's fewer.
- lvass 5y agoSo the potential streaker has one extra step, discovering the amount of guards, before placing the bet? How does this solve the problem instead of creating even more of a plutocracy? Gaming the system will always be possible, except for a smaller amount of people.
- hugh-avherald 5y agoThe market is closed before the number of guards is decided. Indeed the whole point of the market is to decide the number of guards. The potential streaker would have to bet in both markets, so won't affect the difference in prices between the markets.
- Imnimo 5y agoWell, but the reason we want to decide the number of guards in the first place is that we want to prevent a streaker. If, in order to decide the number of guards, we use a process that increases the odds of a streaker, isn't that counterproductive?
- pdonis 5y agoI don't see how this helps any with the underlying problem. All it does is introduce an additional incentive for another party to manipulate the outcome in order to win money by betting: whoever runs the security guards.
- hugh-avherald 5y agoIn this scenario, the person running the security guards is the one organizing the market.
- pdonis 5y agoWhich just means the person organizing the market now has an incentive to manipulate it. Doesn't seem like a good idea.