Strange the article doesn't mention CALEA[0] for the United States. This is what actual local/state/federal law enforcement uses (with a court order) for data/v

Strange the article doesn't mention CALEA[0] for the United States. This is what actual local/state/federal law enforcement uses (with a court order) for data/voice intercept. What's interesting about CALEA is it (essentially) requires compliance via devices with "LI" (lawful intercept) functionality and/or third party providers to provide "tap/trace" functionality in such a way that it's not even visible/detectable to the network provider, network admins, etc. This LI functionality is typically implemented at the network device/operating system level as defined by an ETSI standard[1]. I've never implemented it personally but from what I understand it basically allows for an LI provider to siphon off tap/trace data with something like a VPN back to the LI provider, who is also the contact for response to warrants, etc. So what happens is the LI provider gets a warrant for something like "give us everything to/from this device or phone number". The provider verifies the legality of the warrant, uses the ETSI standard to one or more devices on the provider network, receives the data, and then provides it to law enforcement (in real time). The network provider isn't even aware of the court order. The old trope in Mafia movies of "I got a guy inside the phone company to tip us off" hasn't been accurate since CALEA came into effect in 1995. [0] https://www.fcc.gov/public-safety-and-homeland-security/policy-and-licensing-division/general/communications-assistance https://www.fcc.gov/public-safety-and-homeland-security/poli... [1] https://www.etsi.org/technologies/lawful-interception https://www.etsi.org/technologies/lawful-interception