3 ms·
> The only gap I could fault all involved with would be somehow expecting the unexpected -- that plane hijackers wouldn't be interested in flying the plane to s
by sofixa 5y ago
> The only gap I could fault all involved with would be somehow expecting the unexpected -- that plane hijackers wouldn't be interested in flying the plane to safety, but would instead intentionally fly it into a building.
Sadly it really shouldn't have been unexpected.
> ...between 1994 and 2001 CTC [CIA Counter Terrorism Center] collated no less than twelve specific reports warning that terrorists were scheming to hijack an airliner and fly it into a prestige target. Several of the reports actually named bin Laden and al Qai'da..
(from the book Military Intelligence Blunders and Cover-Ups by John Hughes-Wilson)
The amount of intelligence collected really shouldn't have been missed. There was tons of it, from all sorts of sources, including suspected terrorists on lists that were taking flying courses and asking about flying big airliners, who didn't have any interest in landing or taking-off It was an epic failure on the scale of the US intelligence epic failure of Pearl Harbor.
- ethbr0 5y ago12 reports in 7 years? This is the needle in a haystack of needles problem. Of course it's obvious in hindsight. But cueing the entire civilian ATC / ANG system to potentially shoot airliners out of the sky within 30 minutes? Expecting that to be in place, even with overwhelming in number but unrealized reports, is unrealistic.
- sofixa 5y ago> 12 reports in 7 years? Reports on new capabilities and tactics of a terrorist organisation that has struck US targets and is considered among the most dangerous? And then you have concrete reports on the ground of terrorist-connected people taking flying lessons and asking about bigger planes. Even without hindsight that's pretty obvious things to relate and take note of.
- ethbr0 5y agoThat's making the mistake of assuming these reports were unique in some way, as opposed to being part of a stream of thousands of other reports, some including even more threatening implications. In low signal, high noise scenarios, the hindsight bias is not saying "We should have known this meant something," but rather saying "We should have given this particular thing more attention." In our world, it happens with logs. Post- or during an incident, reading back through a log to find the culprit is trivial. But how easy is it to have a log continually dump to your terminal, all day, for weeks, months, years, and identify the root cause line as it happens and before other monitoring tripwires go off?