> a lot more uncertainty than you might assume There is also more assumed uncertainty than reality. In terms of degrees of espionage, modern PRC's intelligence

> a lot more uncertainty than you might assume There is also more assumed uncertainty than reality. In terms of degrees of espionage, modern PRC's intelligence gathering on TW is probably the most comprehensive apparatus anywhere. Every few years, minister level intelligence assets get exposed in TW defense. There is blind assumption and there is consensus for those that follow the space. There aren't any credible analysis that suggests TW has hidden nukes or can conduct breakout nuke development without PRC being aware. > would they act See edit of all the times PRC acted, with explicit prior warnings on when core redlines are crossed. It's not only precedent but interventions are near certainty. Respectfully, TW trying to bait PRC with false nuclear proliferation is counterproductive, just about the only consensus security council states and current nuclear powers have is they don't want more mid-tier nations getting the bomb. Of all the reasons the PRC could get away with attacking TW with relatively little cost, stopping nuclear proliferation is at the top.